Widespread enthusiasm about the success of Singh’s visit is justified. In only three days India and Myanmar signed a dozen pacts on a range of topics including providing Myanmar with a US$500 million line of credit, establishing a Border Area Development Program, and setting up a rice bio park. The two nations also agreed to develop a border ‘haat’ (a common marketplace), a joint trade and investment forum, and cooperation between the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies. India has also stated its willingness to help Myanmar improve democratic practices through parliamentary- and electoral-process training and the strengthening of human rights institutions.
A closer look at recent Chinese media reports, harsh as they are on India, helps put India-Myanmar relations in perspective. The reports claim that India has been pushed off the stage by the US — which has been actively involved in Myanmar’s ongoing political reform process — and China — which has a strong economic presence in the country. These statements are, on the whole, accurate: India’s economic engagement has a long way to go to catch up with China’s current level, and US President Obama has criticised India for not doing ‘enough’ on Myanmar.
Yet New Delhi’s recent initiatives have positively begun to address three broad issues with the potential to impede India’s deep engagement with Myanmar.
The first, and perhaps most important dilemma, has been deciding whether to support the Aung San Suu Kyi-led democratic movement. After the 1990 elections and the brutal suppression of democracy, India actively supported Aung San Suu Kyi. In fact, in 1992 India sponsored a UN resolution calling on the military junta to respect the 1990 election results and restore democracy.
But after realising the threats to its own internal security, India attempted to also engage the junta with some success. To date, India’s policy has been to keep the military on side. During Singh’s visit, India made its balanced stance clear: it is keen to do business with Myanmar and protect its internal security, while supporting ongoing democratic reforms. Singh’s visit has also helped reconcile any neglect that crept in between the Indian government and Aung San Suu Kyi. Her decision to reschedule her visit to Thailand to meet with Singh demonstrates this rekindling.
Secondly, improving economic engagement was discussed. While India aspires to emulate China’s levels of engagement in Myanmar — partially motivated by fear of Chinese encirclement of India — restoring ties with the military junta did not bring about the desired economic results India had hoped for. The slow pace of implementation of projects was a major factor. For instance, in 1999, at a joint conference in Kunming involving China, Myanmar and Thailand, India declared that it would participate in setting up National Highway 153. A decade later, India was the last country to start working on the project. There is much talk of connecting with Myanmar, Thailand and even Vietnam through rail and road links, yet so far India has been slow to the point of reluctance in connecting its northeastern region with Myanmar and beyond. Quickly laying roads along the borders to ensure that the Imphal-Mandalay bus service starts soon would be a decisive step to ensure that bilateral relations are not hampered by sluggish bureaucracy.
Thirdly, ethnic separatism and insurgency in northeastern India and Myanmar are as old as independent India itself. A calibrated policy needs to be developed to address the issues of the ‘ethnic melting pot’. India cannot connect with Myanmar without addressing pressing problems in its own northeast.
China has shown the way in dealing with insurgent groups. While constructing the highways along the border and working on infrastructure in Myanmar, it openly asked Myanmar to stop insurgency by all means necessary. That worked well for Chinese projects, and India also needs to be upfront in tackling such issues. Yet it is important to ensure that agreements are inked only after due deliberations between the two countries.
At a time when events in Myanmar are taking swift turns, the possibility of divisions within Thein Sein’s government cannot be ruled out. And while no one wants to see the ‘managed democracy’ of the day getting derailed, India should devise a comprehensive contingency plan for dealing with possible ethnic and refugee issues in Northeast India and Myanmar.
India must keep its promises by delivering investment projects on time and engaging with both Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi. The biggest challenge, however, lies in ensuring that subsequent visits are more than a homily and actually help to strengthen bilateral ties. Fast-paced implementation of promises, backed by regular bilateral meetings, will ensure India’s proposed ‘gateway to southeast Asia’ becomes a reality.
Rahul Mishra is a researcher at the Southeast Asia and Oceania Centre, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi.