Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan has called for a ‘close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship’ and proposed the creation of an ‘East Asia community.’ But it has not fleshed out what that really entails, prompting a high-ranking U.S. administration official to express concern that those labels have begun to take on a life of their own.
In particular, some officials in the Obama administration are beginning to show frustration over Japanese wavering on the issue of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
Hatoyama, along with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, have all in recent days offered up their proposals, ranging from moving the Futenma facility outside of Okinawa Prefecture, to consolidating its functions at the U.S. Kadena Air Base and to sticking with the agreement to construct an offshore base off the coast of Henoko in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture.
In mid-October, U.S. government national security experts, led by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, visited Japan for discussions with their counterparts.
Suzanne Basalla, country director for Japan at the Pentagon, explained in detail the U.S. government’s position concerning the Futenma issue.
On the first page of a document prepared by the U.S. side marked confidential was Article VI of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which reads, ‘For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.’
This article is not found in any other mutual security treaty that the United States has with its allies.
Although Japan cannot provide military support due to constitutional restrictions should the United States come under attack, the United States will provide its troops to defend Japan. In exchange, Japan provides bases for use by the U.S. military. That is the essence of security cooperation between Japan and the United States.
In the October discussions, the Americans wanted to reiterate the importance of this point.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Japan soon thereafter and his discussions with Japanese officials contained nothing about China or North Korea.
After calling on Japanese government leaders to make a decision on the Futenma issue before Obama arrives in Japan, Gates quickly departed.
There are some in Washington who fear that the Hatoyama government may be trying to emulate policies championed by governments led by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and the late Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea.
When he was prime minister of Malaysia in the early 1990s, Mahathir proposed the East Asian Economic Caucus that would not have allowed the United States as a participant.
As South Korea’s president, Roh at one time proposed playing the role of balancer between the United States and China.
Some in Washington are now worried that the new Hatoyama government may be trying to copy Roh, especially with Hatoyama’s references to wanting to serve as a ‘bridge’ to other nations.
One high-ranking Obama administration official noted: ‘Even the most spectacular bridge needs an entrance and an exit for anyone to traverse it. Rather than talk endlessly about the ideal bridge, Japan should firm up the foundation of its relations with its Asian neighbors. While that would also be in the interests of the United States, Japan should also not forget that the United States is part of the Asia-Pacific region and feels at home in this area of the world.’
What has been somewhat surprising to the Hatoyama government is the lack of enthusiasm within Asia, and especially from China, for the East Asia Community proposal.
In his diplomatic debut in late September at the United Nations, Hatoyama met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and enthusiastically explained his proposal. Hu, however, barely responded.
At a subsequent meeting of the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made a commitment to making the proposed community a long-term goal, but Japanese officials felt his heart was not totally in it.
U.S. officials quietly provided Tokyo with ‘their input’ on that issue.
Those U.S. officials said Chinese diplomats had confided to American experts that China was puzzled by the absence of the United States in Hatoyama’s conception of an East Asia community.
Those whispers were likely in reference to the omission of the United States when Okada rattled off the names of nations that would be included in the community.
A Japanese government official said: ‘China is likely maneuvering to prevent Japan from playing a leadership role in East Asia. China might also be trying to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States by taking advantage of this issue.’
What may lie at the heart of the discrepancies emerging between Japan and the United States is the thinking that the Japan-U.S. alliance and the East Asia community are mutually exclusive concepts.
In the background to Japan’s ‘lost decade’ that followed the end of the Cold War was the nation’s inability to create deep relationships of trust with its Asian neighbors.
Japan failed to demonstrate leadership during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s. By not dealing sincerely with the history issue, Tokyo had made many Asians feel less comfortable about Japan.
To make matters worse, the global economic crisis that was triggered in the fall of 2008 demonstrated that Japan and other Asian economies can no longer continue with a growth strategy that depends on exports to the United States.
With the emergence of the Group of 20 as a major forum in the world, the end of the G7 or the G8 as globally representative bodies is approaching.
East Asia’s economic growth and integration are now the most pressing strategic issues facing Japan.
What will be most important is creating a region that could transform into the East Asia community by basing the process on the concept of an ‘open regionalism.’
The way to do that would be by connecting the region to the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Unlike moves early in the Meiji Era (1868-1912) to ‘leave Asia, enter the West,’ the historical mission for Japan in this century should be to ‘enter Asia, enter the West.’
What are some steps that have to be taken?
・Japan’s relations with other Asian nations will only be stable if the Japan-U.S. alliance is rock solid. Good relations with Asian nations will in the future maintain and further develop the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Japan should push simultaneously for free trade agreements with both the United States on the one hand and China and South Korea on the other.
There is also a need to bring about a policy dialogue among Japan, the United States and China.
・Japan and the United States should seek out ways to enhance their alliance by strengthening the mutually complementary roles of the two nations, focusing on the areas in which the two nations are skilled or influential.
Japan can play a major role for peace and stability in the world in such areas as economic development, the environment, disarmament and international peacekeeping operations.
・The Japan-U.S. alliance will only be stable through smart management of military bases. In order to accomplish that, there is a need to reduce the excessive ‘footprint’ on Okinawa Prefecture.
The high road toward that goal would be for Japan to develop trust with its Asian neighbors and to create a strong and multilateral framework for peace.
That process should overlap with the path toward the creation of an East Asia community.
・On the Futenma move, the proposals to move the functions out of Okinawa Prefecture or to consolidate the functions at Kadena will be difficult because of strong resistance to those proposals both within Japan and among Okinawans.
The most realistic alternative will be to position the move to Henoko and the transfer of Marines to Guam as the first step in the consolidation and transformation of U.S. bases in Japan.
In any democratic nation, the weakest point for any opposition party that gains control of the government is in foreign affairs and national security.
The Hatoyama government is no exception.
A change of government is a risk factor for other nations because it could lead to a change of the status quo. For that reason, the greatest care must be used in presenting any new course.
What is likely most lacking on the part of the Hatoyama government is its ability to foster nemawashi, or sounding out concerned parties beforehand in an attempt to reach an agreement.
Nemawashi is neither an exclusive practice of Japan nor the most adept facet of the governments led by the Liberal Democratic Party.
Both the United States and China are societies where nemawashi is as important as in Japan.
In a typical nemawashi situation, the right person in Japan would pass on the ‘true intentions’ and the ‘bottom line,’ that are crucial in any nemawashi, to the right person in the United States and China. The only way to come up with an agreement that is politically acceptable in that situation is to create a relationship of trust between political leaders.
In the end, what will be most important for not only the Japan-U.S. alliance, but also the East Asia community, will not be credos, institutions or laws, but leadership, relationships and networks.
This article first appeared here in the Asahi Shimbun on November 10, 2009.