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Canada and China: Beyond Engagement

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In Brief

The fundamentals of Canada’s approach to the PRC were put in place by the government of Pierre Trudeau after recognition in 1970.  They engendered a durable consensus that lasted for a generation.  Successive Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments all made China a priority, established political contacts at the highest levels, encouraged as many connections with China as possible, and calculated that despite major differences in values and interests Canada could play a positive role in China’s constructive emergence in the international community.

The consensus was never complete but at senior political levels it was never seriously challenged, save for a brief period following Tiananmen Square in 1989.  It reached its high water mark in Prime Minister Martin and President Hu’s announcement of the “strategic partnership” in September 2005.

Four months later, a new Conservative minority government was elected. It took power with a special sympathy for democratic Taiwan, little actual contact with China or foreign affairs, and an ideological mindset on China more consonant with American neo-conservatism than traditional Canadian conservatism.  More than one Conservative MP characterized China as a “godless totalitarian country with nuclear weapons aimed at us.”

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Prime Minister Harper’s government rarely made statements on foreign policy.  But its rhetoric of a “principled foreign policy” gave a higher priority to freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  Its approach to China can be described as “warm economics, cool politics.”  It put the strategic partnership on ice, dispatched ministers to deal with practical matters, encouraged deeper economic interactions with China through its Gateway project, defended Chinese imports, and identified China, along with India, as an emerging economy of special importance to Canada.

At the same time, no special efforts were made to culture political relations at the top level.  It pushed the envelope on the Tibet question. The Prime Minister became personally involved in the case of a Canadian citizen of Uighur descent imprisoned in China on terrorism charges.  And in a celebrated remark he stated his unwillingness to overlook human rights abuses in China for the sake of the almighty dollar.

Canadian diplomats, business leaders, academics and opposition MPs cringed and criticized but had little impact. A peculiar feature of the Conservative shift was that it was never enunciated in a major speech or policy statement and never generated anything approaching a serious public or academic debate. A crie de coeur by Bruce Gilley in the journal Canadian Foreign Policy is the only published piece that makes a case for the values-based approach with democracy and human rights promotion at its centre.

Last week’s federal election returned the Conservative government to power with more seats in the House of Commons, though still short of a majority.  During the campaign the Prime Minister indicated that he would visit China soon and there were hints of a desire to warm bilateral political relations.

Some welcome these signs as harbingers of a full restoration of relations and the old consensus. They see signs of a new moderation and sophistication in Conservative thinking and rightly point to the economic crisis in the US as ushering in a new era that demonstrates the virtues of diversified markets and underscores China’s rising heft as a global power.

Possible, but by no means certain. First, the ideological wing of the Conservative party in Western Canada has deep fundamentalist roots and shows no signs of supporting a reversal of line.  Second, increased Conservative support in several urban ridings with a large Chinese (and Indian) population may well be interpreted as support for the hardline strategy.  Third, some in the government still believe that “warm economics, cool politics” is working.  Until very recently, trade numbers and commodity prices have been positive.

Fourth, and most importantly, public attitudes towards China are hardening.  A national survey by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada this year revealed that Canadians sense the power shift that is happening across the Pacific.  While most see more economic opportunities than threats in China’s rise, they are worried about job losses, apoplectic about Chinese product safety, concerned about China’s defence modernization, and persuaded that the human rights situation is China is deteriorating rather than improving.

In the mainstream media and public discourse, human rights abuses in China are recurrent topics.  This hit a high point during the Tibet crisis in March and the subsequent coverage of the Olympics.  China is an encyclopedia of social evils and few of them have gone unreported.  For the first time democracy promotion in China is a serious topic in Ottawa led by an unusual coalition of MPs from all four major parties.  There is serious talk of new instruments such as a national Democracy Institute for promoting democracy abroad and new international institutions of the like minded along the lines of a Concert or League of Democracies.
The China policy challenge for Mr. Harper’s government in its second term is twofold.  The first is to reestablish traction with his Chinese counterparts at the highest level and to reinstate a comprehensive relationship.  In addition to the promotion of Canadian values and expanding commercial ties, there is a full range of global issues for which the solution runs through Beijing.  In the Globe and Mail on October 20th I outlined seven steps that the government could take to boost relations.

The second is to show leadership in persuading a sceptical Canadian public that dealing with China is not just in Canada’s economic interest but is a necessity born of China’s global significance.  The level of anxiety and criticism of China is bound to grow along with its power and influence.  China is no longer “over there” but is a lived daily reality for most Canadians.

Preparing Canadians for the political and economic implications of life with a Sinic superpower will need to go well beyond engagement and demand a recalibration of priorities and self-understanding.

Expanding bilateral relations may ultimately prove easier than preparing Canadians for a world order where (a) the institutions they have valued since the Second World War are of declining significance; and (b) the projection of “universal” values they believe in will need to be replaced by the more modest prospect of working toward “shared” ones.

Paul Evans is Professor in the College for Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of British Columbia, recently returned after a three-year secondment as Co-CEO at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.

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