Thailand’s current domestic situation, however, has been especially aggravating to the relationship as attempts by conservative groups — led by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the Yellow Shirts — to discredit the pro-Thaksin faction has leveraged nationalistic sentiments.
The nationalists attack Thaksin and his allies as ‘selling the nation’, citing the sale of Thaksin’s telecom company, Shin Corp, to Singaporean Temasek in 2005 and the Samak government’s support of Cambodia’s listing of Preah Vihear Temple as a UNESCO World Heritage in 2008. Despite the World Heritage status having nothing to do with any legally binding border demarcation, the PAD has successfully convinced many Thais that the temple’s joint listing will lead to the loss of Thai sovereignty over the disputed 4.6 square kilometre area adjacent to the temple. While Prime Minister Abhisit and his Democrat Party supported PAD’s nationalist agenda over this issue when in opposition, PAD’s manipulation of nationalist attitudes has gone beyond what Abhisit envisaged, resulting in the government’s being pressured into adopting hawkish measures against Cambodia.
The military is another important factor in prolonging the armed conflict, as the dispute keeps the military involved in politics and justifies budget increases (including a recent THB1.80 billion (US$59.3 million) for its operations along the Thai-Cambodian border). The Thai military used to play an important role in Thailand’s relations with neighbouring countries but lost this prerogative to the Foreign Ministry in the 1990s following democratisation. With the fall of democracy following the 2006 coup, the military has increasingly reinserted its old role and sometimes taken different stances to the government. Evidence of the military’s hand can be seen in the government’s decision to renege on its support for Indonesian observers in the disputed area.
How the conflict will be resolved remains uncertain. Thailand prefers bilateral talks, seeing disadvantage in raising the issue at the regional and international levels, although past bilateral negotiations have been unsuccessful. ASEAN, under Indonesia’s chairmanship, has tried to offer assistance on several occasions since February this year, and Thailand has uncomfortably accepted this role. The recent peace deal brokered by Jakarta during the ASEAN Summit brought about the term of reference for both parties to resolve the conflict, including steps of supporting bilateral negotiations and allowing an observer team to monitor the ceasefire. But both countries are presently still playing around with wording and preconditions; and without good will and concession made by both toward peace, ASEAN, not equipped with any enforcement measures, can do little.
A parallel development is also happening at the ICJ as Cambodia recently submitted a request to the Court to interpret the 1962 border ruling. The conflict may be resolved if both parties accept the new interpretation peacefully. But if the ICJ rules in Cambodia’s favour, nationalist sentiment in Thailand will likely intensify, degrading the Thai-Cambodian relationship further. This would also greatly damage Thailand’s economic interests, and, from a geostrategic perspective, Thailand would lose its role in mainland Southeast Asia to other regional players, especially increasingly influential China and Vietnam.
The repercussions of this conflict at the regional level may be farther and deeper than anybody would expect. Foremost, not only are bilateral relations deteriorating but ASEAN’s unity is threatened. The conflict may drift ASEAN apart, at least in terms of political unity, affecting the progress of regional cooperation. A number of ASEAN leaders have expressed this concern. During the Summit, Philippine President Benigno Aquino said, ‘How can we have one ASEAN, one family if we have two major components who cannot solve their problems?’ After the Summit, the Malaysian deputy foreign minister also expressed frustration, blaming Thailand for not respecting the agreement previously made in Jakarta, a claim the Thai foreign ministry rejected.
Significantly, this conflict reveals that ASEAN countries may not be ready for the next stage of integration. The sense of community is not ripe enough for any steps beyond inter-state cooperation. Ironically, as a founding member of ASEAN, originally playing an active role in consolidating ASEAN’s unity and development, Thailand has become an obstacle to the group’s progress. Other founding members also have the potential to react similarly when it comes to sovereignty issues, as the Spratly Islands show.
This conflict could suggest that the integration theory based on the European model of neo-functionalism, which ASEAN has looked up to, may not be suited to this part of the world. More energy and resources need to be directed toward socio-cultural community building. ASEAN’s shared identity needs to be fostered with a stronger foundation of mutual respect, understanding and brotherhood among Southeast Asians. With such bonds, nationalism will hardly be able to stir up hatred between neighbours and friends. Without achieving ASEAN’s socio-cultural pillar, other regional activities, including security and economic cooperation, cannot be sustained.
The recent Summit’s goals — achieving ASEAN Community by 2015, maintaining a safe and stable region, and making ASEAN active in solving global problems — seem distant. The Thai-Cambodian conflict is not only a diplomatic embarrassment but highlights ASEAN’s underlying inability to transcend the archaic concept of sovereignty to manage the conflict peacefully. Consequently, a true ASEAN Community according to ASEAN Vision 2020 may have to stay a vision for quite some time.
Pongphisoot ‘Paul’ Busbarat is a Research Associate in the Department of Political & Social Change in the School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian National University. His research focus is Thai foreign policy, and he has previously worked as a policy analyst at the Bureau of International Security Affairs, Office of the National Security Council of Thailand.