The most conspicuous of these relates to India.  I expect India will receive increased attention.  Above all, it’s vibrant democracy and traditions of robust cultural pluralism will attract him to it. The potential for India to buttress American interests in Afghanistan and Iraq and in counter-balancing China’s rise will reinforce this.  All of these factors lead me to expect an intensified drive for engagement with India. 

I do not expect major change in America’s approach to China.  Two overarching factors are likely to continue to dominate: he will have growing need for China’s cooperation on economic matters and he will be unable to escape the inexorable challenge of China’s growing geopolitical weight for American strategic interests.  Beyond this, his instincts will be to reach out to social, economic and political reformers in China – to the extent circumstances in China afford opportunities for this.

Indonesia is an intriguing case. Although he has said very little about this during the campaign, there are indications that his time in Indonesia has strongly positive associations for him.  His willingness to make time during the presidential campaign for personal meetings with private Indonesian citizens who knew his mother from her years there, offers a small window onto this dimension of his background.  Published and private accounts suggest Indonesia carries very positive associations and experiences of cultural pluralism.  This is unlikely to have major consequences for America’s approach to Indonesia, but it could lead to efforts to ensure a particularly capable envoy is chosen as Ambassador and a heightened interest in engaging with Indonesia.

But the most interesting bilateral question, I think, will centre on Obama and Japan.  Obama appears to have no significant connection to or affinity for Japan.  His political instincts are unlikely to lead him to place the same heavy emphasis on Japan’s importance as ally as Bush.  And Japan is unlikely to put itself forward as a strong, active partner on the international issues that matter most for him. While I don’t expect any conspicuous change here, I would not be surprised if there is a subtle easing in American prioritization of Japan.

Finally, Obama’s interest in rebuilding America’s international image and relationships will almost certainly lead to a renewed emphasis on multilateral engagements.  I would not be at all surprised if – as part of this general orientation – he finds Kevin Rudd’s Asia-Pacific Community initiative a very convenient opportunity for advancing America’s collective engagement with Asia.  There is a strong chance of multiple interests coinciding on that particular piece of policy space.