But it may also be a consequence of an agreement with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou for a truce in what had been an intense competition for diplomatic recognition from Third World countries. This reflects the improved relationship between China and Taiwan since President Ma succeeded his predecessor, President Chen Shui-bian, in May 2008.

But this improved relationship poses problems for both sides. Many Taiwanese fear the economic costs that will accompany an increasingly close economic relationship with China. Although most business groups support the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) being negotiated with China, there is opposition from those who feel threatened by the increased imports of Chinese goods. Increased political vulnerability and potential loss of sovereignty could also accompany a closer economic integration with China.

This improving cross-strait relationship is not favourable to a sizeable number in Taiwan, and Ma’s political support has dropped as a result. A belief in the limited competence of the government has also contributed to this drop, particularly over the mishandling of Typhoon Morakot and the government’s weakness against U.S. pressure to import certain U.S. beef products, a position strongly opposed by a population fearful of mad cow disease. Poor economic performance, declining exports and high unemployment haven’t helped either.

The discontent with President Ma and the Kuomintang (KMT) manifested itself most clearly during the December 2009 elections, when the KMT lost numerous seats in local government. The KMT also lost long-held seats during all three legislative by-elections in January 2010. Although Ma’s approval rating fluctuates and polls differ, one survey reports Ma’s approval rating fell below 30 per cent in December 2009.

The question then is how will China factor into the declining support for the China-friendly Ma, especially if the KMT does not perform well in the four legislative by-elections in February? Since President Ma was elected, China has been taking a more strategic view of Taiwan, and the improved performance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) must trouble Chinese leaders who fear Ma could lose the 2012 presidential election to a DPP candidate. But the 2012 election is still far away and Ma could well recover. Besides, the DPP is still trying to distance itself from former President Chen.

China’s view of this situation might be seen in the strength of their response to the proposed US provision of a further arms package to Taiwan, given that this could boost Ma’s popularity and strengthen the argument that he is pursuing Taiwan’s interests while improving relations with China. But for China, further arms sales to Taiwan would be counter to the interests of an important Chinese constituency: the military. Meanwhile, China has many things think about, including Taiwan’s aid to Haiti, President Ma’s recent visit to the US and the Taiwanese military plane that landed (the first for some decades) in the U.S. to refuel on its way to Haiti. China’s response to these situations may give some indication of how strategic China’s thinking is towards Taiwan.

Stuart Harris is Emeritus Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University