There are also Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia.
However, the G20 is not, and cannot by its nature be envisaged as, an East Asian organisation. The Asian voices are matched, if not overwhelmed, by those of the United States; Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina from the Americas; the European Union; the individual European countries of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy; the great Eurasian power called Russia; Turkey, another Eurasian country; Saudi Arabia, the leader of the oil-producing world; and South Africa.
The G20 is a global organisation that seeks to reflect the existing balance of economic power. It is certainly necessary, but it is difficult to see how it could reflect the aspirations and responsibilities of an ascendant East Asia.
At the other end of the spectrum lies ASEAN. Arguably the most successful regional grouping in the Third World, it is small enough not to threaten anyone but large enough to attract the attention of countries that matter because of its developmental record, strategic location, and not insubstantial population.
The proof of ASEAN’s importance is seen in the fact that it is the driving force of three larger regional mechanisms: the ASEAN+3 process; the ASEAN Regional Forum; and the East Asian Summit (EAS) process.
‘East Asia has not been short of big ideas and visions but it has failed to organise itself to turn those ideas and visions into clear directions and workable plans for the region itself and in shaping the world,’ the late Indonesian scholar Hadi Soesastro wrote. ‘Given East Asia’s prominence here, the region will need to organise itself more purposefully and strategically,’ he added.
How? The important question now is whether ASEAN can build on its record as the hub for multiple processes leading to greater East Asian integration. Can it do so in order to help provide the architecture that the region needs?
At the recently-concluded 16th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, the leaders of participating countries had good discussions on the evolving regional architecture, including recent proposals to remodel that architecture. They agreed that any new proposal should have ASEAN as its main foundation; be based on the central role of ASEAN; and should build upon and strengthen existing ASEAN-based structures.
ASEAN leaders also discussed the growing interest shown by the US and Russia in deepening their engagement with the region. They considered some modalities of achieving this outcome, including expanding the EAS to include the US and Russia; and a separate ASEAN+8 configuration that would bring in the two powers to join ASEAN’s existing partners: China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
Several leaders expressed support for the ASEAN+8 configuration. This was so in recognition of scheduling difficulties in bringing the US President to Asia every year. If EAS were to be expanded but the US President were unable to attend its parleys, the summit process would be weakened. EAS expansion might also dilute ongoing efforts to consolidate and strengthen substantive cooperation. Correspondingly, ASEAN’s credibility would take a hit and its centrality would be called into question.
Given these realities, it would be the ASEAN+8 configuration that would provide a pragmatic way for ASEAN to engage the US and Russia. ASEAN+8 could be convened every two to three years, back-to-back with the APEC Leaders’ Meeting when it is hosted in the region. This configuration would also address the Australian idea of an Asia-Pacific community (APC), but with ASEAN at the core.
Another point to note is that EAS expansion to include Russia and the US would derail the EAS’ efforts at regional economic integration. The EAS is currently working on a region-wide FTA through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership of East Asia (CEPEA) process. The inclusion of Russia and US in the EAS would stall CEPEA.
Thus, it would be better to keep the EAS as it is and allow it to focus on regional integration efforts.
The ASEAN Summit did not decide on whether the EAS should be expanded or whether it would be better to go for an ASEAN+8. ASEAN is still discussing the best way to engage the US and Russia in the region. The ASEAN Coordinating Council (which is composed of ASEAN Foreign Ministers) has been tasked with considering the issue in greater detail and consulting its economic and defence counterparts.
These discussions provide ASEAN with a valuable opportunity in relation to its partners and provide the voice that East Asia needs. Meanwhile, however, credibility begins at home. If ASEAN is to keep driving processes of wider regional cooperation, it must work hard to realise the ASEAN Community by implementing decisions that have been taken.
Dr K. Kesavapany is Director of the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore and Singapore’s non-resident ambassador to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
This essay is also published in today’s Singapore Straits Times.
K Kesavapany states correctly that “as the international centre of economic gravity moves towards East Asia, the challenge for the region is to develop a new architecture commensurate with its growing role in world affairs.”
K Kesavapany argues that although “East Asia countries are well-represented in the Group of 20, the G20 is not, and cannot by its nature be envisaged as, an East Asian organisation. The Asian voices are matched, if not overwhelmed, by those of the United States; Canada, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina from the Americas; the European Union; the individual European countries of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy; the great Eurasian power called Russia; Turkey, another Eurasian country; Saudi Arabia, the leader of the oil-producing world; and South Africa.
The G20 is a global organisation that seeks to reflect the existing balance of economic power. It is certainly necessary, but it is difficult to see how it could reflect the aspirations and responsibilities of an ascendant East Asia.”
Those are obviously correct and excellent analyses that I would agree.
K Kesavapany then seems to have made a sudden yet smooth enough 180 degree turn, turning the back to the East Asia Summit concept and embracing to the ASEAN+8 concept.
Many people may be confused by the different ideas or proposals in East Asia, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, Asia Pacific Community, now ASEAN+8.
Let’s remind people what ASEAN+8 and EAS mean:
ASEAN+8 = ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, India, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea the United States.
SAS = members from East Asian countries.
I am not sure that people are now totally confused by the logic and rationale K Kesavapany uses.
If continuing K Kesavapany’s earlier arguments, one would certainly expect that the EAS, as opposed to ASEAN+8 would be chosen by K Kesavapany to represent the voice of East Asia, but that is not so.
One would probably feel some inherent inconsistency in the development of K Kesavapany’s arguments and conclusion.
It would be helpful if that inconsistency could be avoided.