First, current proposals lack scientific foundation. Uniform medium term 2020 targets are yet to be agreed upon, and current medium term targets, set by individual governments, are simply insufficient to achieving such an ambitious long term objective. Second, the target of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius bears a complicated relationship to the 50 per cent reduction target – requiring additional scientific research. And third, fairness needs to be considered. The developed world’s per capita emissions far outweigh those of developing countries, and restraints should reflect this reality. A 2050 50 per cent reduction would be a hollow victory for developing countries if they achieved it at the expense of their peoples’ chance of a life free from poverty.

So what is important to stress is that the challenges before China are different from those of the developed world’s. Yet China remains no less committed to meeting them; after all, its low-carbon development is primarily driven by domestic considerations.

Consider China’s fossil fuel reserves, which are proportionally low in oil but high in coal. In 2009, automobile ownership in China was one fifteenth of US ownership rates, and one tenth of ownership levels in the EU and Japan. However, at the same time, China’s oil imports comprised more than half of global consumption. By comparison, China’s coal storage is relatively rich –but, of course, not without its limits.

But finite limitations of fossil fuels aside, the vast environmental consequences of oil and coal reliance are hugely detrimental. And the fact is Beijing is not asking itself whether a transformation to renewable energy should be made –it is asking: how can we adapt this to China’s economy, and do it quickly?

Addressing this, China’s hopes of achieving low-carbon growth are underpinned by two major 2020 objectives: lowering per unit GDP carbon dioxide emissions to 40-45 per cent of 2005 levels, and raising non-fossil fuel energy to account for 15 per cent of primary energy consumption.

Evidently, these goals present considerable challenges; these targets would, if met, be without precedent. Presently, China has committed to these goals by implementing energy saving targets set by the eleventh and twelfth Five Year Plans; implementing various low-carbon community and business initiatives (such as the construction of low-carbon cities); and developing China’s wind and solar power industries – which show a higher growth rate than those of most developed countries.

Moreover, the Chinese economy’s 10 per cent growth over the past 30 years has seen industrialisation shift from a labour to capital intensive stage. Following historical trends, this growth will eventually have no choice but to plateau, and the role of the carbon-intensive manufacturing sector is likely to decline as the services sector takes up a growing portion of the economy. This suggests that whilst GHG emission will no doubt increase, it is likely to be at a reduced rate.

Of course, international collaborative effort, especially technological cooperation, is still critical. And, here, it needs to be acknowledged that developed countries – largely unfettered by concerns of lifting their people out of poverty – are better placed to lead by example, and demonstrate that high living standards can sit with low carbon emissions; thus leaving no excuse for developing countries not to follow in their footsteps.

Additionally, low-carbon transformation in China is in need of capital. The truth is, under current economic and technological conditions an over-reliance on high cost renewable energy would ensure that living conditions would never achieve parity with those of the developed world.

However, responding to this dilemma, China could leverage high-carbon industry growth for low-carbon investment via cross-subsidising schemes. As seen in Europe, led by Germany, a primary source of investment funds comes from taxes on fossil fuel energies, used then to subsidise the more expensive renewable energy industries. To make this work, robust regulations would be required, especially to prevent cost blowouts from being passed on to the energy consumer’s bills; and to prevent the advantages of low-carbon growth being negated by the disadvantages of high-carbon expansion.

China is not standing idly by, but is rather fully committed to addressing climate change whilst being attentive to the differing challenges it presents. It can be seen that whilst active international climate change effort is essential, China has no choice but to be prudent in its commitments – something the international community must understand if we are to work through the challenges together.

Professor Jiahua Pan is Director of the Institute for Urban and Environment Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Professor of Economics at the CASS Graduate School.