A modest elevation of American troop presence on rotation and training in northern Australia — one concrete outcome of the visit — will have the most marginal impact on the immediate strategic landscape. But Mr Obama’s visit, and in particular his declaration to Australia’s Parliament that America is ‘all in’ in Asia and the Pacific, has changed the tone of the contest for influence between America and China in the region and cast it in more confrontational terms.

‘Every nation will chart its own course’, Obama declaimed. ‘Yet it is also true that certain rights are universal, among them freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and the freedom of citizens to choose their own leaders’.

‘These are not American rights, or Australian rights, or Western rights. They are human rights. They stir in every soul, as we’ve seen in democracy’s success in Asia’.

‘Other models have been tried and they have failed — fascism and communism, rule by one man and rule by committee. And they have failed for the same simple reason. They ignore the ultimate source of power and legitimacy — the will of the people’.

‘So, as two great democracies, we speak up for these freedoms when they are threatened. We partner with emerging democracies, like Indonesia, to help strengthen the institutions upon which good governance depends. We encourage open government, because democracies depend on informed and active citizens’.

‘This is the future we seek in the Asia Pacific — security, prosperity and dignity for all. That’s what we stand for. That’s who we are. That’s the future we will pursue, in partnership with allies and friends, and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: in the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in’.

These values are unexceptionable, and articulated in the universal terms they were, will be widely shared. They are values to which many, even in China, aspire — an American as much as a universal dream.

But no great open economy or society and democracy has been put in place overnight. China has begun the journey, though it may not yet be even halfway there. And for China, the scale of the challenge makes the path that has to be travelled tortuous, risky and difficult. Will it be more or less helpful to be encouraged to the challenge by the pressure of ‘every element of American power’? Will that be more or less helpful to those who take on the burdens of change? And how exactly should this declaration of mission yet to be accomplished affect dealings along the way — the huge and inescapable dealings with China in which we are all productively enmeshed, America as much as everyone else?

How this last practical question is answered might ultimately be more important to defining the future strategic landscape than the postures that were struck last week. The answers will be different in different places.

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, worries about the Canberra declaration lest ‘these developments were to provoke reaction and counter reaction … a vicious circle or tensions and mistrust or distrust’. At the APEC summit the weekend before last in Honolulu, Indonesia’s President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, observed that, while he welcomed America’s regional presence, it was no longer desirable for the region to be dominated by a sole superpower. ‘New power centres are growing rapidly and power relationships are changing and becoming fluid’, he said, calling for what he called a ‘dynamic equilibrium’. There is a powerful political instinct in Australia to retreat to the protection of American power, on full display last week. But there is another political instinct that willingly and purposefully accommodates emerging power in Asia, with its direct economic benefits, and its understanding of the capacity for change, and its positive dynamic. Japan is similarly torn — educated by its history; confronted by its contemporary choices.

The choices in Washington are dominated by a different political psychology, one that that is deeply rooted in the here-and-now of established power and who is like us and who is not. The tension between these political instincts and psychologies is palpable.

Will China have the space ‘to become more like us’?

In this week’s lead essay, distinguished Chinese economist, Yao Yang, notes that ‘international observers frequently link China’s economic success to authoritarianism’. Some accept the market’s importance, but still believe an authoritarian government was necessary to economic success — it can mobilise large amounts of resources and make quick decisions free of non-economic interference like labour unions. But experience shows that these authoritarianism-plus-free-market regimes do not last long. Such governments ultimately only serve the interests of a small group — often a handful of elites who monopolise the economy — and become a hindrance to innovation and growth. ‘While the Chinese political system may be authoritarian in its outlook, it still has a degree of responsiveness and flexibility that is not entirely devoid of democratic elements. In the West, democracy is often equated with free assembly and competitive elections. But this view disguises some of democracy’s more substantial values, such as a government’s level of accountability and responsiveness’. Authoritarianism, he concludes, does not explain China’s economic success, and nor does it fully characterise the Chinese system: if it did that success would be ‘irrevocably tainted by repression and coercion, and detested by the people’.

As President Obama said in Canberra, ‘every nation will chart its own course’ and some may have to be given the space to do so.

Peter Drysdale is the editor of the East Asia Forum.