The President resorted to populist rhetoric in order to explain the move to ordinary citizens, referring to hordes of self-serving government officials, and implying that only he could tame rampaging bureaucracy and curb pervasive corruption. Since early September the President gave a series of speeches about the need for political reforms ‘in order to turn our Republic into a genuinely independent and successful state with a high quality of life’, the key component of which would be the establishment of a streamlined state machine ‘free from the obsolete and ineffective decision-making system inherited from the USSR’. At a cabinet meeting on 20 October Bakiev revealed the true contours of these reforms, which boiled down to the transfer of executive authority from the government ministries to the presidency. Under the circumstances, the incumbent Prime Minister Igor Chudinov had no choice but to resign at the end of the meeting.

At the core of Bakiev’s plan is the establishment of the President’s Institute, which will be tasked with both strategic planning and the day-to-day management of national affairs. The so-called ‘power block’ of the government – defense, law enforcement, and state security – are now directly subordinated to the head of state. The Prime Minister has also lost control over the conduct of foreign relations. All government assets in the economy will be pooled under the Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation (CADII), which is to become an integral part of the Institute. The President has also arrogated the right to appoint all deputy regional governors, heretofore a prerogative of the Premier.

This reform signifies the consolidation of the super-presidential regime of Kurmanbek Bakiev. Since coming to office in 2005, he has been working hard to expand his personal authority. In 2007, he pushed through a new Constitution, increasing the power of the executive at the expense of the legislative. That same year his political party gained 85 per cent of parliamentary seats in elections which were widely criticised by international observers as unfair. In July 2009, President Bakiev was reelected for a second term in a similarly controversial poll. The only remaining threat to his pre-eminence could now come from within the ruling regime itself, and the current government reform should be viewed from this angle.

The dismissal of Chudinov has little to do with a drive to increase efficiency and tackle corruption. Chudinov did a very good job steering the country through present economic crisis. An ethnic Russian, he is widely regarded as a neutral figure not connected to any of the major oligarchic groups and patron-client networks operating in Kyrgyzstan, which cannot be said about his replacement.

Daniyar Usenov heads a power clique only loosely affiliated to that of Bakiev’s. Usenov proved useful to Bakiev in the heady days and aftermath of the 2005 coup against then President Askar Akaev, but subsequently became somewhat of a liability as the head of the presidential administration. His transferal to the much-truncated premiership, while nominally a promotion, may well enable Bakiev eventually to get rid of a powerful political actor and potential rival for the supreme position.

One appointment within the President’s Institute last week is particularly indicative of Bakiev’s rationale for the reform. The President’s 32-year old son, Maxim Bakiev, became the head of CADII and is now formally in charge of Kyrgyzstan’s economic development. The opinion on the ground in Bishkek is that Kurmanbek Bakiev is grooming a successor to run the country after his second term expires in 2014. A precedent of this kind has already been set in the former USSR by the first president of Azerbaijan, Heidar Aliev, who placed his son Ilham in a series of government posts in the twilight years of his tenure. Ilham Aliev succeeded his father as President in 2003. Perhaps, super-presidentialism may mutate into a system of dynastic rule in Kyrgyzstan, too.

Kirill Nourzhanov is Senior Lecturer, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, ANU.