The whirlwind visit of President Barack Obama to Australia on the way to the East Asia Summit in Indonesia last November, many believe, forever changed the Asia Pacific strategic landscape with a re-assertion of American primacy and power in Asia.

What was the thinking behind the moves that Obama announced in Canberra and how will it shape Southeast Asia’s strategic future?

American power is already well entrenched in Asia and the Pacific. A modest elevation of American troop presence on rotation and training in northern Australia — one concrete outcome of the visit — will have at most a marginal impact on the immediate strategic landscape. But Mr Obama’s visit, and in particular his declaration to Australia’s Parliament that America is ‘all in’ in Asia and the Pacific, changed the tone of the contest for influence between America and China in the region and cast it in more confrontational terms.

In this week’s lead Geoffrey Wade suggests that ‘the Darwin deployment is only one part of a much larger regional strategy, placing US forces far enough from Chinese missiles to be comfortable, but still sufficiently near to maritime Southeast Asian allies to swiftly engage if necessary. The proposed stationing of the US Navy’s newest littoral combat ships in Singapore and the growing American naval and air force cooperation with Indonesia serve a similar function’.

Wade sees these moves as the beginning of a major increment to US-led East Asian security architecture, involving the creation of a Southeast sector to the ‘Offshore Asia’ security zone. He says that the Northeast American security zone is already entrenched, with US bases and facilities in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and Guam being equipped with over 80,000 service personnel and some of the world’s most advanced defence hardware. The concept of a maritime security umbrella in the Southeast sector of ‘Offshore Asia’ (including the maritime ASEAN states, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and some of the Pacific states) is now seen in Washington as key to maintaining a balance of power in East Asia, and achieving the US’s stated aim of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon.

It might seem puzzling that the US would seek to create a security shield just for ‘Offshore Asia’ — the maritime Southeast Asian states and Australasia. One rationale, according to Wade, is that sea lanes in this region are vital to East Asian economic security, a critical choke point in the flow of Middle Eastern oil and Australian resources to Japan, Korea, and also to China. Maritime routes need to be kept open, ‘especially while the South China Sea disputes continues to fester and demand attention’. More straightforwardly, Wade claims, this new strategy is built on the reality that the US and its allies currently have overwhelming superiority in terms of maritime power. The US Pacific Fleet alone comprises 180 ships, nearly 2000 aircraft and 125,000 service personnel. If the US is to maintain influence and allies in East Asia then it needs to provide these countries with some persuasive evidence of its defence commitment and capacities. The ‘Offshore Asia’ security shield — utilising US ‘Air-Sea Battle’ forces — is a low-cost posture that might convince.

There is related hype among the region’s security community about Australia’s integration into a forward American military hub in Southeast Asia. It is, for the moment, just that: hype and hyperbole. That the Australian base has the advantage of having direct access to the Indian Ocean and, therefore, together with the substantial US naval, air and communications facilities in Diego Garcia, provides the US and its allies with unrivalled access to, and surveillance of, Indian Ocean maritime routes is one dimension of this hype. The reports that B-52 long-range strategic bombers, F/A-18 fighters, C-17 transport aircraft and aerial refuelling aircraft will be stationed at the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Tindal, about 320 kilometres southeast of Darwin is another. At another level altogether are reports suggesting that as part of the increased collaboration, Australia is preparing to purchase or lease Virginia-class nuclear submarines from the US. The antidote to this hype is to take a Bex and have a good lie down. Dreams for the so-called American pivot towards Asia need to be based on firmer fiscal and political stuff.

The mainland Southeast Asian states, as Wade argues, are increasingly embedded in tighter developmental and economic relations with China. In all of that the US is a big player. This is no Chinese imperial plot, as the incautious readers of Wade might conclude: it’s simply the product of the weight of Chinese economic growth interacting with the growth and development ambitions of the Southeast Asian mainland states. It is no different in fact from what is occurring with Japan, Korea, Indonesia or for that matter Australia. In mainland Southeast Asia, it has been promoted with the help of the Asian Development Bank (driven more by Japanese than Chinese agendas), through the creation of a Greater Mekong Subregion linking China and mainland Southeast Asia through economic corridors, which include a Chinese high-speed rail network linking mainland Southeast Asian capitals directly to Yunnan.

Unravelling these economic-security interests from political-security postures is not as easy as it might seem to the economically untutored defence strategist. Put simply, in this theatre, Chinese maritime security interests are legitimately and fundamentally interwoven with East Asian and all our economic security interests.

The complexity is reflected in the caution of Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa about the Canberra declaration, lest ‘these developments were to provoke reaction and counter reaction … a vicious circle or tensions and mistrust or distrust’, even the ‘innocent’ Indonesian suggestion that China might well be invited to join joint exercises at the Australian base. At APEC earlier in November Indonesia’s President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, observed that, while he welcomed America’s regional presence, it was no longer desirable for the region to be dominated by a sole superpower. ‘New power centres are growing rapidly and power relationships are changing and becoming fluid’, he said, calling for what he called a ‘dynamic equilibrium’.

Therein lies the crux of it. Playing one hand into ‘Offshore Asia’ security might be a reasonable first move. But it is certainly not a viable long-term security strategy. Whether that hand will serve the preservation of peace or contribute to future tensions in East Asia will assuredly depend also on whether another hand can be extended to China, one that provides reassurance of its role and interests in regional security.

Peter Drysdale is the Editor of the East Asia Forum.

1. The emergence of ‘Offshore Asia’ as a security concept
2. Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation
3. ASEAN divides

That US engagement with East Asia has grown in recent years is news to none.

But as the dust settles following President Obama’s announcement of the imminent stationing of US marine forces in northern Australia, it is perhaps time to assess what this development might augur for the broader East Asian region in the longer term.

The new deployment will involve the transfer of at least 2500 US marines to northern Australia over the coming five years. US naval and air forces will also increase their presence, and military exercises will be expanded. Given that Darwin is located only 800 kilometres from Indonesia and Timor Leste, reactions within the region have also been intently followed since the 16 November announcement. China is one of the loudest critics, suggesting that the placement of US marines in Darwin ‘indicated the persistence of a “Cold War mentality”’, and that this is the ‘starting point for the return of US armed forces to Asia’, with the aim of ‘sowing discord between China and ASEAN’. While Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa has warned that the action could inflame regional relations, ASEAN states have generally produced cautious statements hiding a muted satisfaction with the announcement. And unsurprisingly, Japan has welcomed the news.

Within Australia itself, there is vigorous debate on the new move. Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University and a former deputy secretary for defence, avers that the deployment decision will have deep consequences for Australia’s relations with China, and that ‘in Washington and in Beijing, this will be seen as Australia aligning itself with an American strategy to contain China’. Clearly, the new deployment is responding to Southeast Asian and Western concerns about China’s burgeoning military and economic power in the region. And when all the euphemisms and rhetoric are stripped away, this is great power rivalry for influence and allies in maritime Asia.

The Darwin deployment is only one part of a much larger regional strategy, placing US forces far enough from Chinese missiles to be comfortable, but still sufficiently near to maritime Southeast Asian allies to swiftly engage if necessary. The proposed stationing of the US Navy’s newest littoral combat ships in Singapore and the growing American naval and air force cooperation with Indonesia serve a similar function.

This episode is the beginning of a major addition to US-led East Asian security architecture, involving the creation of a Southeast sector to the ‘Offshore Asia’ security zone. The Northeast sector is already well in place, with US bases and facilities in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea and Guam being equipped with over 80,000 service personnel and some of the world’s most advanced defence hardware. Establishing a maritime security umbrella in the Southeast sector of ‘Offshore Asia’ (including the maritime ASEAN states, Australia/New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and some of the Pacific states) is now key to maintaining a balance of power in East Asia, and the US’ stated aim of precluding the emergence of a regional hegemon.

Why create a security shield just for ‘Offshore Asia’ — the Asian maritime realm? Yes, maritime routes need to be kept open, especially while the South China Sea disputes continue to fester and demand attention. But most importantly, the rationale for this new strategy lies in a simple truth: the US and its allies currently have overwhelming superiority in terms of maritime power. The US Pacific Fleet alone comprises 180 ships, nearly 2000 aircraft and 125,000 service personnel. If the US is to maintain influence and allies in East Asia it needs to provide these countries with some convincing evidence of defence capacities, and the ‘Offshore Asia’ security shield — utilising US ‘Air-Sea Battle’ forces — is intended to do precisely this.

What, then, of the mainland Southeast Asian states? ASEAN has been increasingly dividing along the mainland–island Southeast Asia fault line over the last decade, and China has been progressively drawing unto itself the polities and economies of the mainland. This is being done, with the assistance of the Asian Development Bank, through the creation of a Greater Mekong Subregion linking China and mainland Southeast Asia through economic corridors, which include Chinese high-speed rail networks linking mainland Southeast Asian capitals directly to Yunnan. And despite repeating the rhetoric of ‘ASEAN centrality’ or ‘ASEAN as a fulcrum for regional architecture’, most parties now at least obliquely recognise that the organisation is no longer a unity and that policies toward its component parts need to be differentiated — a practice which China has long been pursuing. The U.S. State Department-sponsored Lower Mekong Initiative, intended in some ways to counter this trend, is far too little and obviously too late.

Meanwhile, Darwin — where the first US marines will be stationed — provides the US and its allies with unrivalled access to both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean maritime routes. Initial reports also suggest that B-52 long-range strategic bombers and other US aircraft will be stationed at the RAAF Base at Tindal, about 320 kilometres southeast of Darwin. The growing impetus of US-Australian defence cooperation in northern Australia will thus see the region increasingly become a major site of military activity. Associated with this, the population of Australia’s northern coastal region will likely swell, urbanisation should increase and commerce will undoubtedly expand. This will not happen overnight. But the new movement of population to this sparsely-populated coast will induce the emergence of new urban, economic and social forms, enriching Australia in diverse spheres.

With Australian population centres and economic activities moving closer to Indonesia — and in fact closer to all of maritime Southeast Asia — the existing political, economic, social and military linkages with these areas will inevitably become more intense, strengthening the ‘Offshore Asia’ grouping of which they will all be a part.

The ‘Offshore Asia’ security strategy, of which the Darwin deployment is an important element, promises to have huge effects on maritime Asia and on East Asian alliances for decades, if not centuries, to come. Whether this strategy will be a means of preserving peace in East Asia or will eventually be seen to constitute a casus belli remains, as they say, to be seen.

Geoff Wade is a historian at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. A longer version of this article can be found here.

1. Asian security strategy: one hand not clapping
2. Southeast Asia: Patterns of security cooperation
3. Piracy and maritime security in East Asia

After the death of Kim Jong-il in December, Kim Jong-un has officially become the supreme leader of North Korea and the supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.

This is in addition to his position as the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party, which was announced in September 2010. These appointments demonstrate that the succession system, with Kim Jong-un as the core person, has been stabilised.

Currently, there are three major powers that are adjuvant to the Kim Jong-un regime in North Korea.

First is the Kim family system, which is now headed by Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Sung-taek, and aunt, Kim Kyong-hui. Jang serves as the Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission, and as a Chief Minister of the Party Central Committee. Together they control the major power of the Korean Workers’ Party, the government and the military — and have established a broad political power base within the Korean government and military systems.

Second are the old-guard politicians. They could be represented by Kim Yong-nam, the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Committee. They have been trusted by the three generations of leaders (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un), and they also have high national prestige. They will continue to support the Kim Jong-un regime.

Third are the military forces, which could be represented by the chief of staff, Ri Yong-ho, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Kim Yong-chun. They have all shown loyalty to the Kim Jong-un regime. After the death of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un publicly issued his ‘first orders’ as supreme commander, proving his actual control over the army.

The support of the above three powers will help guarantee the smooth transition of power to the Kim Jong-un regime.

However, Kim Jong-un still faces a series of challenges.

First, Kim Jong-un has to build his own team. This will potentially enable a group of young politicians to enter the power centre. But this will also conflict with the old political system.

Second, the Kim Jong-un regime will initially continue the ‘military-first’ politics of the Kim Jong-il regime. Yet, once the Kim Jong-un regime gains stability, it will have to face up to economic development pressures, improving people’s livelihoods and opening up foreign economic cooperation, which may force the regime to modify the ‘military-first politics’ line, and weaken the military’s power. This will inevitably lead to a backlash and challenges from the armed forces.

Third, after the Kim Jong-un regime fully consolidates its grip on power, it might adjust the power structure of the Korean government and military. That is, the Kim Jong-un regime may strengthen the core of the Korean Workers’ Party’s leadership system and shift emphasis to the political path of the ‘party leader’ in order to gradually replace the ‘military-first’ politics. Therefore, if Kim Jong-un takes on the position of chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Military Commission, there is a possibility that he will manoeuvre to replace the powers of the National Defence Commission with the Central Military Commission. He also might not install anybody as chairman of the National Defence Commission.

However, the current situation in North Korea will not necessarily trigger significant changes. After all, Kim Jong-un suffers from a lack of experience in governance, military leadership and political power. If Kim Jong-un attempts to make changes too quickly, to further the implementation of domestic and foreign policy adjustment — such as restructuring North Korea’s military and political power system and shifting from the ‘military-first’ politics to a ‘party leader’ political line — he will inevitably invite conflict or power struggle into the restructuring process.

With regard to the role of outside powers, China and US share common strategic interests in avoiding chaos and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. After the death of Kim Jong-il, ROK-US summit telephone talks declared that the US has no intention to interfere in the succession process. This indicates that the US will not put pressure on North Korea to promote its collapse and hopes to avoid conflict on the peninsula and to achieve peace and stability.

The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, visited China recently in order to further exchange views with China concerning the situation in the DPRK and to coordinate policies toward North Korea. China’s strategy has been to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, and to build a harmonious and stable strategic environment in Northeast Asia conducive to national development. Kim’s death has not changed the basic strategy of China toward the Korean Peninsula. The main basis of China’s Korean Peninsula policy is to comprehensively strengthen and support Kim Jong-un’s new North Korean regime. The main purpose of the US’ ‘return to Asia’ strategy is to strengthen its strategic influence in the Asia Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula. It also includes preventing military provocation or possible war in the East Asia region through the strengthening of US-ROK, US-Japan and US-Australia military alliances, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Therefore, China and the US have common strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula issue. They do not want chaos in the North Korean situation, the collapse of the regime, or a large-scale military conflict between the North and South. In resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the missile crisis and other issues, there is a wide range of cooperative space that China and the US can utilise. The two parties should strengthen their strategic coordination and communication with the DPRK in order to cope with any future crises and deal with the current challenges concerning the Korean Peninsula, and act to safeguard the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Wei Zhijiang is Professor and Director of the Institute of South Korea Studies at the School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Sun Yat-sen University.

1. Kim Jong-il’s visit to China: What should we expect?
2. Kim Jong-il dead: apocalypse now or a new dawn?
3. Death of Kim Jong-il: the rise of the Party

Pakistan’s economy remained sluggish in 2011 due to domestic political instability, energy shortages, deteriorating Pakistan-US relations, global climate change and internal security concerns.

For the fourth year in a row, GDP growth in 2011-12 will fall below its long-term growth rate. Per capita income will increase by around 2 per cent, in sharp contrast to the 5 per cent annual growth experienced during the 2002-07 period. The investment rate dropped to 13.4 per cent — its lowest level in the last four decades. Fiscal imbalances arising out of subsidies to loss-making public enterprises, low tax-mobilisation efforts, inefficiency and waste in public expenditure resulted in excessive borrowing from the banking system. And when the government decided to terminate its ongoing arrangements with the IMF, the flow of external resources for budgetary support was interrupted. The shortfalls in financing were made up by additional borrowing from the domestic banking system.

Pakistan’s fiscal deficit rose to around 7 per cent of GDP, and the tax-to-GDP ratio declined further to below 9 per cent. New inter-governmental fiscal arrangements that favour provincial governments in the allocation of the country’s divisible tax pool further exacerbated Pakistan’s fiscal situation. Although growing expenditure on defence, debt servicing, internal security and energy fall within the domain of the federal government, its share of taxes has gradually receded and now represents only 42.5 per cent of the total tax pool. This disconnect between the burden of expenditure and the accrual of revenue has intensified fiscal imbalances, as the provincial governments have little incentive to raise additional revenues from their own sources, while they can spend quite liberally in the absence of constraints and controls. Inefficiency and waste in public expenditure have therefore become commonplace, as the absorptive capacity of the provincial governments has not kept pace with the growth in revenue allocated to them.

Inflation in 2011-12 is projected to remain at around 12 per cent, which is beyond the acceptable threshold for the Pakistani population, and much higher than the long-term rate. The government’s heavy reliance on borrowing from commercial banks crowded out private-sector credit and complicated the transmission of monetary-policy signals in the allocation of credit. Private-sector credit grew by only 4 per cent, while credit to the federal government by commercial banks expanded by 74.5 per cent. In an economy where the private sector is the main driver of economic activity and generator of employment, such a situation has naturally become a source of serious concern.

The spill-over of fiscal imbalances into the energy sector was another impediment to the economy’s revival. The circular debt between buyers, suppliers, refiners, producers and consumers of electricity has disrupted the normal business cycle. While the peak-load demand has increased substantially, constrained generation and distribution due to fuel shortages, gas shortfalls and liquidity crises have placed a heavy cost on industry and exporters. The capacity utilisation rate of public-sector generation companies fell to 25 per cent, while the small- and medium-enterprise (SME) sector is suffering the most as they lack any recourse to captive power supply, unlike large enterprises. The banking sector’s non-performing loans to the SME sector have also risen because of the low capacity of these enterprises to service their debt.

Pakistan-US relations suffered a serious setback after 2 May when Osama bin Laden was captured and killed by US Navy SEALs in an operation undisclosed to Pakistani authorities. The NATO attack on Pakistani border posts in Mohmand Agency in November triggered strong reactions in Pakistan against US and NATO forces. The retaliatory action taken by Pakistan to have the Shamsi airbase vacated, and the stoppage of NATO supply trucks headed to Afghanistan, did not fit well with US public opinion. The freezing of US$700 million in assistance to Pakistan by US Congress and stalled reimbursements from the Coalition Support Fund added fuel to the fire. The results of public opinion surveys carried out in the two countries show the majority of Americans have a negative view of Pakistan, while over 85 per cent of Pakistanis consider the US in a similarly negative way.

Pakistan also experienced floods for the second year in a row. The 2011 floods were limited to the southern province of Sindh, unlike the 2010 floods which devastated the whole country. But the combined damage to livelihoods and property by the two sets of floods is estimated at US$10 billion — almost 5 per cent of GDP.

Internal security concerns in 2011 were not confined to the Taliban and jihadi attacks or suicide bombers. The year also witnessed an eruption of urban violence in Karachi, Pakistan’s business capital and largest metropolitan area. The targeted killings of workers from two rival political parties disrupted normal life in the city for several months. Eventually, the Civil Armed Forces were called in to assist local police. The situation was brought under control and the city has since remained calm.

The year 2011 was particularly tumultuous for Pakistan’s economy, society and politics, but 2012 does not seem to be shaping up much better — election campaigning to begin this year will make the management of Pakistan’s economy even more difficult.

Ishrat Husain is the Dean and Director at the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, and served as a Governor of Pakistan’s central bank from 1999 to 2005. 

This is part of a special feature: 2011 in review and the year ahead.

1. Assessing the tragedy of the Pakistan floods
2. Pakistan: lots of headlines, little progress
3. Pakistan: A year of extraordinary challenge

On the evening of 25 October 2011 the southern Thai town of Yala was shaken by a string of 30 explosions that caused great terror and loss of life. The following day the neighbouring province of Narathiwat saw a similar wave of attacks.

This latest bombing campaign was a stark reminder from southern Thailand’s insurgency movement of the seventh anniversary of the Tak Bai massacre.

The violent conflict still ravaging southern Thailand has claimed more than 5000 lives since the eruption of violence in 2004, and is concentrated in the three Malay-Muslim majority provinces, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as four districts of neighbouring Songkhla.

This historically rebellious region has seen waves of uprisings against the Thai state since it became part of Thailand through the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty. Many of the armed movements that have fought for independence over the years have emerged as reactions against recurring efforts by Bangkok to exert increased authority over the region. The 1970s and 1980s saw an extended separatist campaign by the Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), which relied on traditional guerrilla warfare conducted from jungle bases. This was effectively suppressed by a combination of conventional military campaigns and amnesty programs. Following the decline of PULO, BRN-Coordinate (BRN-C) emerged as the main insurgent group, and the movement made a number of strategic shifts away from its predecessors’ failures. BRN-C also focused on initially conducting a systematic mass-indoctrination of the local southern population in order to build a solid political base before eventually launching its violent struggle.

Maintaining separate political and militant cells in villages throughout the Malay-Muslim south, BRN-C has built a strong base and effectively undermined state control in the region. Rather than relying on a regular guerrilla force, the movement relies on part-time fighters organised in autonomous cells acting in their own communities. This mode of operation provides a challenge for state security agencies employing traditional counter-insurgency tactics. The largely Thai-Buddhist police and military is simply incapable of separating friend from foe when operating in the ‘Deep South’.

The current wave of violence began in 2004 with a bold raid on the Chulaporn military camp, where the separatists made away with a large weapons cache. The security agencies initially tried to counter the insurgency using cruel repression: the infamous massacres at the Kru Se mosque and later at the police station in the small town of Tak Bai are two clear examples. While outside attention has largely focused on these symbolic events, the bulk of casualties have been caused by a drawn-out campaign of daily acts of violence using small arms, explosives and arson attacks. The security agencies’ mismanagement of the initial round of violence has also contributed to its steady escalation.

The spread of violence has pushed state power back from the south, leading to increased lawlessness and secondary violence in the form of revenge killings, settling of scores among criminals and extra-judicial executions at the hands of rogue elements within Thailand’s security agencies.

Instances of violence tend to follow linguistic and religious patterns, reinforcing the view that southern insurgents rely on ethnic and religious identities for mobilisation. While the Thai state has maintained an inclusive policy toward religious minorities, language policies are extremely conservative. Standard Thai is the sole medium of communication with government officials, for example, leaving the south’s Malay-speaking population feeling largely alienated. Economic disadvantage also adds to the sense of exclusion, as the region is among the poorest in the country, and significantly less developed than Thai-Buddhist provinces to the immediate north.

The central Thai government has been largely ineffective at handling the violence in the south. Efforts to mediate in the conflict are hampered by the hyper secrecy maintained by BRN-C leaders and the state’s unwillingness to make any concessions. Consequently, serious proposals for handling the conflict have principally been found outside this bloc, and include academic blueprints for increased self-determination. Researchers at the Prince of Songkla University in Pattani have suggested that autonomy through the creation of a Pattani Metropolitan Administration could allow space to pursue local identity within the bounds of the Thai state — and undermine local support for the armed uprising.

In the July 2011 election, several parties floated policies for autonomy or decentralisation, with the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party adopting the Pattani Metropolitan Administration proposal as party policy. In the end, the pro-establishment Democrat Party triumphed in the Deep South, taking nine of 11 parliamentary seats. The party benefited from a spilt of the Malay-Muslim vote between large numbers of candidates contesting the elections after the break-up of the Wadah faction, which had dominated Malay-Muslim politics for decades.

The failure of Pheu Thai to gain any seats in the south leaves them without clear electoral support to pursue autonomy. Back-tracking on their election promises, the party has recently floated alternative ideas for preserving strong central government control over the south, even while increasing the army’s role in handling the situation. The lack of meaningful effort at decentralisation can only prolong the conflict.

Anders Engvall is a recent PhD graduate in Economics from the Stockholm School of Economics, where he is now an assistant professor.

This article appeared in the most recent edition of the East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Where is Thailand Headed?‘

1. ASEAN and the Cambodia-Thailand Conflict
2. The Japan-Thailand economic partnership agreement: Utilization and implementation issues from the perspective of Thailand
3. Silenced smiles: Freedom of expression in Thailand

Australia’s first academic conference on Indonesian terrorism was held at the Australian National University (ANU) early in December.

Entitled ‘Indonesian Terrorism in a Global Context’, the conference brought together researchers specialising in the study of Indonesia’s jihadists and scholars working on global trends in terrorism. The various topics covered, and insights drawn from related discussions, help build a picture of the current state of terrorism in Indonesia.

Rice University’s David Cook, gave the keynote address, tracing the history of jihad as a concept, first from its understanding in classical Islamic texts and then through its subsequent reinterpretation. Militant groups have used this later interpretation to help justify the use of terror as a tactic, and to provide a theological basis for suicide attacks in particular. Cook discussed the critiques of terrorist acts that have come from within militant circles, and argued that the most salient protest against terrorism is the rejection of indiscriminate violence against civilians, especially fellow Muslims. This critique is of particular significance because it undercuts claims that terrorists are acting in defence of the Muslim community.

Nelly Lahoud, from West Point’s Counter-Terrorism Center, examined the doctrine of defensive jihad, and how terrorists have reinterpreted this concept, especially those associated with al Qaeda, to be a duty incumbent on each individual Muslim, rather than a more diffuse collective responsibility. The diaries of al Qaeda operative, Fadil Harun, reveal, according to Lahoud, the essentially pragmatic nature of al Qaeda and the absolute primacy it gives to the doctrine of defensive jihad over all other aspects of religiosity. Additionally, she argued that the Arab Spring had dramatically undermined the jihadist project, because it grew as a democratic protest movement — rather than being led by terrorist groups — and was aimed at removing corrupt, repressive Muslim regimes.

Quinton Temby examined the murky relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda. He adduced new evidence of the close collaboration between key figures in the 9/11 plot, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, and JI leaders like Hambali. Sidney Jones, senior researcher with the International Crisis Group in Jakarta, reviewed recent developments within JI, contending that it is now a largely non-violent organisation, but has the capacity to regenerate and provide logistical support to more extremist jihadists. She identified the successful police operation against the group’s operations in Poso, Central Sulawesi in 2007 as the ‘knock-out blow’ to JI. This operation, which led to the arrest of key leaders, pushed the organisation toward preaching and education and away from jihad.

Solahudin, an independent terrorism researcher, looked at case studies of two terrorist groups which he argues are unique: Jemaah Imron and Laskar Hisbah. Jemaah Imron, formed in 1980, was Indonesia’s first home-grown terrorist organisation and carried out the hijacking of Garuda flight DC9 Woyla in 1981. The second group, Laskar Hisbah, was involved in a series of attempted assassinations and bomb plots in Solo and Klaten, Central Java in early 2011. Solahudin argued that both groups mutated from being radical to terrorist because of the presence of a charismatic leader. ANU’s Greg Fealy looked at the nature and role of apocalyptic literature within Indonesian jihadism, paying special attention to the idea that the Antichrist (Dajjal) is present on earth and leading the forces of evil against Islam. For jihadists, perceptions of the approaching end of time — preceded by a cataclysmic struggle between Islam and its enemies — is a powerful factor in their beliefs about the need for physical struggle to defend their faith. Angus McIntyre examined the motivations of the Bali bomber Imam Samudra, contending that Samudra’s narcissistic personality led him to use terrorism as a means of disowning his own sense of humiliation at being unable to defend his community from Western ‘attack’. Reflecting these international considerations, Curtin University’s Ian Chalmers also argued that a paradigmatic shift has occurred in Indonesian jihadism, and the terrorists’ ‘struggle actions’ are increasingly justified on global rather than local grounds.

Sally White, from ANU, discussed the case of Putri Munawaroh — a jihadist widow — and the reaction to her circumstances within jihadist circles. Despite reports that Putri wanted to die a martyr, White used analysis of jihadist web and blog sites to argue that Putri’s views on the virtues of martyrdom do not reflect growing radicalisation among jihadist wives in general.

A number of speakers addressed issues of disengagement from terrorism and deradicalisation. Julie Chernov-Hwang, from Goucher College, has conducted research among former jihadists and identified a number of factors that have led to individuals leaving terrorist activities. Most former jihadists cite the importance of building new relationships outside jihadist circles as crucial to their turning away from violence, even if they still ascribe to radical ideas. The terrorism researcher and journalist Noor Huda Ismail also discussed his personal experience of helping numerous jihadists disengage through productive work and by pursuing opportunities for broader social interaction.

Greg Fealy is Associate Professor at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University. Dr Sally White is Senior Research Associate at the College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University.

1. Terrorism today: Jemaah Islamiyah, Dulmatin and the Aceh cell
2. Aid to Indonesian Islamic schools helps undermine terrorism
3. Pakistan: US losing hearts and minds in the battle against terrorism

Last year proved a tipping point for China’s approach to the world. The confluence of Europe’s debt crisis and America’s contracting defence budget has created rising expectations that China will shoulder ever greater power burdens for international stability.

No longer can it keep a low profile in international strategic and economic affairs. Could it join America as a world policeman sooner than expected?

Beijing’s push outwards has happened faster than its most ambitious leaders could have expected. But as it extends its reach to diversify investments, protect oil interests, patrol shipping lanes and support overseas workers, it risks unexpected ripostes. Every superpower eventually faces blowback.

A honeymoon decade of frictionless business expansion worldwide is over. Already China is embroiled in skirmishes and politicking on new frontiers. After the murder of 13 Chinese sailors on the Mekong river in October, China dispatched armed patrols into Burma, Laos and Thailand, the unruly states forming the notorious Golden Triangle. China is now the Mekong’s de facto river cop.

To predict the outcome of this, consider how Chinese investments were a contested issue in the recent election campaign in Zambia. Even in China-friendly Burma, a giant dam project orchestrated by a Chinese company was just shelved due to local popular opposition.

As China increases its commercial presence in resource-rich countries, such scenes will play out more often. The number of Chinese workers abroad expands by the day. In Libya, more than 35,000 Chinese workers had to be evacuated in March. The combination of search and rescue operations with interests in natural resources can thrust substantial burdens on a nation. Great powers have often been moulded by events rather than grand strategy. The commercial adventures of the East India Company compelled the British state to intervene in China, sparking the opium wars.

China’s traditional inclinations have been to work directly with other governments and demand assurances of protection for Chinese interests, while also freeriding on the security provided by western players, as in Afghanistan. But the absence of credible government in Somalia, for example, has forced China to contribute more heavily to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. While it is still reluctant to vote in favour of interventions such as in Syria, that could change. China has more blue helmets UN peacekeepers worldwide than other Permanent Security members.  Much as western powers have long used the UN’s legitimacy as cover for their own interests, China could do the same.

The west should view this as an opportunity, not a threat. China should be encouraged to move from hands-off non-interference to engage, as it has done over Iran, North Korea and Sudan. The Mekong river incident and the rescue operation in Libya reveal how China has launched its own ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine, at least concerning its citizens and workers abroad.

China has crept into the superpower league by deftly building friendly ties with regional powers. While it may seek to avoid choosing sides between various rivals, it will inevitably suffer repercussions as its influence grows. Just as few predicted five years ago that China’s navy would be patrolling the Gulf of Aden, we could one day witness Beijing demanding action in the UN for crisis intervention in a resource-rich country, such as Angola, where it has big interests.

This might not fit with the ‘responsible stakeholder’ mantra promulgated in western capitals several years ago, but China can be motivated to collaborate through self-interest. As the US and Europe have learnt in the Arab spring, China is taking note that negotiating solely with regimes is inadequate. The Lancang-Mekong navigation route could be the Gulf of Aden or the Katanga copper belt of Africa as resource corridors open, they become not only channels of commerce but also conduits for warlords and hijackers. To ensure long-term access to resources, China will have to make friends across the spectrum beyond the Gaddafis and Mugabes.

If it pursues this proactive strategy, China can leapfrog centuries of imperialist missteps and avoid blowback. After all, China has to date not been conquering colonies but rather buying them. This may sound optimistic. But while many in the west tend to quail at the thought of an increasingly interventionist China, it is just possible that an assertive Beijing protecting its interests could also be good news.

Parag Khanna is a Senior Research Fellow at the New America Foundation, Senior Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and Director of the Hybrid Reality Institute.

 Jonas Parello-Plesner is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He has worked as senior advisor with the Danish government on Asian affairs. He is on the board of editors of the Danish magazine Raeson. The original version of this paper was posted pm the Financial Times and can be accessed here. 

1. A regional solution to global imbalances: We need a Beijing Accord
2. Need for a paradigm shift in Mekong management
3. Sino-Indian relations: Beijing muffs its hand

‘No, thanks’.

That, in summary, is Hugh White’s response to the recent announcement that the US would be sending marines on permanent rotation to Darwin.

White is Professor of Strategic Studies at the ANU, one of Asia’s most distinguished strategists, and a former Australian deputy secretary of defence. And he has been making the case for strategic reorientation in Canberra for a couple of years now.

White is also a distinct minority among Australian strategists, and his comments have triggered fierce discussion in his country. Canberra’s decision to accept the US forces is for many a definitive rejection of his conclusions. But White and the debate he has unleashed deserve more attention, for this discussion is — or will be — taking place in capitals throughout the region, although there is little chance it will be as public or as sharp. Australia is the canary in the Asian security coal mine.

The Debate

White starts from a simple premise: China is getting stronger and more powerful, and the basis of its growing strength and influence is economic dynamism. Australia’s Defence White Paper 2009 concludes, for example, that China will eclipse the US as the world’s largest economy around 2020. This newfound heft manifests in two dimensions.

First is the military modernisation and capability afforded by increasing national wealth. White also notes that with military modernisation has come diplomatic outreach to help consolidate the image of a county that wants to work with its neighbours (at least until 2010).

Second, and perhaps more significant, is the gravity created by the desire to tap the Chinese market. White notes: ‘a country that wants to benefit from China’s unique economic opportunities must … take careful account of China’s political and strategic interests’. Consistent with that, in my meetings, Chinese interlocutors remind us that the US should put relations with it above all other concerns, especially Taiwan.

The list of countries subject to the Chinese economy’s gravitational pull is long. China is Australia’s top trading partner, comprising 23.1 per cent of Australia’s total trade (a 27 per cent increase over 2010); it has invested A$11.8 billion in China and China has invested A$19.5 billion in Australia. And regionally, China invests in every US ally in Asia.

This sets up a competition between these nations’ economic and security interests. But as White correctly points out, ‘the real question is not about how we balance our ties with the US and China. It is about how we protect Australia’s interests in this strategic transformation. Those interests are reasonably clear. We want Asia to keep growing strongly and for Australia to be part of that growth. And we want America to stay engaged in Asia, to prevent domination by China but not in a way that forces us to choose between them, or inhibits Asia’s economic growth’. White even argues that China’s rise does not mean the end of the alliance: ‘A new order can be built in Asia that accommodates Chinese power peacefully and preserves a vital role forAmerica, including a strong US–Australia alliance’.

White is not choosing Beijing over Washington, as many have accused. He is conscious of the pressures in China — a strong self-image, a desire to maximise its independence, a powerful nationalism — that push Beijing to fight the subordination of its growing power to US primacy. It is this inclination that threatens the stability that made Asia’s prosperity possible. White believes that ‘continued US primacy would be the best outcome for Australia, but the chances of it being achieved in the face of China’s power and ambitions are low’. That demands a focus on the second-best outcome, a ‘Concert of Asia’ in which the US voluntarily relinquishes primacy to share power with China — a nation that ‘has a legitimate leadership role to play in Asia’ — and other major powers in collective leadership based on the principles of the United Nations Charter. White calls this a US choice between influence and order.

There are two ways to challenge White’s argument: question his premises or question his conclusion. Opponents do both.

Those who take the first course argue China’s rise is not inevitable, its trajectory will change and its influence will be checked. Even if it is not, Beijing’s capacity to upset the regional order requires allies: a revanchist China cannot act alone. Some analysts assert that a US-led hierarchy will continue to be the first choice of regional governments who will try to preserve US primacy rather than back Chinese efforts to dilute it. Others argue the US may yet recover and remain ahead of potential peer competitors.

The second group argues that White’s recommendation is wrong. Rather than forging a new order that embraces China, they believe that Australia — along with other nations — should double down on efforts to balance Beijing. Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, a report by Australian think tank the Kokoda Foundation, endorses that approach, calling for diplomatic and military measures to strengthen Canberra’s capacity to respond to a more assertive and potentially hostile China.

The Response

Make no mistake: Canberra has chosen the second approach. Of course it seeks to engage China, as do all regional governments. But Canberra’s commitments to Washington were made clear during President Obama’s recent visit to Australia. And as described by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard before a joint session of Congress, Australia is ‘[a]n ally for the sixty years past and Australia is an ally for all the years to come’. While there is no sign of a shift in Australian thinking, it is worth noting that Gillard has called for a new white paper, Australia in the Asian Century. This whole-of-government analysis, drawing on external advice as well, will explore a strategic environment where Australia ‘hasn’t been’ before.

Even if he has not prevailed, Hugh White has made a clear and plain case for strategic reorientation. This debate needs to be had and heard. In recent conversations throughout the region, I have heard echoes of this discussion but they were invariably less focused, coherent and articulate. Governments and publics throughout the region are facing a new world and they must understand the choices they face. The canary is not dead, but it is clearly uncomfortable.

Brad Glosserman is Executive Director at the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC. A longer version of this article was first published here on CSIS.

1. Australia between the US and China
2. Is China a military threat to Australia? The Babbage fallacies
3. China’s rise and the importance of Australia-China youth dialogue

As China’s power grows, the Asia we have known is passing into history, and a new and very different Asia is taking shape.

Barack Obama’s visit is a key moment in that transformation, because he is coming here to promote America’s view of how the new Asia should work.

America has a lot at stake. For 40 years it has been the region’s uncontested leader. Now China wants to lead instead, and is trying to ease America aside. That means the era of uncontested US primacy has passed. This is a big loss for America, for Australia and much of Asia, but it is the strategic price we must all pay for China’s economic miracle.

There are two competing visions of Asia’s future now. China’s vision is that America will slowly fade as a strategic power in Asia, leaving China as the region’s new uncontested leader. America’s vision is that Asia will divide into two camps, with China on one side and the rest, under US leadership, on the other. It hopes that if the rest of Asia stays strong and united by America’s side, China will eventually see the error of its ways and join the US-led camp as well, thus restoring America’s uncontested primacy.

Of course neither Washington nor Beijing describes their vision in such blunt terms. But behind the diplomatic drapery, these are clearly the plans to which each side is working. Washington has suddenly woken up to the magnitude of China’s power, and now understands that Asia, not the Middle East, is where it faces its most decisive challenge. That’s why Obama is making this trip. He is here to persuade America’s friends and allies to sign up to Washington’s vision of Asia’s future.

At APEC in Hawaii, Obama promoted the economic element of his vision. His Trans-Pacific Partnership initiative is aimed at building a new economic framework in Asia that includes America’s friends and allies and excludes China. It is not clear that is a good idea. Now Obama is coming to Canberra to promote the political and strategic element of his vision. He wants to draw America’s loose network of Asian allies and friends together into a more unified military coalition to confront China’s growing maritime power. That will be the underlying message of his speech to Parliament tomorrow, and it is the symbolism at the heart of the announcement he will make about US military training in Darwin.

Practically and operationally, the new rotational training deployments for US marines mean very little. Symbolically and strategically they mean a great deal. They show Australia’s willingness to join America’s military coalition against China. And make no mistake: this is all about China. For 40 years, despite our close alliance, Australia has been careful not to line up militarily with the US against China. That is why the Darwin announcement is so significant.

More broadly, taken together with Julia Gillard’s enthusiastic embrace of his Trans-Pacific Partnership, the new military arrangements signal Australia’s support for Obama’s overall vision for America’s role in Asia’s future. For Obama, this is an important win.

But is it a win for Australia? That depends on whether Obama’s vision will work, and on what the alternatives are.

For his vision to work, three things will have to happen. First, a lot of China’s Asian neighbours will need to decide that siding with America against China is in their interests. None of them want to live under China’s shadow, and all welcome US support, but none want to make China an enemy. Keeping them on side will be harder than it looks.

Second, America itself must decide whether taking China on like this is worth the cost. Economically, Obama’s vision of Asia’s future makes no sense, because America is as interdependent with China as everyone else. And strategically, Americans will have to decide whether they really are willing to back all their Asian friends and allies in any fight they pick with China. A small stoush in the South China Sea could become very costly and dangerous for the US.

These are issues that Americans themselves have not clearly addressed. Few of America’s political leaders, pundits or the public at large have yet come to grips with the new geometry of power, and the hard choices America now faces.

Third, for America’s plan to work, China will have to be persuaded to accept US leadership in Asia even as it overtakes America to become the richest, and hence ultimately the most powerful, country in the world. That seems highly unlikely. And if China pushes back rather than comes around then America’s vision of Asia’s future does not lead us gently back to the era of uncontested US primacy. It pushes us brutally forward towards a new era of unbridled strategic rivalry — a new Cold War, or worse.

If the only alternative to America’s plan to perpetuate its primacy in Asia is China’s vision of its own uncontested leadership, then we might reluctantly accept a new Cold War as the lesser of two evils. But these are not the only possibilities. A new Asia could evolve in which China exercises more power and influence than it has before, but does not dominate, and in which America no longer exercises primacy, but still plays a large and vital role. In short, an Asia in which the US and China share power.

This should be Australia’s vision of Asia’s future. We do not want to live under Chinse domination, but nor do we want to be squeezed by US–China rivalry. That is why, having given Obama a respectful hearing, we should explain why we take a different view. That is what good allies do.

Hugh White is professor of strategic studies at ANU and a visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute.

This article was originally published by the Sydney Morning Herald here.

1. Obama goes to China
2. Obama visits Australia
3. President Obama comes to Canberra – Weekly editorial

The Ulan-Ude summit on 24 August 2011 highlighted Russia and North Korea’s commitment to overcoming the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem — and they must be credited with considerable success.

Kim Jong-il confirmed that North Korea is ready to return to the Six-Party Talks without any preconditions, and both leaders agreed to advance with the construction of a gas pipeline linking Russia and South Korea via North Korea.

This year, Russia — like China in the recent past — confirmed its opposition to the DPRK’s complete isolation. This includes excessively broad interpretations of UN Security Council sanctions against the country. Russia considers that, whatever the circumstances, sanctions should not hurt the civilian sector of the economy. And this view, combined with Russia’s own national interests aimed at integration into the East Asian regional cooperation process, led Moscow to expand cooperation with North Korea in a number of ways.

But some reactions to the warming of relations between Russia and the DPRK were far from positive. The agreement to launch joint Russia-North Korea search and rescue naval exercises in 2012 appears to be the only component of the massive package of bilateral agreements to draw observers’ attention. Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul each seem to have forgotten that their key objective — to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table — was accomplished through Russian diplomacy, and that now is an opportune moment to contribute to this recovery.

Instead, the US Department of State expressed concern over Russia’s contacts with North Korea in military affairs, stressing that they should not obscure the message sent by the international community: that Pyongyang’s military programs are a problem and that it should return to the Six-Party Talks.

Policy analysts went even further and interpreted Moscow’s openness to joint semi-military exercises with North Korea as a step toward a new Cold War in Northeast Asia, or an attempt to neutralise US, ROK and Japanese influence on the Korean Peninsula. These comments are full of out-dated preconditions that are aimed at gauging exactly how serious North Korea is about returning to the negotiating process. But during the inter-Korean Foreign Ministry-level consultations held in Beijing on 21 September 2011, the ROK’s representatives failed to budge from an inflexible approach to resuming the talks, and no progress was made there either.

It seems that Western analysts are deliberately ignoring the fact that the planned Russia-North Korea naval exercises are a small-scale effort of a purely humanitarian nature with no armaments involved. Compare this to the exercises continually carried out by US and ROK armed forces, often in direct proximity to North Korea’s borders. In this context, it is difficult to understand why the former is a threat to stability across the Korean Peninsula and the latter — the markedly militant games of much greater proportions played by the US and ROK which culminated in inter-Korean clashes last year — is a contribution to stability.

It is also unfortunate that certain circles in Japan and South Korea are ready to denounce the gas pipeline construction plan that was discussed in Ulan-Ude. ROK President Lee Myung-bak’s positive approach to the gas pipeline changed drastically to a more negative position immediately after a meeting in Washington on 6 October 2011 — a striking and disappointing outcome. It is both unfair and paradoxical to criticise the project, which is clearly aimed at strengthening multilateral economic cooperation, as somehow undermining this same objective.

A question arises about the West’s real priorities in the course of analysing its response to the Ulan-Ude summit. Engagement and dialogue are traditionally considered the optimal strategy if non-proliferation is the key objective — whereas attempts to isolate the opponent, add pressure and struggle for dominance suggest regime change is more likely the end goal.

The West’s reaction to the Ulan-Ude summit shows that its stated commitment to non-proliferation and its actual intentions are worlds apart, and that a hidden agenda built around regime change in the DPRK still exists. If this is the case, any initiatives aimed at helping Pyongyang — for example, those which invite it into negotiations or multilateral economic projects — are going to meet with resentment in the West. Only time will tell how long the unrealistic hopes for regime collapse in North Korea will continue to cast a shadow over the inter-Korean settlement.

Alexander Vorontsov is Head of the Korean and Mongolian Studies Department at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

1. Russia-North Korea: Denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula
2. Russia and the DPRK: cooperation in Ulan-Ude
3. Russia-North Korea trade