Having ruled Japan for the better half of a century, it is no surprise that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has found it difficult to adapt to its role as Japan’s major opposition party.

But with the prospect of further political gridlock, it may be time for the LDP to reconsider its strategy.

At the LDP National Convention last month, Sadakazu Tanigaki, the party’s president, criticised Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for their handling of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and labelled the proposed increase in Japan’s consumption tax rate ‘an empty cheat’. In order to return the LDP to power, Tanigaki has also vowed to pressure Noda to dissolve the lower house and call a snap election.

This uncompromising stance is largely in line with the obstructionist attitude adopted by the LDP when Noda’s predecessor, Naoto Kan, was in power, and is likely to continue throughout Noda’s term. Given that the government lacks an upper-house majority, the LDP can effectively block any of the government’s bills, but there are several reasons why this strategy is unlikely to pay strong electoral dividends in the long run.

First, Noda’s major policy agenda is ambitious in scope. He has proposed bills to raise the consumption tax rate from 5 per cent to 10 per cent by 2015, reform independent administrative institutions, reduce the salaries of government employees and advance Japan’s position in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Regardless of whether it can be achieved, Noda’s vow to break with ‘the politics that can’t decide’ and push forward with reform clearly puts the LDP on the defensive. Tanigaki has repeatedly warned that ‘Japan could experience an irreversible national crisis’ in pursuing Noda’s policies. But his party’s unwillingness to reach a compromise with the government exposes the LDP to criticisms of not acting in the national interest. If the prospect of a national crisis does not spur the LDP to enter negotiations with the government over the consumption tax, then what will?

Second, a number of Noda’s policies were either previously supported by the LDP, or overlap with the party’s traditional support base. Tanigaki has rejected talks with the ruling party on the grounds that there is no mention of the proposed consumption tax increase in the DPJ’s 2009 manifesto, but the LDP strongly pushed for the very same proposal in the 2010 House of Councillors election. Further, the DPJ’s support for Japan’s entry into the TPP negotiations, comprehensive reform of the social security system and the reduction of government employees’ wages leaves little room for the LDP to carve out a viable policy alternative. If the DPJ now represents the party of fiscal austerity, trade liberalisation and administrative reform, where exactly does the LDP fit into Japan’s party system, and how can it distinguish itself from the ruling party?

Third, despite declining electoral support for Noda’s cabinet, the LDP has failed to make the most of recent political events and increase its own standing. According to a recent Yomiuri Shimbun poll, support for the DPJ has risen from 22 per cent to 25 per cent, while the LDP’s popularity fell from 19 per cent to 17 per cent. Although one would expect the opposition to benefit in light of the planned austerity measures, this has not been the case; however unpopular a tax increase might be, 73 per cent of respondents still agree that the LDP-Komeito coalition should participate in policy deliberations with the government. It might seem obvious, but opposition for opposition’s sake is unlikely to return the LDP to power.

But with Tanigaki at the helm, the LDP’s current strategy of obstruction may be the best the party can hope for. Tanigaki’s term as LDP president expires in September (while Noda can delay calling an election until August next year). So failure to force an early election may seriously undermine Tanigaki’s prospects for re-election as party president, particularly as the current LDP secretary-general, Nobuteru Ishihara, has expressed interest in replacing Tanigaki.

Failure to match Noda’s policy agenda with sensible counter-proposals, added to the LDP’s refusal to debate the government’s key initiatives, may only further weaken the LDP’s electoral position at a time when smaller opposition parties are merging and forging new cooperative strategies in order to court the conservative vote. The People’s New Party and Stand Up Japan! have agreed to launch a new political party in March with Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro Ishihara. And Your Party, a centre-right party made up of former LDP members, also announced that it will be cooperating with Osaka’s increasingly popular mayor, Toru Hashimoto, and his party (Osaka Restoration Association) in the next election.

Still, a much larger problem is that for the LDP to only engage in policy-based discussions once in power belies the opposition’s role in a parliamentary system. It also offers little hope for the majority of Japan’s independent voters that the current LDP would govern any differently from the LDP that lost in the general election of 2009.

Kevin Placek is a recent graduate of the University of Melbourne, where he completed a Master of International Relations specialising in Japanese prime-ministerial politics.

1. The next Democratic Party of Japan prime minister
2. The Democratic Party of Japan’s credibility crisis
3. Japan must support liberal international order

Malaysians expressed a collective sigh of relief when Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim was acquitted of sodomy charges in early January.

Their groan of dismay over the prosecution’s subsequent decision to appeal was equally palpable.

For most Malaysians, despite being divided in their opinions of Anwar, the acquittal marked a chance to move away from the sleazy politics that has long dominated daily life. Now, they expect more of the same. Aware of public exasperation, Prime Minister Najib Razak was quick to seize on the not guilty verdict as proof of his ‘reformist’ agenda and Malaysia’s supposedly independent judiciary. But the appeal leaves him stranded, inclined to delay calling a general election, and acutely aware that he is under threat as much from within his own ranks as from the opposition. It seems likely that Najib will win the next election, but unless he scores big — which seems unlikely — his leadership could be at risk.

The old guard in Najib’s United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the core of the Barisan Nasional coalition government, has been trying to have Anwar convicted of sexual misconduct for more than 13 years. His first sodomy trial in the late 1990s was regarded as a miscarriage of justice, and the recently completed second trial was just as dubious, according to international legal and human rights organisations. Kuala Lumpur has a thriving gay club scene and nightlife, and the police — to their credit — do not hound homosexuals. But Anwar was hauled into court twice on a charge of ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment.

The government’s deliberate targeting of Anwar is obvious. His arrest in 2008 came soon after he led a revitalised opposition to unprecedented gains in a general election, depriving the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional of its usual two-thirds majority in parliament. Subsequently, Anwar has spent much of the past three years caught up defending himself in the sodomy trial, when he might have otherwise engaged in consolidating the opposition coalition.

Despite, or perhaps because of, these efforts, the trial has become a liability for Najib. The value in distracting Anwar and trying to knock him out politically has been offset by the damage to Najib’s reputation as a putative reformer. Conscious that the long-term electoral trend is running against the ruling coalition, which has held power since independence in 1957, Najib has positioned himself as an agent of change, who is in touch with Malaysia’s younger generation. He has attempted to roll back unpopular elements of an affirmative action program designed to benefit the country’s majority ethnic Malay community, liberalise press restrictions and replace controversial security laws, including detention without trial. Still, Najib is yet to convert the rhetoric of reform into reality, which he must do to win back the alienated centre of Malaysian politics, where cynicism and anger run deep.

Najib is encountering entrenched opposition within UMNO, particularly from conservatives who favour continued Malay privileges and the flow of patronage to the party faithful. These older UMNO Malays and their supporters in the business world and bureaucracy — especially the police and prosecutors — strongly objected to Anwar being freed and lobbied hard and successfully for the appeal. In the end, Najib will lose the most. It seems he failed to stand up to these factions — again — and lost the public relations gains from Anwar’s acquittal.

The loss of the momentum that Anwar’s freedom initially gave Najib may persuade him to wait until later this year to call an election, which must be held by March 2013. Najib must gamble that the electoral climate will improve by this time. But the economy could slow and more political scandals could emerge — rampant corruption involving UMNO politicians has already hurt his government.

Free to campaign, Anwar will lift the spirits of the three-party opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition. But he is looking and sounding tired, and his own People’s Justice Party is rife with factionalism and squabbling. Although Anwar said recently: ‘My gut tells me we will win [the election]’, most analysts believe he will fall short, even if not by much.

While the opposition will surely live to fight another day, Najib may not have it so easy, even if he wins. Only the recovery of a two-thirds parliamentary majority will ensure his continued leadership of UMNO and Malaysia. Failing this, Najib could face pressure to step aside if he loses more seats, a fate that befell Abdullah Badawi, his predecessor.

Barry Wain is Writer-in-Residence at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

1. A low note for Malaysia as Anwar trial starts
2. Malaysia’s politics post-Anwar Ibrahim
3. Politics without priorities in Malaysia

The death of Kim Jong-il, though not entirely unexpected given the state of his health following a debilitating stroke in August 2008, has had a powerful psychological impact both domestically and globally.

His death leaves a huge vacuum not only in the North Korean psyche, but in the system that he embodied.

As North Korea comes to grips with his death, the new government headed by Kim Jong-un — Kim Jong-il’s youngest son and successor — must begin navigating the grave challenges that North Korea faces at home and abroad.

The Kim Jong-un regime now stands at a crossroads, and the country’s future depends on whether it looks to the past or to the future in searching for the solutions to its enormous and pressing problems.

Perhaps the most serious challenge facing the new regime is the ongoing, deep-rooted economic problems that have led to chronic energy and food shortages. While North Korea rebounded from economic collapse in the late 1990s, its economy continues to be grossly insufficient in meeting the people’s basic needs. With a quarter of its population starving, the regime presides over a country where the lives of ordinary people are consumed by an ongoing struggle for subsistence.

Private markets sprang up during the 1990s as a mechanism to cope with the food shortage caused by the collapse of the Public Distribution System, and were it not for these markets, the suffering of the people would be even worse today. To make up for the shortfall of its moribund economy, North Korea is still dependent on external food and energy aid, of which China remains the majority provider.

The North Korean regime can continue to muddle through by restricting private markets and foreign investment while relying on external aid to keep the economy afloat. Or it can address the root cause of the economic problems by fundamentally changing its system through reform and opening up to foreign trade and investment. As this is the only way the regime can resolve its economic problems over the long term, the policy of muddling through will exacerbate the suffering and continue to erode the regime’s legitimacy.

The second challenge is the ongoing nuclear conflict. In the face of growing external pressure to abandon its nuclear program, North Korea has upped the ante over the past few years by engaging in ever-more serious provocations. These include conducting nuclear and missile tests in 2009; the sinking of a South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 (killing 46); and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 (killing four including two civilians).

These provocations are intended to escalate tension in order to break the deadlock pervading the Six-Party Talks, as well as to bolster the legitimacy of the regime and the leadership succession. But they have led to growing confrontation among all parties to the talks, and this, in turn, has increased the danger of the situation spiralling out of control into a wider conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

As such, the North Korean regime is faced with another stark choice. It can continue to muddle through by fostering conflict and tension in order to neutralise external pressure on North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, thus raising the stakes on the Korean Peninsula to an intolerably dangerous level. Or it can make a strategic choice to give up its nuclear program in return for economic aid, diplomatic ties and security guarantees, laying a solid foundation for creating a viable and secure North Korean state.

Lastly, the regime is faced with the North Korean people’s increased exposure to the outside world. Through a variety of channels — such as cross-border traffic with China, foreign radio broadcasts, expatriate North Korean communities, increasing access to mobile phones and a greater availability of foreign DVDs — the once hermetically sealed society is slowly being pried open. As North Koreans become more knowledgeable about the outside world, the more dissatisfied they will become with their own lives and the North Korean state. The regime can continue its futile effort to control information, or it can harness the increasing flow of information to help develop the country as part of a broader effort to open up North Korean society to the outside world.

While the death of an important historical figure usually marks the end of one era and the beginning of a new one, the death of Kim Jong-il has only increased the urgent need for his successor to make difficult choices. Either the regime must be willing to take the country in a new and bold direction or it must suffer the consequences of maintaining an unsustainable status quo.

Steven Kim is Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu.

1. North Korea: Kim Jong-il snubs Jimmy Carter in lead up to succession
2. North Korea: strategic thinking, strategic response
3. North Korea’s succession gets twisted

As bright as the future may seem for China, crucial reforms are needed in order to maintain its current rate of economic growth and prevent the Chinese economy from falling over like a house of cards.

Some of the most imminent challenges that China faces in the near future include environmental pollution, income inequality, uneven development between rural and coastal areas, and a risky financial system. The central government has already identified these problems, and reforms are now in place — including those contained within China’s twelfth five-year plan announced in March 2011. But widespread corruption continues to undermine the effectiveness of any potential reform.

China’s domestic wealth has increased dramatically. But for some, the limits of transformative growth already seem to have been reached. Even conservative estimates suggest that the 54 million people currently unable to find work will remain in this position for at least another four years. China also runs on a risky financial system. Its banks are hiding piles of non-performing loans — piles built on the prediction that growth will continue to increase indefinitely. Income disparity, unbalanced growth and the need to reform the financial system were issues the IMF emphasised in their Chinese sustainability report. China also faces a grim battle against pollution. The price of rapid economic development is high; water, soil and air contamination puts the health of countless people at risk.

With the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government is setting out an ambitious proposal to put more money in the pockets of the poor and provide incentives to increase domestic consumption. It is also addressing economic restructuring, and tackling pollution by conserving energy and cleaning up the environment.

But corruption has the power to essentially nullify the government’s reform efforts. It is hindering development in remote areas and marginalising the poor. Often, money tagged for environmental programs disappears without making any noticeable impact. Corrupt officials are also obstructing individuals and groups reporting on pollution, and state-owned commercial banks are at the disposal of bureaucrats who exploit their position to benefit themselves. Above all, the biggest danger of corruption is that it undermines the very legitimacy of the government and key reformers.

One of Hu Jintao’s first addresses to party leaders in 2012 included an order to fight harder against corruption. The fight is crucial, but a poor record of success gives little reason for optimism. There are different views on why this battle is not being won. While some say it comes hand in hand with the benefits of an otherwise successful system, others say it is the legacy of extreme poverty during the Cultural Revolution. And others just believe it to be a part of Chinese culture. Be that as it may, the corrosive effects of corruption on government reforms, the economy and the reputation of the party are undeniable.

China’s previous efforts to curb corruption have focused on toughening related penalties, even resorting to capital punishment. But this approach has proved unsuccessful. Rather, transparency and public accountability are more effective in fighting corruption. And while China’s authoritarian leadership provided fast and comprehensive reforms, which turned the impoverished state into a superpower, accountability has little place within authoritarian regimes. This is why reform in China is so difficult.

China does not have to become a Western-style democracy; it should find a way to implement the idea of public accountability within its own system to allow for public scrutiny and expose corruption where it thrives. Channels that encourage credible and accurate reporting without fear of being labelled ‘anti-government’ have to be built. China will need to implement these reforms without forgoing the very characteristics that allowed for its economic development.

Failure to effectively curb corruption risks widespread public dismay with the country’s political leadership. Corruption is skimming away the resources allocated for China’s urgently needed reforms, and while it may not be the country’s biggest problem, it is seriously hindering efforts to tackle more-imminent ones. Consequently, success in curbing corruption is vital not only for China but also for the rest of an increasingly China-dependent world.

Michel May is a MEXT scholar and a Masters student in international relations and Asia-Pacific studies at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.

1. Indian corruption: Time to fight back
2. Markets and corruption in Indonesia
3. Vietnam’s endless corruption campaign

Malaysia recently soared into the headlines after Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim was acquitted of sodomy charges — although the prosecution has already filed for appeal.

The case is entirely political and reflects the government’s willingness to use the judiciary for political ends. Malaysia is set to enter the most competitive elections it has ever faced — likely to be held before June or else pushed off until 2013 — and each side has a fighting chance to win.

Malaysian politics is dirty. Murder, sodomy, secret trysts, sex videos and conspiracy are all commonplace, and corruption scandals occur regularly. Both sides wallow in this political gutter, each trying to darken the reputation of the other, and not fully appreciating how much the system as a whole has been damaged. The acquittal provided the government with an opportunity to take the high road and move away from this negative approach to politics. Instead, it opted to appeal — despite the shabbiness of the evidence.

Concerns are now focusing on the integrity of the electoral process. The government is mooting reforms but the problems are vast, from the administrative neutrality to vote buying. As the system becomes more competitive, political institutions involved in anti-corruption and the rule of law have increasingly been compromised, with the government putting pressure on institutions such as the civil service to toe the line.

The upcoming election will revolve around the two leaders tapping into their own popularity bases, as politics in Malaysia is highly personalised. Both men have been damaged by character assassinations, and will have to work hard to win support. The test now is whether either candidate will move beyond a largely self-centred campaign and articulate the solutions his leadership can offer. The country’s problems are well known — including the need for economic reform and improved race relations, coupled with growing inequality — but, sadly, the policy options each side promise to pursue are unclear.

Anwar Ibrahim’s strength has been his charisma, and he succeeded in consolidating his support base through martyr politics. Nevertheless, Anwar’s reputation suffered during the trial, and he has a long road ahead to win over new supporters — especially in rural areas, where the government media remains dominant.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Najib Razak faces a trust deficit, which seems to be growing at the same rate as the inconsistencies in his reform policies. It remains unclear what he stands for, and his reliance on handouts to woo voters reflects weakness, not strength.

Malaysian politics is also highly polarised. Both sides can expect support from around 35 per cent of the electorate, with the remaining third in the middle. But in keeping their primary support bases happy, Malaysia’s leaders have alienated the center — and a strategy aimed at the middle ground risks alienating the base. To win the upcoming election, both leaders will need to meet the expectations of their support bases, while simultaneously reaching out to those who are ambivalent, tired of over-politicking and looking for more than negativity.

Najib in particular faces the challenge of preserving the loyalty of his own base, as many are resistant to change and adopt reactionary racial positions. They expect Najib to protect their interests, and have shown in recent years that they will remove any leader who fails their expectations. Najib’s attempts to reach the middle ground — in areas of political reform and ethnic relations — compromise the support of his base. He now has limited political space and the result has been inconsistency. In contrast, Anwar has more of an advantage in reaching out to the middle ground due to the fact that his support base wants change. Yet, he too, has to manage the growing anger of his supporters.

In this complicated terrain ethnic politics remain alive and well. Malaysia has three interconnected inter-ethnic dynamics. The first involves race relations between Malays and non-Malay minorities. Then there is the issue of religion, especially relations between Muslims and other religions. Finally, there is the issue of moderates and more extreme views of race and religion in the Malay community. Each of these has become more difficult to manage since the 2008 elections when Najib’s National Front lost its two-thirds hold on seats, and in some instances has led to acts of violence, such as the church bombings in January 2010.

Navigating these divisions is not easy, and the contenders for power ultimately need to include all Malaysians. For Najib, the challenge is to reach out to non-Malays as his coalition has lost the legitimacy to represent them. For Anwar, the challenge is to show that his coalition can represent the positions of different ethnic groups, while also incorporating the country’s Islamists. Especially challenging for both men is how to accommodate more extreme perspectives within a moderate framework, to move Malaysian politics from negativity and anger towards more inclusion and hope.

Bridget Welsh is Associate Professor of Political Science at Singapore Management University.

1. A low note for Malaysia as Anwar trial starts
2. Malaysia’s prime minister loses most from Anwar trial
3. Malaysia: Disputing elections

Indonesians have reason to be both optimistic and pessimistic coming into 2012. The question is: which outlook is more likely to prevail?

In his New Year message, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) requested that all Indonesians work to maintain order. Acknowledging that the country’s political landscape is becoming more heated due to the upcoming general election — scheduled for 2014 — SBY urged Indonesia’s political parties and politicians not to inflame tensions.

Yet, problems in Indonesia are mounting. Hoping not to have more heated situations is not enough; the President is expected to do more. In 2011, many persistent problems were not dealt with, and corruption is still the biggest challenge in the country. Though Indonesia’s rating in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index improved slightly from 2.8 in 2010 to 3.0 in 2011, deep problems remain. Junior bureaucrats were found to possess billions of rupiahs in their savings accounts; wealth which is largely incompatible with their standard salaries. The wife of a former deputy police chief facilitated billions of rupiahs worth of grafts for members of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). And the head of a public elementary school stole huge amounts of public money which was supposed to be used for the school.

Mahfud M.D., the chairman of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court, in December 2011 noted that many state institutions appear to have been ‘contaminated’ by corruption viruses. Out of the several judicial authorities dealing with anti-corruption legal actions — the National Police, the Attorney General’s Office and the Corruption Eradication Commission — only the latter stands strong, even though it is also under attack by many lawmakers, who wish to weaken it.

In 2012, Indonesia should look to its neighbours, including Singapore and Australia, in its effort to deal with corruption. Indonesia should not feel awkward about learning from other countries. It is better to ‘lower’ the country’s dignity for some time in order to subsequently reach a more dignified status.

Human rights also demand greater attention, particularly after the recent bloody clashes involving citizens, corporations and police authorities. State authorities have been found guilty of human rights abuses in some recent cases, such that national and international attention remains focused on Indonesia. Some progress has been made, with reforms instituted since 1998 increasing the freedom of the press, and the public have also become more critical of human rights abuses perpetrated by the authorities.

This year may also see a possible breakout among the governing coalition parties, with the potential to shake the foundations of SBY’s government. This could be sparked by the Bank Century saga — the bank for which Indonesia’s previous government authorised a large bailout. Even though Indonesia survived the financial crisis — due perhaps to its bailout policy — some politicians in the DPR remain committed to prosecuting the policy makers responsible for the move, of whom are members of the current government. Interestingly, the strongest critics of the policy are members of the Golkar Party and Prosperous Justice Party, which are both members of the governing coalition. Either way, Indonesian politics will undoubtedly become more heated in 2012. Even though the next general election is two and a half years away, campaigning has already started. Some parties have announced their presidential candidates, whereas others are still in a wait-and-see mode.

Internationally, 2012 will be less hectic than 2011, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN after Indonesia’s stint last year. Another issue that may prove difficult for policy makers is the protection of Indonesian migrant workers abroad. Last year, an Indonesian citizen was beheaded by Saudi authorities, to strong public criticism in Indonesia. The government must nevertheless be commended for its ability to save a number of other workers through its diplomatic missions in Riyadh and Jeddah. But others are still waiting to face court proceedings, with many confronting potential death penalties.

One positive from December 2011 was an increase in Indonesia’s sovereign credit rating. Fitch Ratings increased Indonesia’s ranking from BB+ to BBB- with a stable outlook. The upgrade should provide for increased foreign investment, which in the future can create more jobs. This opportunity shall not be missed or wasted, but it is up to Indonesia’s elites to determine the country’s longer-term direction. Indonesia can move forward, or embrace the status quo. But it is also possible to go backward if care is not taken.

Yasmi Adriansyah is a PhD student at the School of Politics and International Relations, the Australian National University, and Executive Director of Projecting Indonesia. 

1. Markets and corruption in Indonesia
2. Indonesia’s struggle with reform
3. Asia’s mixed outlook for 2012

Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang (KMT) won a double victory at the 14 January elections. Ma was re-elected — albeit with a much smaller margin — and the KMT maintained a reduced majority in the Legislative Yuan.

But this reduced double victory may intensify the double challenge facing Ma and the KMT in his second and final term. As with most incumbents, Ma ran on his first-term record, and particularly his success in calming cross-strait tensions and maintaining Taiwan’s minimal ‘international space’. He achieved this by forging more cooperative relations with China and negotiating cross-strait economic agreements; just as closer economic ties with China have helped Australia ride out the last four years of global turbulence, so it is for the smaller, export-oriented economy of Taiwan.

After eight years of cross-strait tensions under President Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Beijing played along with Ma’s ‘economics-first’ approach to cross-strait relations in the hope that closer economic integration would shift the focus of Taiwan’s interests and politics — which have so far precluded any Taiwanese interest in discussing political agreements with China beyond the vague and disputed 1992 consensus. Beijing also stayed quiet on the lack of progress on Ma’s 2008 campaign promise to negotiate a cross-strait peace agreement, and gave Taiwan some minor wins in expanding its international space.

It is not clear though whether Beijing will be as patient in Ma’s second term, and it may push harder for political discussions. China is not interested in only establishing closer cross-strait economic ties and maintaining the political status quo of separation, even if these are what the Taiwanese want. Many in China believe that Beijing offered Ma and the KMT numerous economic and international diplomatic benefits in his first term, and are frustrated that this has not led to any real progress on political discussions.

Yet, the DPP’s improved performance in 2012 means that it will likely be more difficult for Ma and the KMT to move on political discussions despite pressure from Beijing. Ma’s ‘economics-first’ cross-strait policy may become an ‘economics-only’ cross-strait policy in his second term. The DPP has long predicted that closer economic ties with China will in time erode Taiwan’s autonomy — at the same time as its sense of autonomy and self-identity is growing.

Ma’s 2012 campaign promise was to negotiate a peace agreement with China within the next decade, but only if a Taiwanese referendum supports the commencement of negotiations; the island needs such an agreement, and if it is supervised by Taiwan’s legislative bodies. These conditions provide Ma and the KMT with more than enough wiggle room to move slowly or not at all on this promise over the coming four years. This wiggle room also allowed Ma and the KMT to divert focus from this potential hot-button issue during the presidential campaign.

In Ma’s first term, both China and the majority of Taiwanese citizens were relieved that the cross-strait tensions characteristic of Chen’s two terms were moderated and that the natural and powerful economic complementarities between Taiwan and China became less fettered. It is far from clear that this sense of relief will last his second term. If Beijing pushes harder for political discussions, it may become more difficult to forge additional cross-strait economic agreements, and would certainly reduce Chinese support for expanding Taiwan’s international space. But greater Chinese pressure for political discussions — and no further expansion of Taiwan’s international space — will make it harder for Ma and the KMT to maintain the domestic political support that will be key for the 2016 elections.

Malcolm Cook is Dean at the School of International Studies, Flinders University, and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute.

1. US, China await Taiwan elections with apprehension
2. Taiwan and Hu Jintao’s end-year overtures
3. Taiwan, China, and the WHO

After North Korea’s sinking of a South Korean frigate, Cheonan, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, inter-Korean relations did not improve much in 2011.

There was limited official contact between the South and the North and between the US and the North to discuss the possible resumption of Six-Party Talks or food aid. Pyongyang also continued to decline the request from South Korea and the US to stop uranium enrichment before resuming the Six-Party Talks, a major stumbling block to the process. But the South Korean news agency Yonhap reported on 16 December that North Korea finally agreed to suspend enrichment activities. It was around that time that the US government indicated its decision to provide North Korea with nutritional assistance. These contacts and exchanges seemed to mark the end of acute tension between the two Koreas and between the US and North Korea.

Yet this small progress was overwhelmed a few days later by Kim Jong-il’s sudden death. The news shook the world and attracted great international attention, particularly regarding North Korea’s future under its new leader, Kim Jong-un. Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un — believed to be in his late twenties — received only two years of training before he inherited power.

The world may have to wait at least a year to ascertain the likely future stability of Kim Jong-un’s regime. There may be some short-term stability in a crucial period of power transition like this, but nobody knows whether Kim Jong-un will be able to build his own charisma and solidify his power base by successfully handling the many challenges which face North Korea. These issues include poor economic performance, international isolation, food shortages and changing perceptions of ordinary residents due to an ever-increasing inflow of information from the outside world. Both South Korea and the US delivered a carefully prepared message of condolence to North Korea in the hope of establishing more constructive relations following Kim Jong-il’s death. Predictably, China was the first country to express strong political support for the new leader.

The year 2011 was also an important period of change in domestic politics. South Korean voters sent a strong message of dissatisfaction to politicians from both the ruling and the opposition parties. Though South Korea’s economy performed relatively well compared to other countries in the West, many middle- and lower-class Koreans began to feel the negative impact of widening economic polarisation, convinced that the successful economic performance of big businesses had nothing to do with their own lives. Voters became frustrated by the government’s inability to handle problems such as youth unemployment due to jobless growth, an increasingly poor welfare system for low-income groups and the weakening of small- and medium-size enterprises — not to mention the opposition’s inability to offer viable alternatives.

A political backlash against the Lee government’s pursuit of neo-liberal economic policies could clearly be felt in the recent mayoral election in Seoul, held on 26 October. For the first time in history, a civic activist, Park Won-soon, defeated the ruling-party candidate and was elected as mayor.

Another political surprise for most Koreans in 2011 was the sudden appearance of a medical doctor-turned-software businessman, Ahn Chul-soo, as a very popular political figure. His influence was so substantial that the announcement of his support for Park Won-soon boosted Park’s popularity greatly and helped bring him the election victory. Nobody knows yet whether Ahn, currently a dean at Seoul National University, will run for presidency in 2012. But the phenomenon indicates how much Korean voters are dissatisfied with the political establishment.

Despite the political backlash, South Korea does not seem to have an alternative strategy to the utilisation of economic globalisation to underwrite domestic growth. For example, after a few years of delay and heated political debate in both countries, the US Congress finally ratified the Korea–US FTA in October, with the South Korean National Assembly following suit in November. Conclusion of this FTA has significant implications — not only economically, but also politically. This may be why the Chinese government, too, has been eager to conclude an FTA with South Korea in recent years.

In conclusion, the year 2011 marked an important watershed in inter-Korean relations, domestic Korean politics and Korea’s external economic strategy, but many risks and surprises still appear on the horizon.

Yoon Young-kwan is Director at the Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Republic of Korea from 2003–04.

This article is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead.

1. Russia-North Korea: Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula
2. Military spending and the arms race on the Korean Peninsula
3. Blow-out in inter-Korean relations

In selecting his first cabinet and party executive line-up in September 2011, the most important motivation for Japan’s Prime Minister Noda was intra-party harmony.

His ministers were largely selected to appease political strongman Ichiro Ozawa, who maintains a well-deserved reputation for either running parties or destroying them. Noda’s approach contrasted with his predecessor, Naoto Kan, who followed a ‘datsu Ozawa’ line and sought to exclude Ozawa’s influence from his administration. The result was a series of furious internecine disputes. Ostensibly the fights were about policy; in reality they arose from Ozawa’s grievances about the distribution of power within the party.

If Noda’s first cabinet was selected to keep Ozawa at bay, his recently appointed second cabinet aims to placate the opposition by getting rid of offending ministers. Defence Minister Yasuo Ichikawa and Consumer Affairs Minister Kenji Yamaoka, against whom the upper house passed censure motions last year, were both demoted. By these actions, Noda has kept alive the possibility of constructive negotiations with the opposition on a proposed consumption tax and social welfare-reform legislation. But the opposition will find it hard to agree on any legislation unless they see direct political advantage in doing so. Their primary objective is to bring down the Noda government and force a general election.

Noda paid the price for intra-party harmony the first time round. He appointed Ichikawa and Yamaoka not on the basis of their policy experience or political nous but because of their strong political connections to Ozawa. He also went for political balance in the party, choosing not only Azuma Koshiishi — one of Ozawa’s major supporters and defenders — as DPJ secretary-general, but also anti-Ozawa stalwart Seiji Maehara as chairman of a strengthened DPJ Policy Affairs Research Council.

Noda has also continued the trend begun under Kan toward decentralising the policy-making process, thus strengthening the role of the party as a separate policy organ. These changes reversed earlier reforms instituted under the Hatoyama administration, which sought to centralise policy making in the cabinet and reinforce the prime minister’s executive powers by establishing entities such as the National Policy Unit. By prioritising consensus within the government and the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Noda successfully undercut the executive policy-making power of the Kantei and the cabinet. Unfortunately, Noda soon realised that his administration needed more executive power to carry out difficult tasks such as increasing the consumption tax and engineering Japan’s membership of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Ozawa’s cronies had begun using the consumption tax issue as an excuse to jump ship and form another political party (New Party Kizuna), in addition to another new party led by former Diet member and convicted felon Muneo Suzuki (New Party Daichi-True Democratic Party), which has enlisted two key ex-DPJ Ozawa supporters to its ranks. All the while, Ozawa’s previously muted criticisms have been growing louder and his behind-the-scenes machinations for possible party realignment more apparent.

Now Noda has sought to swing the pendulum back the other way with the appointment of Okada as Deputy Prime Minister and simultaneously to a whole host of other ministerial positions. Okada’s selection signals that Noda feels the need to buttress his policy leadership, but his elevation may also be a sign that Noda recognises his own policy leadership is weak. Okada is the DPJ’s Koizumi — someone who acts on the basis of policy conviction, rather than from the careerist mentality of so many other Japanese politicians.

Okada will certainly add some ballast to the Noda administration, but the downside is that Okada’s policy convictions can lead him to act unilaterally, without clearance from fellow members of the government. Moreover, Ozawa is implacably opposed to Okada given their past dealings: Okada was the principal architect of Ozawa’s suspension from the DPJ in 2011. And even though Ozawa is engaged in a long-drawn-out trial over an alleged money–politics misdemeanour, a wounded lion can still be dangerous. His criticism of the Noda administration may now become stronger after the reshuffle, although it is unlikely to reach the intensity with which he sought to bring down the Kan administration.

It is possible that Noda has repeated his earlier mistake in appointing Naoki Tanaka to replace Yasuo Ichikawa as Minister of Defence. Both Tanaka and Ichikawa have strong connections to Ozawa. Noda made both appointments to appease Ozawa, but Ichikawa’s incompetence on the job came back to bite him. Tanaka has had a singularly undistinguished political career, with his biggest claim to fame being his connection to the Tanaka family — his father-in-law is a former prime minister and his wife Makiko also has a long career in politics. And though Tanaka’s most recent position was as a member of the Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems, he is completely untried and untested in dealing with security issues involving the US.

Normally, cabinet reshuffles are undertaken to breathe new life into governments. It remains to be seen whether Noda’s new line-up achieves this objective. The overwhelming impression is that both Noda and his cabinets are only temporary. The new cabinet is not going to save the Noda government, just extend its life briefly. Its effect will be palliative rather than curative.

Aurelia George Mulgan is Professor at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

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North Korea’s leadership succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un has gone according to script.

The Korean Workers’ Party and the Korean People’s Army are supporting Kim Jong-un as North Korea’s new leader and North Korea’s propaganda machine has not missed a beat in announcing new titles, manufacturing accomplishments and portraying Kim Jong-un as a Great Successor worthy of the name. But despite these efforts, there are two notable missing pieces: Kim Jong-un’s brothers Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-chul. The failure of these brothers to publicly appear at the funeral clarifies that they are excluded from power, but their apparently differing fates raise important questions about Kim Jong-un’s power and the sustainability of his leadership.

Kim Jong-chul, in his thirties, is Kim Jong-il’s second son (the first son of Kim Jong-il’s second wife, Ko Yong-hee, who is also the mother of Kim Jong-un). Although Kim Jong-chul is Kim Jong-un’s elder brother, he is rumoured to have been dismissed by his father as a potential successor for being too effeminate. Kim Jong-chul’s absence is disturbing because it raises questions about how far Kim Jong-un might go to squelch even perceived contenders for power. North Korean purges have historically been ruthless, but family members have usually been exiled rather than executed. Kim Jong-il’s half-brother Kim Pyong-il was assigned to decades of diplomatic service abroad in Europe rather than eliminated. Kim Jong-chul’s fate may hold telling clues to the character of leadership under Kim Jong-un.

If Kim Jong-chul’s silence raises questions, Kim Jong-nam’s visibility poses even more serious challenges. Kim Jong-nam, aged 40, is Kim Jong-il’s child with his first wife, Sung Hae-rim. As Kim Jong-il’s eldest son, Kim Jong-nam is reported to have been groomed for succession until he fell out of favour in 2001, after being detained at Narita Airport in Japan with a fake passport. Since that time, he has lived in apparent exile in Macao and Beijing. Kim Jong-nam has emerged as a surprisingly voluble critic of North Korea’s leadership succession, directly challenging the legitimacy and capability of Kim Jong-un as a leader. Tokyo Shimbun journalist Yoji Gomi quoted an e-mail from Kim Jong-nam received on 3 January, in which Kim Jong-nam states that ‘I expect the existing ruling elite to follow in the footsteps of my father while keeping the young successor as a symbolic figure . . . It’s difficult to accept a third-generation succession with normal reasoning’, he added. He also said he doubted that a young successor ‘with some two years of training can retain the absolute power’. (Gomi’s book, based on several years of e-mail exchanges with Kim Jong-nam, was published a few days ago in Japanese.)

This forthright public assessment of North Korea’s succession makes Kim Jong-nam the foremost external critic of Kim Jong-un’s succession and a direct challenger to the viability of Kim Jong-un’s leadership. It directly contradicts North Korean efforts to burnish Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy, and raises questions about whether sibling rivalry might be a sign of discord among Pyongyang’s elites.

External public criticism of the succession cannot be viewed as helpful to Kim Jong-un’s efforts to consolidate power, and it is presumably in Kim Jong-un’s interest to prevent his older brother from providing ongoing commentary regarding his succession, if for no other reason than that quieting Kim Jong-nam would be one means of proving that Kim Jong-un is not a puppet or ‘symbol’ of the North Korean elite.

Kim Jong-nam’s public criticisms of the succession from his base in China also raise the question of who is Kim Jong-nam’s protector, especially given rumours last year that Kim Jong-un had instigated purges against leading supporters of Kim Jong-nam in Pyongyang. China presumably sees utility in protecting Kim Jong-nam — as a reform-minded Kim family member who is indebted to China — as a potential alternative leader if Kim Jong-un’s leadership fails. A more complicated factor is that in 2002 and 2003, shortly following his exile from Pyongyang, Kim Jong-nam appeared to have an open line of communication from Beijing with his uncle Jang Sung-taek and his aunt Kim Kyong-hui, who are now critical supporters of Kim Jong-un.

It is ironic that Kim Jong-nam is able to robustly exercise his freedom of speech from his home base in China despite his presumed dependence on China to allow him permanent residency in that country. This circumstance complicates Kim Jong-un’s ability to silence Kim Jong-nam as compared to Kim Jong-chul, but it also raises a potentially awkward situation for China at a time when North Korea’s leadership surely seeks assurances that China is not hedging its support for Kim Jong-un.

Scott A. Snyder is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on US–Korea Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.

This article was first published here on the Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog.

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