Lately both Chinese and US actions have escalated this rivalry. As long as the two powers are more interested in keeping the other in check than in stabilising the peninsula no significant progress in terms of stabilising the region is possible.
North Korea recently shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong after a period of escalating tensions, killing two soldiers and two civilians. North Korea claims that it opened fire after being provoked by a South Korean exercise. In response to the shelling incident the US and South Korea have conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. These involved a US aircraft carrier and are regarded as threatening not only by North Korea but also by China.
China’s economic and diplomatic support for North Korea undermines efforts by other countries to affect the behavior of the regime in Pyongyang. Even China is troubled by North Korean behavior. The North Korean nuclear program, and the risks Pyongyang is running in escalating tensions with South Korea and the US, are counter to China’s security interests. Theoretically, the Chinese government could therefore decide to put pressure on Pyongyang by limiting its economic support and by ending the diplomatic support it often gives in the United Nations Security Council. It is very unlikely that China’s policy towards North Korea will change much. The US diplomatic reports revealed by WikiLeaks are a confirmation of uneasy Sino-North Korean relations rather than an indication that this relationship is about to change.
China will probably continue to give more support than any other country because it is highly vulnerable to the consequences of political or economic collapse in North Korea. The longest and most accessible border of North Korea is the one it shares with China. Chaos in North Korea would harm stability in China’s northeast, the region formerly known as Manchuria.
Moreover, Beijing is less motivated to put pressure on the North Korean regime than other countries are. The US is primarily interested in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technologies from North Korea. South Korea and Japan are mainly worried about the military threat from the north. Compared with these countries, China is less concerned about such issues.
The most fundamental element in China’s policy towards North Korea is that Beijing regards the US as a greater security threat than the situation on the Korean peninsula. Since neither China nor the US is by itself the predominant great power in Korean affairs, Beijing can only assume responsibility for regional stability if it does so jointly with the US. However, this will not happen since China and the US each regard one another as their main potential military adversary. They also have contrary interests on the Korean peninsula.
While China regards the US military presence in South Korea as a potential threat that should eventually be removed, the US intends to maintain this presence as it helps to limit Chinese regional influence. The relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang cannot be seen apart from this context of geopolitical rivalry. It is desirable for China that the regime in North Korea continues to exist and that the Chinese government retains a certain degree of influence in Pyongyang.
A major precondition for China to change its policy towards North Korea is an improvement in Sino-US relations. In the past months these have been deteriorating. This is the result of China’s growing power, and America’s increasing concern that Beijing is not using its influence for the right purposes. Washington has been strengthening its strategic ties with actors such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia and India. The US government has also shown greater involvement in territorial disputes between China and some of its neighbours. It is likely that, from a Chinese perspective, the US deploying an aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea is merely the latest attempt by Washington to exploit a regional security crisis in order to strengthen its own position and weaken that of China. The American dual strategy of trying to get China to put pressure on North Korea while at the same time attempting to limit the growth of Chinese influence in regional affairs is unlikely to result in a more stable Korean peninsula.
Frans-Paul van der Putten is a research fellow with the Clingendael Institue in The Hague. He is co-editor, with Chu Shulong, of China, Europe and International Security: Interests, Roles, and Prospects (Routledge, 2010).