But in the past few months, top Chinese leaders have made strenuous efforts to assuage such apprehensions, hoping to reassure neighbouring countries of China’s peaceful intentions. President Hu Jintao, for instance, pledged at the recent Boao Forum for Asia in Hainan that China sought to resolve its territorial disputes with neighbouring states through peaceful means to build a ‘harmonious Asia’. Premier Wen Jiabao also emphasised a willingness to improve engagement and cooperation with neighbouring countries during his recent trips to Malaysia and Indonesia.

So what should we make of China’s security policy in the midst of all these events and signals? What has changed and what remains constant in China’s security posture? These questions are crucial for the rest of the world, particularly China’s East Asian neighbours.

China’s increased assertiveness could be characterised as ‘non-confrontational assertiveness’. This rationale is likely to undergird China’s security policy in the coming years; a reality the rest of the region should be prepared for.

Non-confrontational assertiveness means that — at the strategic level — Beijing will not pursue confrontation with other regional actors. This strategy is shaped by a number of factors. Foremost, Beijing’s top priority continues to be domestic economic growth. China’s elite believe they still need a stable and peaceful external environment for domestic economic modernisation. And there is very little evidence that the Chinese leaders are considering or willing to sacrifice the imperative of economic development by confronting other major powers.

Further, China’s overall strategic position in East Asia does not provide it leverage to be confrontational with any other major regional player. After two decades of hard work consolidating its foothold in the region, China is, by and large, still a strategically isolated big power in East Asia. Any missteps by China will only result in the further consolidation of the US’s security role in East Asia, exacerbating what Beijing sees as an unfavourable strategic position.

Domestic politics in China also warrant consideration. With its military and economic advancements China’s self-confidence has grown, especially in the wake of the financial crisis, and, among the Chinese public, there has also been a discernible growth of nationalistic sentiment in recent years. Still, the growth of societal discontent over corruption, rising housing prices, social injustice, and abuse of power by local governments is of serious concern for the ruling elite. The top leaders may worry that any compromise or perceived weak response to regional security issues could be used by discontented forces as an excuse to trigger a popular revolt over domestic problems. No Chinese leader wants to appear weak on issues concerning China’s ‘core interests’.

All this creates an atmosphere in China that only assertive stances are politically correct. While the outside world believes that China made continuous blunders in East Asia in 2010, the Chinese themselves may have drawn a very different conclusion. They may have firmly concluded that China’s tense security relations with neighbouring states were a result of regional states pushing the envelope in collusion with the US.

It is no surprise that many Chinese analysts find it increasingly more difficult to publicly discuss and suggest moderation in China’s security policy. The new political environment has also significantly changed the dynamics of bureaucratic politics in China. Forces and agencies that favour a tougher policy line have gained prominence in decision-making. Various maritime law enforcement agencies, for instance, have taken advantage of the domestic political atmosphere for their own benefits, leading to the increased assertiveness in the maritime domain in recent years.

Yet, containing all this is the likelihood that China’s assertiveness in regional security affairs has reached its limits; Beijing cannot afford to go any further. This dichotomous combination of non-confrontation and assertiveness is likely to dominate China’s security behaviour in East Asia in the coming years. The East Asian region may see many conflicting signals in China’s security policy: abundant expression of goodwill and heavy-handedness on specific disputes. There will be frequent displays of Chinese assertiveness, but Beijing will likely refrain from escalating the tensions and conflicts into any major confrontation.

Li Mingjiang is an Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University.

A version of this article was originally published here as RSIS Commentary No. 80/2011.