On September 5 2007, George W. Bush and John Howard signed a treaty to improve defence cooperation between the United States and Australia. Although signed over two years ago, the treaty has not yet been ratified by the United States or Australian governments. Recent developments within United States Senate indicate that it is likely to obtain Senate approval, and ratification shortly thereafter.

At the time, the treaty reflected the Bush administration’s especially close ties with the Howard government in Australia. The treaty simplifies the process for exporting and importing defence articles, defence services, and related technical data between Australia from the United States.

Currently, where an export of a defence article is to be made from the United States to Australia, the exporter must obtain a licence for each export from the United States State Department. Where the value of the export exceeds a certain value, the export also requires the informed consent of the Congress.

The new treaty provides for an export regime which allows the President to authorise the export or transfer of certain defence items and services to Australia without a State Department licence. There will remain export controls and limitations on re-transfers as already established, including the provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, which prohibit arms exports to certain nations, or where the export ‘would not otherwise be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States’.

When Barack Obama became president, it was predicted that his administration would not have the same focus on the Western Pacific as his predecessor. In the twelve months since his inauguration, this has proved true. But despite the administrations’ overt focus on Northern Asia and China, senior Departmental officials and Senators have noted the closeness of the relationship between Australia and the United States. Three of four Senators at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing in the early December referred to Australia as one of the United States closest allies, highlighting the special relationship between the two countries.

At the same hearing, noting the ratification of the treaty was ‘strongly supported by this administration’, the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs in the State Department, Andrew
Shapiro, confirmed the two nations shared a ‘special relationship’. Amongst the Committee members, there was unanimous support for the endorsement of the treaty. Committee Chairman John Kerry stated the process was overdue and, subject to review of certain implementation articles, he indicated the Committee would recommend ratification of the treaty early in the new year.

The treaty is a significant recognition of the close relationship between the United States and Australia. The ratification of the treaty will facilitate exports of all but the most sensitive United States defence articles and services. Australia will gain simpler and easier access to United States defence equipment and battlefield technology, and it will facilitate technical collaboration and discussion between Australia and the United States. The treaty also simplifies and enhances opportunities for cooperative security and defence research, and the development of production and support programs, allowing for Australian involvement in more programs similar to the Joint Strike Fighter Program.

Within the Asian region, the treaty would provide Australia with unparalleled access to United States defence articles and services, and unrivalled access to opportunities for defence and technological
collaboration. Members of the Senate Committee recognised the benefits of such collaboration in the current battlefield environment, with United States soldiers fighting alongside Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. Although the treaty is a legacy from the previous administrations in both countries, the current US administration’s embrace of its provisions and the strong recommendation for its ratification augurs well for a continuing close defence relationship the United States and the new administration in Australia as well.

James Boyers is a graduate student at the ANU and is currently an intern in the office of Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

1. Is defence cooperation the next step in U.S.-India relations?
2. The Australian Defence Force and Timor-Leste: looking toward 2020
3. A new trans-Tasman defence relationship?

The Hollywood blockbuster Avatar is breaking box-office records in China and cinemagoers have been treated to a visual feast from the Shangrila-like moon of Pandora. At the same time, the savagery depicted in the film about the demolition of the natives’ home has also resonated with the Chinese. A young literary commentator wrote that ‘For audiences from other places, barbaric eviction is something they simply can’t imagine – it is the sort of thing that could only happen in outer space and China.’

Much like the Na’vi people from Pandora, forcibly evicted Chinese residents have fought back literally, with bows and arrows and Molotov cocktails against camouflaged hired thugs from real estate developers. Some of the most valiant resisters such as Pan Rong and Tang Fuzhen have indeed become household names in China and assumed folk hero status very much like that of Australia’s Ned Kelly. Tang Fuzhen paid the ultimate price of taking her own life in a bid to stop the demolition of her cloth factory.

Expropriation of land in China has become one of the most polemical social issues. Forced eviction and demolitions often result in violent confrontation between residents and government-backed property developers. This problem is even more pronounced in rural China where corrupt local officials collude with real estate developers to dispossess farmers of their only livelihood.

Many experts and commentators blame the ‘Regulation Concerning the Management and Expropriation of Urban Residences’, promulgated by the State Council in 2001, as the principal culprit.  At the end of last year, five law professors from Peking University petitioned the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s supreme legislative body, to amend or abolish the regulation. They appealed on the basis that the existing regulation is in clear contradiction with both the Chinese Constitution and the newly enacted Property Law.

The existing regulation on expropriation was enacted with the purpose of clearing hurdles for rapid urban development in China, but there was inadequate attention paid to the protection of private property rights. Most importantly, the regulation was also ambivalent on the important issue of land expropriation for public interest. It is commonly recognised across many jurisdictions that it is necessary for the government to compulsorily acquire private holdings in the interest of public welfare such as building infrastructure. But the ambiguity on the definition within the Chinese regulation provides fertile ground for corrupt officials and real estate developers to expropriate land in the name of public interest without the need to compensate people on just terms.

It was recently exposed that a university in southern China expropriated a large tract of framing land for the purpose of building educational facilities. But a large portion of that compulsorily acquired land was resold to a commercial property developer at a premium. The handsome profit made by the university was used to pay off its debt and that of the municipal government. The grossly inadequately compensated famers could do little to seek redress.

Another thorny issue is compensation for expropriated land. At the moment, the compensation scheme is wildly arbitrary, especially in the countryside. Until a transparent and market-based fair compensation scheme has been developed, we will continue to witness endless protest against inadequately compensated expropriation projects.

The State Council just released a new draft regulation on expropriation for public consultation which more clearly defines the scope of public interest, which includes land acquired for defence facilities, infrastructure projects, public health and education facilities, public housing estates and so on. If this draft legislation can be enacted, this could provide a firmer basis for people to challenge unfair commercial acquisition of land in the name of public interest. It also envisages a more market-based pecuniary compensation scheme and proposes to outlaw barbaric eviction techniques such as the termination of water supply.

But this potential new legal protection can be quite powerless in the face of immensely powerful government closely tied together with real estate developers. A compliant and under-resourced court system can hardly be relied upon to constrain the power and authority of government.

A Chinese blogger sarcastically remarked that the film Avatar can serve as a great manual on how to resist unjust eviction. Indeed, without developing a sound and fair expropriation and compensation system, Beijing can count on a very bumpy ride on the road of its great urbanisation drive.

1. Australia and Japan: Emerging partnerships in the shadow of China
2. Social security and housing the poor in China
3. Land reform in China

Some 20,000 or so Malaysians met the full force of Prime Minister Najib’s security forces when they demonstrated peacefully on August 1 in Kuala Lumpur against the repressive Internal Security Act (ISA), a draconian law used by the Malaysian Government to quell the Communist insurgents after the Malayan Emergency. By Malaysian standards, this was a mammoth demonstration; not only in size but also in the statement it made, considering the extent to which Mr Najib had gone to stop it. The government’s response to the demonstration casts further doubt on Mr Najib’s commitment to democratic reform.

Since coming into power on April 3, 2009, Mr Najib has portrayed himself as a reformer. He released 13 ISA detainees, including key HINDRAF leaders, and promised that he would amend the ISA. In addition, he also implemented some populist reform measures in the economic sphere. Although these changes raises Mr Najib’s popularity within the electorate, analysts have observed that Najib’s strategy mimics UMNO’s tried and tested formula of quick political wins which are long on form and short on substance.

The ISA was enacted in 1960 at the end of the Communist insurgency in Malaysia (then known as the Federated States of Malaya) as a measure to ensure internal security by detaining without trial suspected communist insurgents who may be planning and implementing acts that endanger public safety. According to the Malaysian Centre of Public Policy Studies, since its enactment, more than 10,000 citizens have been ‘deprived of their liberty and have been mentally and physically tortured under the ISA’. Furthermore, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) has since been disbanded and Malaysia has established diplomatic ties with China, the MCP’s main benefactor. Those detained now are often Malaysian political activists, rather than military and para-military agents that threaten the nation. Journalists, academics, activists, religious leaders, students and politicians have been detained for the ‘crime’ of commenting critically on the UMNO-led political ideology. The ISA has been used to create an atmosphere of fear that curtails citizens’ participation in legitimate discussions on public issues.

It is important to recognise just how restrictive the ISA law is. While the original ISA legislation allowed for judicial review, this clause was removed by the Mahathir regime. The Home Minister now has absolute power to determine who is a threat to ‘national security’ and does not need to justify his/her actions. With the judicial system and security agencies (police, military, and civil defence forces) under the thumb of the ruling party, this law gives the Home Minister unbridled power [pdf].

Under the ISA, a person may be detained for up to 60 days without trial for an act which is ‘prejudicial to the security of the country’. Exactly what constitutes a prejudice to security has been—and continues to be—unclear. The law also suffers from various procedural deficiencies. A person detained under the ISA does not have effective recourse to legal protection nor any opportunity to establish innocence. This often leads to detention for extended periods. After the initial 60 days of incarceration, detention can be extended for a further two years and then renewed for successive two-year periods. A detainee can thus expect to remain in detention indefinitely. During the first 60 days of detention, detainees are allowed no family visits and no access to legal counsel. If a further two-year detention is approved, the detainee is taken to the Kamunting Detention Centre where they are held in isolation in what the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network describes as ‘small, poorly ventilated cells’. An example of this indefinite detention is Dr Abdullah Daud, a geo-info Lecturer at the University of Technology in Johor, who has been detained under the ISA for more than six years. The highly restrictive nature of this law, coupled with the tendency of the Malaysian government to abuse it, demonstrates why the ISA must be abolished, rather than reformed.

The ISA has been a powerful tool in maintaining UMNO hegemony. Nevertheless, in abolishing the ISA, Mr Najib’s administration may gain more than it loses. Although many vocal UMNO supporters are Malay chauvinists, hence partially explaining Mr Najib’s fear of implementing reforms which are perceived to be endangering Ketuanan Melayu (Malay supremacy), these extremists form only a minority (albeit a significant minority) within the Malaysian electorate. More broadly, the result of the 2008 general elections demonstrated that the majority of the Malaysian populace want civil and political reforms. The increasing regularity of public demonstrations further reveals that Malaysians are no longer willing to sacrifice their democratic freedoms. The ISA does not directly threaten Ketuanan Melayu in the same way as the affirmative action does. Therefore, abolishing the ISA could pacify the collective demands for civil and political reforms without jeopardizing UMNO’s pro-Malay support base. Najib could point out to the extremist faction in UMNO that the Malaysian Penal Code is adequate in protecting public safety without needing to fall back on the repressive ISA.

Malaysians want a government that guarantees the safety of its citizens without sacrificing genuine civil and political liberties. The ISA may have been an appropriate legislative response to the period of violent Communist insurgency, but UMNO’s ongoing misuse of the law, coupled with social demands for greater civil and political freedoms, underlines its archaic character and the need for its abolition. In abolishing the ISA, Mr Najib could demonstrate his genuine commitment to democratic reform. Malaysia may need legislation for terrorism-related crimes; it definitely does not need the ISA.

Siaan Ansori and Greg Lopez are postgraduate students in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

1. Malaysia: the political tide runs out
2. Politics without priorities in Malaysia
3. A low note for Malaysia as Anwar trial starts

It seems that President Obama’s Prague speech on nuclear disarmament completely suits Japan’s identity as a non-nuclear state. As the only state that has suffered from nuclear bomb blasts, Japan has aimed for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the post-World War 2 era.

This is why the Japanese Foreign Minister quickly announced Japan’s strong backing for Obama’s initiative and later addressed Japan’s resolve for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by announcing ‘11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament’.

It was also reported that Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso – deeply impressed by Obama’s speech which mentioned an American ‘moral responsibility’ as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon – sent a personal letter to President Obama in order to express Japan’s strong commitment to the US initiative for non-proliferation and disarmament.

At the same time, Obama’s speech also illuminated the so-called ‘nuclear dilemma’ that inherently exists in Japan’s post-war nuclear policy. As often mentioned, while keeping its national identity as a non-nuclear state, Japan has consistently relied upon the US nuclear umbrella for its national security.

Although logic of both positions is fundamentally contradictory, the Japanese Government has been able to maintain these two different postures as integral parts of its nuclear policy.

As Japan perceives greater threats from within its region (for example, from North Korea), Japan’s ‘nuclear dilemma’ will become more prominent. Tokyo’s commitment to nuclear disarmament as a global agenda will occasionally be challenged by regional security demands, which call for credible nuclear deterrence by the United States.

This is why Japan should make greater efforts at securing regional stability, such as through the denuclearisation of North Korea. Such efforts will not only mitigate immediate threats but also help to preserve its non-nuclear identity while reducing its dependence on the US nuclear extended deterrence over the long term.

This post is adapted from a longer article, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Between Non-Nuclear Identity and US Extended Deterrence’, published in Nautilus. It can be found here.

1. Two sides of the same coin: nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy
2. Should Japan and South Korea declare a nuclear weapon-free zone?
3. The 2010 NPR: Toward a nuclear weapons free world

Peking University is, perhaps, China’s top university. Each year, every position in the School of Management and Finance receives approximately 30,000 applicants. If you get the opportunity to study there, like I did, you are studying with some of the most ambitious, intelligent and hard-working students on the planet.

Peking is an establishment that has been at the heart of intellectual, social and political movements in modern Chinese history. It is a great privilege to experience the inner workings of an institution that commands such a powerful place in the modern Chinese psyche.

After a year and a half of mingling with Peking University students and meeting internationals from world-class institutions like Harvard, Yale and Oxford, I came to the sobering conclusion that Australian graduates are grossly underprepared to compete effectively in the globalised Asian job market.

Amongst the thousands of impressions etched in my memory, this is the one that startled me most.

In an era of deep globalisation, where thousands of graduates applying for the same position in Hong Kong hail from New Delhi to Ningbo, there is still a dearth of Asia-literate Australian graduates.

This stands in sharp contrast to the huge pool of well educated, bi-lingual and culturally adept graduates from China’s top universities, graduating in their hundreds – if not thousands – year-on-year.

How, over the course of the next decade, can mono-lingual Australian graduates with little to no experience in China or Asia generally realistically expect to compete effectively with Chinese graduates in the globalised Asian market?

In Peking University there is a distinctly different ethos in respect of hard-work and ambition. Students have ‘hard-core’ attitudes to study and professional ambition. Internationals might grab a beer on the weekend; Chinese students study until their dorm lights flicker out at 11, shortly afterwards relocating to the brightly lit diners of the nearby McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chickens. These students might represent the nerds; but in Peking the nerds are the norm. The hunger to succeed pervades – and they are proud of it.

There is no ‘tall poppy’ syndrome there, only admiration – and, of course, envy and jealousy – for those who ‘make it’. Winning a graduate school scholarship to an Ivy League school in America, or a well paid job with a multinational in Hong Kong is the ultimate goal. This is a wake-up call to the levels of competition Australian and other overseas graduates in a globalised Asian job market.

This is globalisation, up close and personal.

It doesn’t stop there. Do an internship in Hong Kong and – in the globalised Asian job market – your competitors are bi-, or tri-lingual students from global top-tier schools. They hail from a regional and international who’s who of prestigious universities: Peking University, Tsinghua University, Renmin University, University of Pennsylvania, Columbia University, New York University, Oxford, Cambridge, and the London School of Economics. Not one of your fellow interns will come from a non-globally recognised university.

Chinese backgrounds are a commonplace – either full, half, or second generation Chinese. Those not from Chinese backgrounds generally have advanced Chinese, written and spoken. More often than not, the young professional making a career in China has been grooming him or herself since high school to be internationally competitive.

Professional interns in Hong Kong – leveraging family connections, the children of high net-worth families, from leading high school and university societies, engaging in volunteering activities, with families willing to paying top dollar to attend the best cram schools, the best high schools and ultimately the best universities – all share a common goal: to be internationally competitive.

These are the realities of competition within the globalised Asian job market.

ANU provides the Peking University experience if you go for it. The opportunities that follow in Hong Kong allow you to grow much faster than you ever could ever have hope at home. Beijing is an international melting pot. Its centres of learning are filled with young people where naked ambition and the relentless drive typify what young Australians are competing against in the globalised Asian market.

The sobering conclusion is that Australian graduates are grossly underequipped to embrace the rise of China and compete effectively in a globalised Asian job market. There needs to be a fundamental re-emphasis of the importance of Chinese Studies (and Asian Studies), complemented by strong corporate and government backing. To act otherwise means many exciting and lucrative opportunities that lie in Australia’s backyard will simply be out of the reach of future Australian graduates – underprepared to engage in the globalised Asian job market.

Henry Makeham is a final year Law/Asian Studies student at the ANU and a founder and President of the Australia-China Youth Association.

1. How to improve Australia’s Asia literacy
2. What does China want in international economic reforms?
3. The future of the international currency system and China’s RMB

Najib Tun Razak was sworn in as Malaysia’s sixth Prime Minister on the 3rd of April 2009. He takes over the Prime Ministership of Malaysia at a critical juncture in the history of his party.

Globally speaking, Malaysia is suffering under the worst crisis since the Great Depression. Domestically, Najib’s ruling party, the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) and the coalition that it leads, Barisan Nasional (BN), are at their lowest ebb, suffering a backlash from citizens fed up with the blatant abuse of power from a regime that has ruled Malaysia since independence.

Najib realises that party reform is critical for his and UMNO’s survival. He watched how Ahmad Badawi turned from ‘party hero’, leading UMNO and BN to a resounding victory in the 11th general election in 2004, into a ‘failed leader’ in the 12th general elections, where the citizens punished him for squandering their mandate and not instituting long-needed reforms. Badawi has been removed.

Najib knows that he will face the same consequences if he does not deliver victory for UMNO. For all its promises of loyalty, and the feudal mentality that pervades it, UMNO is ultimately driven by money and power.

Najib, who headed BN’s election campaign for the election in 2008, is aware of the challenges. BN lost four states on the more prosperous west coast of the Peninsula – Kedah, Penang, Perak and Selangor – and failed to retake poverty-ridden Kelantan on the east coast, which has been under opposition control since 1990. BN only obtained 49 per cent of popular votes on the Peninsula. Sabah and Sarawak saved BN.

Although BN won 140 of the 222 Parliamentary seats, 54 of them came from these two states on the island of Borneo, confirming that island politics are not linked to the Peninsula. Most importantly, the popular vote obtained by UMNO in the Peninsula was 35.5 per cent, which was matched closely by the combined votes of Anwar’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat) and the Islamist party (PAS).

This trend is also evident in BN’s loss of all four by-elections in Peninsular Malaysia with a face-saving win in Sarawak – the only by-election to date on the Borneo Island. The three most recent by-elections were held simultaneously to weaken the opposition campaign (two in the Peninsula, one in Sarawak), on April 7th 2009, four days after Najib was sworn in as Prime Minister. BN lost two. BN and UMNO campaigned on the platform of giving the new Prime Minister and his policy of ‘One Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ a chance; a platform that did not resonate with the electorate.

Even more worrying is that in all these by-elections, the opposition’s winning margin increased over that of the General Election despite BN training all its and the state’s resources and machinery against the opposition.

Najib also understands that Malaysia’s economic fortunes are trending downwards. Economic growth over the past 18 years has averaged just a little over 6 per cent while the average growth since the East Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 has been only 4 per cent. This is worrying as the performance has undershot all BN government targets.

In the Vision 2020 Policy, economic growth was targeted at 7 per cent per annum from 1991 to 2020 and in the Industrial Master Plan III, the target was 6.3 per cent for the plan period from 2006 to 2020, while the 9th Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) set the target for 6 per cent. While the reasons for Malaysia’s lacklustre economic performance are varied, the electorate and Opposition have laid the blame squarely at the feet of BN’s incompetence and corrupt practices.

This, of course, has raised serious questions about the credibility of the BN government’s ability to deliver on economic growth. While Federal government debt from 2000 to 2008 averaged 42.6 per cent of GDP, a manageable rate, that figure is steadily increasing as revenues progressively fall due to limited new growth areas, higher tax thresholds, increased exemptions from taxable incomes, depleting natural resources and the mismanagement of public funds.

Ever since affirmative action was introduced through the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, the government has never had a balanced budget or surplus except for the period from 1992 to 1997, when Anwar was Finance Minister. Budget deficits have been the norm despite economic cycles and, since 1999, budget deficits have consistently exceeded forecast outcomes. The slowdown in the global economy has also made Najib’s task more difficult as Malaysia, the third most open economy in Asia, relies heavily on international trade.

Najib realises that he comes with a great deal of baggage. He is the ultimate UMNO insider. He was ushered into politics on the death of his father at the age of 23, taking over his father’s seat. The son of the highly respected second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, and the nephew of the third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein On, meant that his path up the ladder in UMNO was secured. His tenure as Defence Minister was scandal ridden, with allegations of various shady defence deals, a National Service program which has resulted in the deaths of 17 young Malaysians participating in the program, and ultimately with the allegation of being complicit in a murder.

With all these setbacks, Najib realises that he must convince UMNO and BN that the critical challenge to his and their survival is to end or at least temper patronage politics, improve government efficiency, deliver on economic growth and improve race relations which had been the hallmark of the successful BN machinery of yesteryear. Najib’s policy slogan of ‘One Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ may demonstrate that both he and UMNO are beginning to understand that although Malaysia remains a country with deep-rooted racism, Malaysians of all races and creeds are increasingly doubtful about BN’s continuing rule. The BN/UMNO’s strategy of racial division has not worked in the same way as in years gone by. Voting patterns, especially among the younger generation (below 35), reveal the willingness of voters irrespective of race and social class to vote for opposition.

Najib may also realise that only substantive reforms will give him and UMNO a serious shot at redemption. Immediately after becoming the Prime Minister, he released 13 individuals, including three Hindu Rights Action Force (HINRAF) leaders – a people’s movement advocating fair treatment for the minority Malaysians of Indian heritage. They were being held under the Internal Securities Act (ISA), an Act that provides for detention without trial for unlimited period.

Najib also revoked the suspension on the biweekly internal newspapers of PAS and PKR, hoping to influence the by-election, but this had no effect. Najib correctly pointed out after the by-elections that BN had to ‘shape-up or ship out.’ Although 80 per cent of Najib’s Cabinet is comprised of Ministers from the previous Badawi administration, it is unclear how his administration will proceed in addressing the work that is needed, given all the challenges UMNO, BN and Malaysia are facing. But it seems highly unlikely that Malaysians will tolerate business as usual.

Gregore Lopez is currently pursuing a PhD in Economics at Australian National University and blogs at greglopez.wordpress.com. He also volunteers as the Editor of the Malaysia section of New Mandala. This post first appeared here on New Mandala.

1. Malaysia: the political tide runs out
2. Return to higher principles in Malaysian politics
3. Politics without priorities in Malaysia

A recent article by ‘reformed terrorist’, Tawfik Hamid, accuses Muslims worldwide of hypocrisy in their reactions on Palestine.

Hamid’s article implicitly poses one important question: why is Palestine such an important issue for Muslims around the world? Why does it set off protests in Southeast Asia, so far away? During the January Gaza bombing, Islamists closed down Indonesia’s only synagogue, and the Malaysian Muslim Consumers’ Association called for boycotts on a hundred American products in protest.

Far away from the conflict, Southeast Asian Muslims hear about the destruction in mosques, watch it on their screens, and sympathise with the Palestinians. Do these Muslims feel a genuine stake in Gaza? Do their protests, as Hamid insinuates, come from a global Islamic tendency towards hatred, rage and bigotry?

Whatever the case may be, there are more salient reasons.

Palestine is an important political issue in Malaysian and Indonesian domestic politics, and foreign policy.

First, in both countries large numbers of Muslims are genuinely faithful, and feel solidarity with other Muslims. This feeling is heightened by the increased prominence of Islam in Southeast Asian public life over the last two decades.

Palestinian politics have also Islamised, and Palestinian attacks are no longer explained as part of a national liberation struggle. This is the mood in which Southeast Asian Muslims hear about the issue in mosques and as media consumers, and donate money for relief efforts. They do this as concerned global-Muslim-citizens responding to what they view as a disaster experienced by people who are like them.

Second, in both Indonesia and Malaysia Islam is deployed strategically in domestic political competition, during and outside election campaigns. Palestine is used in both countries as a platform for competition between governments and Islamist parties and pressure groups. In Indonesia, Islamist groups demanded that the government send troops to Gaza. This statement appears ineffectual, but is calculated to achieve much: both pressuring the government to be seen to act Islamically, and polarising the community, repelling those who do not agree, but drawing closer those who might.

Third, partly in response to such pressures, governments have self-consciously Islamised their politics before domestic and international audiences. This is why Malaysia demanded – through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – an emergency United Nations General Assembly on Palestine, and unspecified sanctions against Israel.

This call was also ineffectual, but helped the government to be seen to act. It also assists Southeast Asian Muslim countries in pursuing greater economic cooperation, especially trade, between OIC member nations, partly by positioning themselves as global leaders in ‘moderate’ Islam and Islamic finance. This, incidentally, is also why they do not speak of Rohingya refugees from Burma in terms of global Muslim solidarity.

There is wide public support for the Palestinians in Southeast Asian Muslim countries. There is a Southeast Asian politics of Palestine because political actors there are as expert as any others in strategic messages, spin, and manipulating wedge issues.

1. Worlds at stake in Arab Reform
2. Obama’s choice between the state and street in Middle East
3. Indonesian Muslims in the Islamic world

The Malaysian national and state elections on 8 March 2008 surprised all observers.

Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, lost its two-thirds majority in the federal parliament, and a coalition of secular and Islamist opposition parties, Pakatan Rakyat, won five state governments.

The election saw Malaysia’s ethnic voting patterns break down to an unprecedented extent.

Pakatan leader Anwar Ibrahim heralded the result as a ‘New Dawn’ for Malaysian politics. Pakatan’s rise seemed to finally enable the creation of a new politics that could somehow unite both Islamists and liberal cosmopolitans against ethnic and religious political manipulation.

Very quickly however, the possibility of a genuine political challenge to Barisan began to fade.

Instead of articulating a post-racial vision, Anwar’s major post-election strategy has consisted of seeking defectors from the ruling coalition. He even suggested 16 September as the date Pakatan would gain the numbers to form a new federal government.

Instead, almost one year on, Pakatan’s state government in Perak has collapsed. Pakatan representatives crossed over as Barisan allies instead, reportedly in return for millions of ringgit in payment. Media speculation over the viability of the Selangor and Kedah Pakatan governments is intense.

Malaysia’s New Dawn has been reduced to a sheer numbers game. The grim calculus of attaining numerical dominance in state and federal legislatures, in turn, has seen important players launch cynical and calculated attacks based on sex, race and religion against Pakatan parliamentarians.

Two recent events have revealed that sex, race and religion are still key themes, and major political weapons, in Malaysian public life.

A Pakatan member of the Selangor state assembly, Elizabeth Wong, offered her resignation on 18 February 2009, after photographs of her sleeping semi-naked were leaked to the Malay Mail, a government-linked tabloid.

The photographs appear to have been taken without Wong’s consent by a former partner and political ally.

Despite the cruelty of the public betrayal, and Wong having broken no laws, the photographs were immediately used to slur her character. Former Barisan Chief Minister for Selangor, Mohamad Khir Toyo, quickly declared that “This is about morality”. It was not necessary to elaborate, but Khir persisted, “She is a single person. How can she allow a man into her room when they are not married?” Wong’s resignation has not yet been accepted by the Pakatan leadership, but she has effectively been shamed off the political stage. She has been one of Pakatan’s brightest stars, one of the most capable of articulating the new politics that was promised last year.

Months earlier, in September 2008, another high-profile, ethnic Chinese Pakatan member for Selangor, Teresa Kok, found her parents’ home had been firebombed.

Some weeks earlier, the same Khir Toyo had used his blog to allege that Kok had asked that a mosque in her constituency cease amplifying the azan (Muslim call to prayers). The accusation was repeated in another newspaper, Utusan Malaysia.Mosque officials quickly revealed that the amplifier was actually faulty, but Kok was arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act, which allows for indefinite detention. Several Muslim NGOs, widely regarded as government fronts, quickly declared Kok an enemy of Islam.

Fortunately for Kok, other prominent Muslim organisations denounced her detention and she was released a week later. Regardless, the insinuations continued, and Kok was accused of wearing a short skirt to a Ramadan meal to break the fast.
Attached to the Molotov cocktails was a note which mocked her racially, called her a pig, and threatened that she would burn next.

These two women’s public humiliation has been driven by two developments following the election.

First, Kok was detained on 12 September, days before Anwar’s federal government crossover deadline. The political defectors, however, did not exist.

Second, Barisan’s reduced majority has created much bitterness within its main constituent party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Abdullah was immediately blamed for the poor election result. A political succession deal was brokered and Deputy Prime Minister, Najib Tun Razak, will apparently become Prime Minister next month.

Khir, too, is involved in a major power struggle. Vying for the position of UMNO Youth Chief, Khir is hoping to undermine the Pakatan state governments with appeals to racial and religious majoritarianism, and widespread community acceptance of the moral surveillance of Malay-Muslim women.

The moral insinuations which result, along with frequent racial and religious slurs, are key features of Malaysian political life. Non-Malay, unsurveilled, non-Muslim and immoral: two prominent, unmarried and politically capable Chinese women hit all the important political triggers at once.

Pakatan component parties have condemned the attack on Wong’s character. However, Islamists in the coalition—like Barisan—have an active interest in promoting public discussion of women’s personal choices.

Other power-brokers are focused on keeping the coalition together, and on winning two upcoming by-elections in Perak and Kedah states. Without a coherent, unifying vision to bind the coalition, Pakatan has lacked the political resources to defend Wong, and her fate is uncertain.

Amrita Malhi is a PhD Candidate in the College of Asia and the Pacific at The Australian National University.

1. Return to higher principles in Malaysian politics
2. Malaysia: the political tide runs out
3. Politics without priorities in Malaysia

Can anyone ‘out-devil’ the devil? In Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim has learnt the hard way that it is impossible to outmanoeuvre Barisan Nasional (BN/National Front), Malaysia’s long-standing regime, using unethical measures. Since 8 March, 2008, BN has been at its weakest when facing the ‘Rakyat’ (citizens) at the electoral ballot but strongest when using dubious practices. The Pakatan Rakyat(PR/Citizens Alliance)-led state government in Perak lasted barely a year, brought down through the use of dubious tactics by BN. This episode must be a lesson for Anwar to desist immediately with the strategy of forming government through defection and return to higher democratic principles. Governments are best formed through elections and not defections.

The story of the Perak power grab is a remarkable one. Two PKR legislators who were charged for corruption in August 2008 – procuring monetary and sexual favours in return for approving a building project – went missing for five days.

Rumour has it that, during those five days pressure was brought on the duo (offered money in addition to having their charges dropped) to defect to BN. This was preceded by the defection of an UMNO legislator to PKR who has since rejoined UMNO. More surprising was the news that a 20 year DAP member and Deputy Speaker of the House also defected.

It looks increasingly as if Malaysia will return to an era of near-dictatorship and flagrant abuse of power under Najib. That Najib would accept two legislators who have corruption charges pending against them to regain power instead of instituting reforms to clean up the ruling coalition is worrying. Najib has sacrificed real reforms and long term gains for BN in favour of short term gains for his ambitions.

Malaysians are disgusted with how BN grabbed power in Perak. The way in which Najib orchestrated these defections (with legislators going missing) is also a worry. The fact that the private investigator who made a statutory declaration that Najib is involved in the murder of a Mongolian national is still missing only compounds this worry.

There are also constitutional concerns. When the Speaker of the House declared the two seats vacant, the Election Commissioner, went beyond his constitutional authority and ruled that the seats were not vacant. The Election Commissioner, in doing so, took upon the powers of the Speaker and the Judiciary in determining the validity of the resignations.
Anwar and PR must take full stock of these developments. There is no way that PR can outmanoeuvre BN through unethical means. PR needs to strengthen its capacity to govern, and take that message directly to the people.

As PR is a new alliance, more resources will need to be spent on strengthening it. There were clear indications that all was not well within the Perak DAP – the main reason for the DAP member’s defection. The PR government failed to stand down the two legislators who were accused of corruption, allowing BN to use the state apparatus against them. And importantly, Anwar lost the moral high ground when he accepted the defection of the UMNO member into PR.

It is becoming clear that PKR is a party without an ideology. Since its formation in 1998, it has been mostly filled with unhappy ex-UMNO politicians. There are several high ranking PKR members who have since returned to UMNO. Without any clear ideology, PKR has an uncanny ability to attract dubious characters looking for quick pay-offs from the political process, rather than with broader political ambitions. The other members of PR – the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), the Democratic Action Party of Malaysia (DAP) and the Socialist Party of Malaysia (PSM) – are used to being in the opposition, and attract individuals who are more committed to public service.

The lesson for Anwar from the Perak debacle is the need to return to higher principles. PR must challenge the validity of the BN government in Perak but it must also focus on strengthening the alliance in governing the four PR-led states.

The current global crisis presents a unique opportunity for Anwar to showcase his leadership qualities by providing sound policy proposals to lead Malaysia out of the morass it is in. Domestically, Anwar and PR should fight hard to develop a stimulus plan that allows Malaysia to weather the current global economic crisis, as well as to prepare the Malaysian economy for the future. In the region, ASEAN badly needs a charismatic figure to lead them out of the paralysis that key ASEAN members (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines) are facing. Anwar has all the pre-requisites to be a leader. But Malaysians want him to become a leader democratically and with high principles.

Gregore Lopez is currently pursuing a PhD in Economics at Australian National University and blogs at greglopez.wordpress.com. He also volunteers as the Editor of the Malaysia section of New Mandala.

1. Sex, race and religion still political weapons in Malaysian politics
2. Politics without priorities in Malaysia
3. Anwar’s victory boosts Malaysian democracy

Malaysia’s main challenge in 2009 will not be the global financial meltdown. Rather, it will be continued grandstanding between the ruling coalition and, since March 8th 2008, a much stronger opposition. The aftermath of March 8th, 2008 produced a lame duck Prime Minister with a lame duck government. The Prime Minister, Ahmad Badawi, instead of gracefully resigning for leading the United Front (Barisan Nasional) to its worst ever electoral results, stubbornly held on to the party presidency and Prime Ministership of the country.

However, members from within his party (United Malay National Organisation – UMNO) and the United Front were calling for his resignation. Simultaneously, the newly constituted opposition coalition – The Peoples Coalition (Pakatan Rakyat) led by the charismatic Anwar Ibrahim, was threatening to overthrow the ruling government through mass defection.

The lame duck Prime Minister, after intense pressure has agreed to step down in March 2009 as part of a transition plan. The current Deputy Prime Minister, Najib Tun Razak will then take over as the next Prime Minister when he is voted in at the next UMNO general assembly. Although, this plan was supposed to have improved confidence in the ruling government, the reverse has actually taken place as there exist serious doubts on the credibility of Mr. Najib as he has too many skeletons in his closet. Meanwhile, Anwar Ibrahim and the Peoples Coalition continue to threaten to topple the government.

The above situation has shifted the politicians and bureaucrats focus away from managing the country to gaining political mileage. Debates in parliaments have focused on scoring political points and not on critical issues, save a few. Policymaking has been reduced to blackmailing the citizens. A case in point was the presentation of the economic recovery plan by the Deputy Prime Minister who is also Finance Minister. The oppositions staged a walk-out of Parliament when the Finance Minister refused to answer their questions. The Deputy Prime Minister has since come under heavy criticism for providing a weak fiscal stimulus plan amounting to RM7 billion (approximately US2 billion) that is deemed to be insufficient and insinuations that it would only benefit the ruling parties cronies. However, the opposition’s proposal of RM50 billion (approximately US14.3 billion), led by the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is clearly a populist strategy. Among the recommendations were:

• RM 6,000 annual oil bonus to all families earning less than RM 6,000 a month or RM 3,000 annual bonus to bachelors earning less than RM 3,000 a month;
• Progressive reduction of corporate tax rate from the present 25per cent to 17per cent;
• Daily revision of petrol prices to take into account of changes in the international price of oil;
• Immediate reduction in gas prices as well as electricity tariffs, which was increased by 26per cent for businesses when the price of oil was USD 124 per barrel to reflect in the drop to around USD 50 per barrel; and
• An additional RM 2 billion wireless project to make all the major towns and cities in Malaysia wifi so that as many Malaysians as possible can be connected to the Internet.

While expansionary policies are a necessary response to the financial meltdown, the recommendations seem to focus on pleasing the public rather than sound economic deliberation. It is important to note that Malaysia has been running a fiscal deficit since 1998.

Sound policymaking in Malaysia may still be an illusion as Mr. Najib deals with the fallout from the by-election on January 17th, which threw serious doubt over his bid to be crowned Prime Minister. He also has to demonstrate to UMNO that he is not weak and will not give in to the demands of the non-Malay political parties in the National Front who now are themselves fighting for their political survival. At the same time, Najib must attempt to restore the peoples confidence in him in the light of serious allegations of foul-play and corruption. It is therefore unlikely, that the global financial crisis will be a priority for politicians in Malaysia for the year 2009.

–

Gregore Lopez is currently pursuing a PhD in Economics at Australian National University and blogs at greglopez.wordpress.com. He also volunteers as the Editor of the Malaysia section of New Mandala.

This is part of the special feature: Reflections on developments in Asia in 2008 and the year ahead

1. Malaysia: the political tide runs out
2. Return to higher principles in Malaysian politics
3. Malaysia: a year of economic and political reversals