Early last Friday morning, the video taken by the Japanese Coast Guard of the 7 September collision between the JCG’s Mizuki and the Yonakuni and a Chinese fishing boat, the Min Jin Yu-5179 was leaked to youtube by a user known only as Sengoku38. There is no doubt that this is the real footage.

It is ironic that the characters forming the name of the Min Jin Yu refers to the start of the Warring States period in Chinese history. This connection has been picked up by the leaker of the footage, whose name ‘Sengoku38′ means ‘Warring States 38’. The 38 in the leaker’s name may refer to events during the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1938, a disturbing suggestion of a neo-nationalist agenda. Indeed, this name seems to symbolize the possibility that this incident will mark the start of an adversarial relationship rather than simply rivalry between China and Japan.

What does it show?

The footage was released in six parts, all up 44minutes (links provided in the footer). The first three parts merely show the JCG warning (in Chinese) the Min Jin Yu that it had entered Japanese territory and to retreat from the area.  A voice is heard giving the time (10:05) and location (N26 01.7, E123.37.1). In the fourth part, the collision occurs. The captain of the fishing boat, Zhan Qixiong, seems to have waited until the Yonakuni has ‘crossed his T’, (that is, was directly in front and perpendicular to the Min Jin Yu) before accelerating suddenly and steering towards the Yonakuni – Captain Zhan could have easily avoided this and there seems no question about the deliberate nature of the first collision.

The fifth section opens with the JCG Mizuki running parallel to the Min Jin Yu. Warnings are issued to ‘Stop Engine’ in Chinese, English and Japanese while a siren sounds. At 10:55am, the Min Jin Yu turns left suddenly and collides with the Mizuki’s mid-section. The sixth section is a view of the same from another JCG cutter, the Hateruma. The footage shows the Min Jin Yu apparently behaving recklessly and causing the second collision.

The location of the first incident places it inside the Provisional Measure Zone of the 1997 Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement (discussed here) and therefore outside its provisions for joint use of the area. This means that only the flag-state (in this case China) is permitted to arrest/detain or investigate breaches of the Agreement (although it must respond to notification from the China-Japan Joint Fisheries Committee). Japan is not permitted to take action against a boat which is suspected of a fishery violation.

But is Japan entitled to action against a boat which is behaving aggressively, with whatever provocation?

The answer to this issue is open to debate, but the answer will depend at least in part on whether Japan was acting to protect public safety at sea or to further its own narrow national interest by changing the status quo around the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. Clearly what is upsetting to China is that Japan’s act of boarding the Min Jin Yu and arresting Captain Zhan smacks of Japan exercising sovereign rights under Article 73 of the UN Laws of the Sea – even if Japan’s acts were not designed to change the status quo. Moreover, the decision to arrest Captain Zhan occurred nearly 12 hours after the collisions. This suggests that a deliberate decision was made to make an arrest, and that this decision was probably made by Japan’s executive (Kan Naoto and Maehara Seiji) in consultation with Ministry Foreign Affairs. Indeed, China is targeting already the Foreign Minister after his comments at Hanoi.

Although the video footage had been viewed in private by Japanese parliamentarians, the decision to release the video to the public was at the time not only pending but seemed unlikely. The subsequent leakage has left Prime Minister Kan Naoto, Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji and Defence Minister Kitazawa Toshimi to thunder impotently about investigating the source. As noted elsewhere, the effect of Kan’s handling of the issue has cost him much popular support, and this footage will damage him further.

Interestingly, one effect of the incident has not been the abandonment of 1997 Fisheries Agreement, at least not yet. The Agreement can be terminated after six months by either of the party on notice. Sengoku Yoshito has expressed his continued support for the process, and the continued existence of the Agreement provides something of symbol that the two countries still wish to return the situation to the status quo ante and get on with things. There is acknowledgement at the top that the two countries simply cannot afford to be adversaries.

View footage of the collision: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

Joel Rathus is a recent PhD graduate from Adelaide University and a regular contributor to the East Asia Forum.

1. The Senkaku Islands incident and Japan-China relations
2. China-Japan trawler incident: Japan’s unwise – and borderline illegal – detention of the Chinese skipper
3. Japan-China relations stand at ground zero

There has been a lot happening in North East Asia recently. December 13th last year saw the first ever Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Meeting. The meeting was in planning for a long time and long overdue, but given a sense of urgency due to the global financial crisis.

Now attention again has shifted back to the two giants, Japan and China, who have hit a rough patch right before the 9th Strategic Dialogue to be held today in Tokyo. The meeting is timely as last week saw the return of the dispute over the islands in the East China Sea which have potential oil and gas reserves. This issue has been the subject of past Strategic Dialogue meetings but goes back much further. It appeared to have been finally resolved in June last year in an historic agreement where joint exploration of the potential reserves was agreed to. Now private Chinese firms are said to be exploring the reserves on the Chinese side of the agreed border but the issue is whether they could be extracting reserves from the seabed on the Japanese side. Tokyo has lodged a series of official complaints.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura said recently,

The Japanese government has conveyed that such unilateral development by the Chinese side is unacceptable and regrettable. We have lodged protests over the matter.

To this, the Chinese Foreign Ministry claims

Gas fields such as Tianwaitian are located in waters controlled by China that are not under dispute. China’s development activities in such gas fields constitute the exercising of its sovereign right.

This issue has the potential to escalate and into more than just official complaints. It is a serious issue. China’s reference to the issue of sovereignty and how this is ultimately resolved has potential implications for all other sensitive border and sovereignty troubles, namely: India, Taiwan, Russia, Vietnam and even Tibet. Hopefully the Strategic Dialogue meeting today will lead to a resolution.

The Strategic Dialogue meeting is conducted at the Vice Ministerial level, not between Foreign Ministers. The High Level Economic Dialogue, the first ever of which was conducted in 2007, includes both Foreign Ministers. This recognition of the importance of the China-Japan economic relationship was overdue.

Tokyo and Beijing have been growing closer since that period which saw no leadership visits for 6 years from 2001. Indeed, the Strategic Dialogue was launched in 2005 in the middle of the ‘frozen period’ of Sino-Japan relations.

If both Foreign Ministers are now meeting under the guise of a High Level Economic Dialogue, perhaps the time has come for them to beef up the Strategic Dialogue.

–

See other articles on Sino-Japan relations

1. The India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue
2. Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
3. A new start for Japan-China relations?

Taro Aso is scheduled to visit Beijing on October 24 and 25 for the the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) but the focus of the trip will be in his planned meeting with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao.

Aso was foreign minister from October 2005 until August 2007 but did not visit China once. It would have been difficult for him to do so during Koizumi’s time (which doesn’t mean that he shouldn’t have) but it is surprising he didn’t during Abe’s leadership which started in October 2006.

While Abe was breaking the ice, Wen Jiabao was melting the ice, Hu Jintao was playing ping pong and Fukuda was warming ties, Aso was making random noises in the background and staying away from China.

At least Aso is going now, but his trip this time is may be too late. Chances are slim for him to make any significant positive impact on the bilateral relationship; his best chance may have come and gone as foreign minister. 

What can Aso achieve with so many battles on the domestic front and polls showing the LDP could lose the impending election? It was widely believed Aso would call a November election but it seems the financial crisis which has also engulfed Japan (the Japanese stock market being hit harder than most Asian countries last week) has given him some breathing room. The opposition DPJ finally supporting the bill to extend the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean (a tactical retreat according to Tobias Harris) and the chance to push through a 10 trillion yen economic stimulus package might be short term domestic victories that could give him a bounce in the polls with enough momentum going into the elections. 

Aso’s upcoming visit to China would be to delivered something that is not presently anticipated to build on the significance of the last few bilateral leadership visits. There is a chance that the powerful Japanese bureaucracy pushes an initiative through but their power in running the country has waned. More likely the visit, from a leader who could be one of the shortest serving PMs in Japanese history (a bold claim given recent experience!), will be a small blip on the radar screen of current Sino-Japanese relations.

1. Low expectations for Aso’s trip to Beijing
2. China, multilateralism, and Obama’s trip to Asia
3. Japan-China Strategic Dialogue enough?

Taro Aso starts his prime ministership in Japan this week.

A few years ago you couldn’t imagine headlines such as ‘Aso vows to build friendly relationship with S. Korea, China’ or ‘Japan PM Hopeful Aso Seeks Friendship With China, S Korea’.

There is an underlying dynamic in the Japan-China relationship that is too strong for a hawk even of Aso’s stature to try fight – he has to go with it. The turning point in the Sino-Japanese relationship in recent times was the 2005 anti-Japan protests in China.

Aso as foreign minister moving (un?)willingly with the tide, AP Photo by Everett Kennedy Brown

The revision of Chinese history textbooks in Chinese high schools is one significant yet little known outcome of the turning point in the relationship.

The treatment of Japanese imperialism in Japanese history textbooks has been highly publicised and criticised by China and Korea, and has been a sensitive sticking point in relations. While revisionist Japanese history textbooks are worth a post or two, there is plenty of analysis available (Wikipedia has a nice write up, for example).

But what is less well known and receives much less attention is the changing coverage of the same time period in Chinese textbooks. These changes have arguably more impact on the Japan-China relationship than the Japanese textbooks.

Chinese history textbooks were revised after the 2005 riots to tone down the anti-Japanese rhetoric. The Danwei blog reproduces an article from the Phoenix Weekly:

In previous history texts, the anti-Japanese War and the war of liberation each received a separate chapter, totalling 49 pages. The new edition puts them together, with only 28 pages between the two. . .

The same piece then goes on a rant from the perspective of a teacher with a nationalist bent:

Against the current rise of the right wing’s power in Japan and its distortion of historical facts and denial of an invasive war, a middle school teacher said, “This looks bad, if we shrink this period of history in the textbooks, how will we commemorate history? Can we ask Japan to learn from historical facts again?”

Why did the Chinese curriculum tone down the anti-Japanese section in the history textbooks? The anti-Japan protests in 2005 got out of hand for the Chinese government. What started as permission for a small scale protest got out of hand with emails and text messages spreading faster and wider than the authorities had anticipated. Although billed as a protest against Japan’s Yasukuni shrine visits and increased revisionist rhetoric from Japan, the protest quickly became a vehicle to protest against anything and everything as it was one of the only windows open to voice political grievances in China. The protesters were both blue collar and white collar workers and spanned both young and old.

China as a nation had made their point to the Japanese and the situation had almost got out of hand in China.

The protests marked a turning point in the Japan-China relationship. The Chinese narrative portraying Japan had changed and the events brought a new recognition in Japan of how fragile the relationship with neighbour was.

1. Hatoyama victory a watershed in Japanese post war history: a view on the Japanese election from China
2. Yasukuni shrine
3. Sino-Japan ties warming

The Japan-China relationship is improving.

That’s the result of a survey conducted by the China Daily and Tokyo-based non-profit group Genron-NPO, which polled 1,557 Chinese urban residents in five major cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Xi’an, Chengdu and Shenyang, and 1,037 students in five Chinese universities. 1,000 urban residents and 400 ‘intellectuals’ were surveyed in Japan in June and July.

While each group surveyed responded more positively than the year before, the differences among the groups within the countries is stark. But more interesting is the disconnect in perceptions between the two countries.

It seems that, of the urban samples in the survey, 80 per cent on the Chinese side thought the relationship had improved, compared to only 22 per cent in Japan.

The explanation?

Chinese people’s improved opinion of Japan are directly related to President Hu’s ‘warm spring trip’ and the subsequent promotion of all-round cooperation.

The Japanese support during the earthquake in May, including the sending of rescuers, is also something the Chinese will not forget.

says Cheng Manli, deputy dean of Peking University’s school of journalism and communication.

Japanese support during the earthquake was the subject of the very first post on this blog and it looks as if that support has contributed to the improved perceptions of Japan in China.

Indeed, under Fukuda’s leadership the countries have become closer politically. I have argued that it is in fact more than just a China-friendly Fukuda or the retreat from the strong anti-Japan bent that got out of hand in the 2005 anti-Japan riots (which proved to be a good chance, indeed the only chance, to protest against anything and everything) but a recognition of the importance of the economic relationship. Obvious signs include pro-China behaviour from some very nationalist Japanese leaders, both past (Abe) and perhaps future (Aso).

There is a long way to go in building trust, however, with the survey results showing that the Nanjing Massacre is the one thing that most reminds Chinese people of Japan.

Update: Kazuo Ogoura, currently President of the Japan Foundation and Professor of Political Science at Aoyama Gakuin University, had a piece in the Japan Times a few days ago titled Roots of antipathy toward China which has some explanations of the not-so-positive Japanese sentiment towards China.

The key sentence for me is: ‘Japan’s own feeling of frustration is being projected into a form of “rejection” or “resistance” to China.’ which he explains is because of the ‘Japanese factor: Japanese people’s frustration over its own economic growth, political stalemate and demographic changes tend to find outlets on the foreign target of China.’

1. The Prime Ministers Fukuda and Sino-Japan relations
2. Strategic economic engagement for stronger Sino-American ties
3. Japan-U.S. ties crucial for East Asia community

There will always be some ‘noise’ in a relationship as big as that between Japan and China, no matter how close and robust it becomes. The important thing is that disagreements and tensions don’t dominate the relationship. Much of the tone depends on how the relationship is managed at the top, by each country’s leaders.

Yasukuni shrine

Last week’s news that three Japanese cabinet ministers, 53 Diet members, and former PM Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine on the 15th of August – the anniversary of the end of WWII and the most politically hot day for Japanese politicians to visit the shrine from a Chinese and Korean perspective – is the latest ‘noise’. The visit itself is not unexpected for domestic political reasons, and involved mostly the usual suspects. Cabinet members who went were Japanese Agricultural Minister Seiichi Ota, Justice Minister Okiharu Yasuoka, and Consumer Affairs Minister Seiko Noda.

A surprise was that former PM Koizumi also visited. This is curious since many believed Koizumi was only visiting Yasukuni shrine as Prime Minister to keep an election promise which he had to make to garner the support of the right. Mindy Kotler’s piece discusses Koizumi’s visit in more detail.

Fukuda of course stayed away from Yasukuni. More surprisingly, so did Taro Aso. Since Aso, who is now LDP General Secretary, is widely seen as positioning himself for taking the Prime Ministership after Fukuda, not going to Yasukuni is a sign of the underlying importance of the Sino-Japan relationship for Japan and Aso’s recognition of this.

Aso’s base is from the right. He is a revisionist, and he is widely regarded as unfriendly towards China. In 2006, as Foreign Minister, he said it was desirable for the Emperor should visit the shrine. Fukushima, the Social Democratic Party (DSP) leader said Aso:

…ignored the constitutional principle of separation of politics and religion, as well as the severe consequences caused by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Aso’s response?

The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It’s just like when you’re told ‘Don’t smoke cigarettes,’ it actually makes you want to smoke. It’s best [for China] to keep quiet.

In the past a visit by Aso to Yasukuni might have seemed on the cards but there are now too many business and strategic interests that favour avoiding a freeze in the relationship like that which occurred when Koizumi visited Yasukuni between 2001 and 2006.

The political instinct in Japan is that cold political relations with China are damaging to the economic relationship on which Japan is increasingly dependent and a Prime Ministerial aspirant Aso now seems to agree.

1. Ambivalence in Japanese sentiment over China
2. Aso and Chinese history textbooks?
3. Low expectations for Aso’s trip to Beijing

The 63rd anniversary of the end of the Sino-Japan war, and WWII, on the 15th of August last week passed with very little media attention, at least in the US and in Australia.

In fact last week was an even more significant week for Sino-Japan than usual. The 12th of August was the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. This also, to my knowledge, passed without much press (there was some news of course, such as reports of then resident liaison of the Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Japan’s Hiroaki Kitamura’s insight into the negotiations of the Treaty).

This was not an insignificant treaty. Current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s father Takeo Fukuda was Prime Minister then and was instrumental according to Yosuke Nakae, former director general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asia bureau:

Fukuda and then Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda were the two most important Japanese politicians in the negotiation for the treaty and their enthusiastic attitude and persistent efforts contributed much to the success of the negotiation.

He quotes Takeo Fukuda as saying the treaty helped upgrade Japan-China relations to an ‘iron bridge’ from a ‘hanging bridge when the two countries just formed diplomatic relations (in 1972).

The Treaty was signed in response to the then growing tensions surrounding disputed islands between Japan and China in 1978, right after the bilateral trade agreement signed earlier that year.

There is of course the usual “noise” in the relationship, such as last week’s news that three Japanese cabinet ministers, 53 Diet members, and former PMs Abe and Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine on the 15th.

Despite the usual noise in the relationship, the relationship is in the best shape it has been in recent times, as I noted recently and the EAF has reported here and here. The Japanese Foreign Minister is in China for 3 days as right now and is discussing joint development of gas fields in disputed territory and seeking resolution of the North Korean abductees issue with his Chinese counter part, Yang Jiechi.

The pendulum of Japanese politics could swing back to the right – see Tobias Harris on increasing chances of a hawkish Aso as the next PM. Now might be an opportune time for the younger Fukuda to show the ‘enthusiastic attitude and persistent efforts’ (read: leadership) which his father showed in bringing Japan and China closer together. There is now some political space for a new initiative to secure the Sino-Japan relationship from political noise, as I have said before. Does the younger Fukuda have the time to use it?

1. The Fukuda government’s China tightrope walk
2. Sino-Japan ties warming
3. A sea of trouble in Sino-Japanese relations

Hugh White on the solution to peace in Asia:

…Crispin suggests that the best solution is for China and Japan to learn to get on. Of course that is right, and we should all hope that they do. But how likely is that? And what if they don’t? Hoping for the best is not a policy.

Indeed, as the Republicans would say to the Obama camp, ‘hope is not a plan’, well, here is a step in the right direction (from Xinhuanet on Friday):

A senior official of the Communist Party of China (CPC) said here Friday that the CPC is willing to work with the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to promote the Sino-Japanese strategic and reciprocal partnership.

Wang spoke highly of the great significance of President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Japan in May and his presence in the Outreach Session of the Group of Eight Summit in Japan in pushing forward China-Japan relationships.

He said the CPC is willing to work with LDP to seriously carry out the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries and facilitate bilateral political mutual trust, in a bid to promote the Sino-Japanese strategic and reciprocal partnership.

Yamasaki Taku again expressed deep sympathy regarding China’s May 12 earthquake in southwest Sichuan Province and wished Beijing Olympic Games a complete success.

He said the Japanese government and the LDP both attached great importance to the development of China-Japan ties and is willing to promote the Japan-China relationship through party-to party exchange.

The two sides also exchanged in-depth views on such issues as the regional situation.

Some of my work suggests that it is indeed the economics that is driving the politics [full paper in pdf]. The economic relationship continues to boom and the countries are sorting out some of their differences. Some evidence of closer ties:

• A hawkish Abe visited Beijing on his first trip as PM
• The recent agreement on a gas exploration deal in the East China Sea, striking a compromise over a long-running bilateral row
• Japanese navy destroyer visiting China last month

Bloomberg has a piece on where some experts think the relationship is at.

1. Japan-China Strategic Dialogue enough?
2. Japan Self-Defense Forces in China?
3. Thoughts on Japan-China

The Japanese Destroyer, Sazanami was led into Zhanjiang military port yesterday by the Shenzhen, a Chinese missile destroyer (and the first Chinese navy ship to visit Tokyo last November).

This is the first time the Japanese navy has been in China since World War II.

The 4,600 ton warship and its 240 member crew arrived in Zhanjiang (in Guangdong province) loaded with relief supplies. The supplies (mostly food, blankets, hygiene masks and disinfectant) are being unloaded today and will travel by train to Sichuan to aid the recovery of the Sichuan earthquake victims. (CCTV)

The visit has received wide coverage in Chinese media, with Chinese sailors lined up to welcome the ship under the flags of both countries.

Last week China and Japan announced an agreement for joint development of a gas field in the East China Sea which had been a major source of long term tension, while China and Taiwan held their first formal talks in a decade this month.

These developments are potentially important for broader regional cooperation.

Responding to Kevin Rudd’s “Asia Pacific Community” speech, Qin Gang, spokesperson for China’s Foreign ministry said:

It is the trend of the contemporary times to strengthen regional cooperation. We hope relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific region can work together and have more exchanges so as to build up political mutual trust, deepen cooperation of mutual benefit, promote common development and share win-win progress. We are open to every proposal conducive to this goal.

True to his word.

1. China, Japanese security and the bomb!
2. Japan and China continue to narrow divide
3. Hatoyama victory a watershed in Japanese post war history: a view on the Japanese election from China

This headline says it all: Japan military to provide China quake aid. . . as Observing Japan says, these are indeed strange days.

*update: unfortunately both sides saw too many obstacles (historical and emotional) and as of Friday had to scrap the plan. Instead the Japanese government is chartering commercial aircraft to do the job.

1. The legitimacy of Japan’s Self Defense Forces
2. Japan and China continue to narrow divide
3. Japan: The Hatoyama government will delay on defense policy