That plan was critical for the reforms that followed, even if Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy have no real legislative power.
But Myanmar’s critical institution is still the Tatmadaw, the military. The constitution grants the military a quarter of the seats in parliament and the right to nominate the most important of the country’s two vice presidents. In July, when the first vice president, long known as a hard-liner, stepped down due to ‘health reasons’, the president replaced him with an ostensibly more moderate vice admiral. In making this transfer, Thein Sein may have wanted to ensure a smooth continuation of the reforms.
Although public figures in Myanmar are politically diverse, nearly everyone now claims to be a ‘reformer’ (considered good) as opposed to a ‘spoiler’. This even applies to individuals from more conservative military backgrounds who may have taken part in past repression. If the country’s stability comes under serious threat, such men could revert to harder-line views.
Ultimately, apart from the balance of forces between reformers and spoilers inside the military, national stability is and will remain a key requisite to further liberalisation and the consolidation of democracy. Yet Myanmar’s level of stability continues to vary throughout the country. In Naypyidaw, the capital, or in Yangon, caught up in the influx of investors, fortune-seekers and diplomats, things probably look pretty good — opportunistic and venal, but dynamic and potentially beneficial. However, in the restive north or in clash-ridden Rakhine State, which borders Bangladesh, things probably look distinctively worse.
Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities tend to live on the periphery of the country. These border areas have been marked by endemic unrest and violence for a very long time. The latest flare-up in Rakhine is particularly unfortunate because it implicates a group that is identified both by ethnicity and by religion: the Rohingya. They are Muslims, and they have long been subject to discrimination at the hands of the Burman-Buddhist majority. Thousands of Rohingya have fled across the border to escape the latest violence. The government in majority-Muslim Bangladesh, unwilling to alienate Naypyidaw by appearing to harbour the refugees, has begun to push some of them back into Myanmar.
Assuming that Bangladesh does not champion the Rohingyas’ cause, the violence in Rakhine State is unlikely to disrupt Myanmar’s stability on a national scale. But it will reinforce the ‘need’ of spoilers in the Tatmadaw to enlarge the military’s presence and its budget to prevent the clashes from getting further out of hand. And that could strengthen the nationalist legitimacy of the military and its rationale for retaining a political role.
The urgent priority for Thein Sein in keeping the government’s reform agenda afloat is performance. It is vital that he be able to point to the positive results of reform. In aid, investment and trade, Western countries, China, India and other outside powers can facilitate meaningful economic growth, or be seen as abetting cronyism and corruption. If the reforms foster a high-performing economy in which incomes start to go up and a middle class begins to form, one can be more optimistic about the future. But if official repression of the Rohingya intensifies, if other ethnic-minority grievances are reignited, if fighting spreads, and the Tatmadaw regains its former clout, disillusioned Westerners will be less willing to work with a regime they no longer trust.
Myanmar is scheduled to hold elections in 2015, and as this date approaches the stakes for reform are rising. Thein Sein will be 70 years old in 2015, and so will Aung San Suu Kyi. The former has said that he will not run, although he could change his mind. The latter is constitutionally barred from running, and her party is not currently strong enough to push through an amendment. What if neither one is available to run? Who will continue the process of reform, if it is still under way?
If 2015 bears watching, so does 2014, when Myanmar becomes chair of ASEAN. The authorities in Naypyidaw will host all of ASEAN’s major meetings in 2014. Some of these gatherings will involve the United States and other countries at ministerial and head-of-state levels. In 2015 ASEAN will inaugurate a first-ever, Southeast Asia-wide ASEAN Community encompassing economic, political-security and socio-cultural cooperation. In 2014 Myanmar will oversee the Community’s final preparation. If in the meantime an intra-military coup occurs and the winner cracks down, the leaders of democratic countries will think twice before agreeing to lend legitimacy to such a regime by attending its events.
In this risky context, one can hope that Myanmar’s leaders will not take President Obama’s unprecedented visit to the country in mid-November 2012 as passive congratulation for prior reform, but as reason actively to pursue further reform.
Despite the uncertainty, however, there is a real chance that reforms will take root. Myanmar is not likely to become a fully stable and liberal democracy, at least not soon, but it could, with skill, help and luck, become a ‘good enough’ democracy of sorts.
Donald K. Emmerson is Director of the Southeast Asia Forum, Stanford University.
A version of this article first appeared here as an interview on The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies website.