And it has consistently argued that the need to address poverty morally trumps other requirements associated with freer trade and reduced carbon emissions. In doing so, India seeks to separate developing from developed countries to produce a two-tier approach to trade and climate change outcomes. It has used both formal and informal multilateral gatherings, such as the WTO Doha Round, UNFCCC negotiations, BRICS meetings and the G77, to reinforce this strategy.

Commerce and Industry Minister Anand Sharma recently noted in relation to the Doha Round: ‘The critical interests to be served are those of protecting the food and livelihood security of farmers’. Behind this statement lies not just India’s desire to protect its perceived interests in the WTO, but also an attempt to address the political imperative of pleasing the agricultural community. This sector still employs over 60 per cent of Indians and is allegedly suffering due to globalisation — resulting in the burgeoning problem of farmer suicide.

India argued against binding emissions reductions for developing countries at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on the basis that its emissions per capita were extremely low and it still had to eradicate widespread poverty. China, India’s growing economic and political competitor, frequently uses the same argument. The two have even coordinated their strategies prior to key meetings, as they did on the eve of the Copenhagen Summit. Such a strategy has been both morally acceptable and strategically useful in the past, but all that is now rapidly changing. In the emerging economic climate, India’s major competitors are not so much developed countries, but rather fellow developing powers — especially China. With bilateral trade topping US$60 billion, China is now India’s largest trading partner. But within this trade, the balance in favour of China amounts to US$20 billion. India’s arguments in the Doha Round about the need for poverty alleviation will not address the China problem, since China makes the very same claim.

Given China is equally protected under WTO rules, India has sought to address its concerns regarding Chinese trade and investment by other means. In matters of investment, it is increasingly reliant on the so-called ‘national security’ interest to block China. Telecommunications, aviation, space-related technology, port development, shipping, energy and investment in sensitive border areas are particular targets. These restraints on Chinese investment are not just about limiting competition; they embody genuine security concerns — especially given China’s alleged poor track record on cyber warfare, the issue of state control in some Chinese companies, the on-going border dispute and China’s growing footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. This stance is particularly precarious when combined with India’s urgent need for capital and expertise to develop its infrastructure, and in light of the West’s etiolated economic status. It is becoming ever more critical for India to harness capital investment from robust Asian economies like China, which has been relatively rare in the past. As well as limiting Chinese FDI on security grounds, India also issued a démarche to China on trade, citing the need for better market access for its more competitive agricultural products such as fruits, vegetables and basmati rice. India is also increasingly reliant on the WTO’s anti-dumping provisions to limit Chinese imports.

India’s strategy of differentiation between developed and developing countries can no longer suffice, given the inherent contradictions for such a policy in the emerging global order. It needs to strike out afresh and develop a new approach. Whatever strategy New Delhi adopts, it must be one that enables India to draw in large amounts of FDI and related expertise in order to augment its diminishing domestic resources and those sourced from developed countries. As well as providing commodity distribution and energy to fuel industrialisation, this will also support the vast process of urbanisation that agricultural and economic restructuring would involve. Equally, as India restructures its agricultural sector, the country will need to press home its comparative advantage and reconsider the agricultural protection policies inherent in its WTO strategies. But given India’s status as a large, vibrant democracy in which most voters are still rural, this might be easier said than done.

Sandy Gordon is a Visiting Fellow at RegNet, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.