Just days after Tohti’s arrest the Xinjiang regional government announced that it would double the public security bureau’s ‘counter-terrorism’ budget for 2014 in an effort to prevent terrorist attacks and curb religious extremism.
But this is only the latest incident. Inter-ethnic violence in the regional capital, Urumqi, captured international headlines in July 2009. Since then, numerous incidents of violence have rocked the region — including anti-government protests, attacks on police stations and inter-ethnic clashes. Last year alone was punctuated by at least five such incidents in Kashgar and surrounding areas, as well as in Turpan and Khotan. The regional authorities have claimed that these incidents have been the handiwork of extremist and terrorist gangs bent on ‘jihad’ with links to hostile external forces. In their attempts to link unrest in Xinjiang with such forces the authorities have also made the expansive claim that up to 100 Uyghurs have travelled to Syria to ‘sharpen their terrorist skills’.
Although it may be difficult to either confirm or refute this claim, it is not difficult to pinpoint the three aspects of long-term Chinese policy that are contributing to unrest in Xinjiang.
The first is the state’s commitment to fully integrate Xinjiang and the Uyghur politically, economically and culturally with China. While this has been the overarching goal of state policy in the region since its ‘peaceful liberation’ by the PLA in 1949, it is one that has been embodied since the 1990s in ‘state-led mega-projects’ — such as massive oil and natural gas pipelines linking Xinjiang to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. While bringing economic development, these projects have also destroyed Uyghur communities (such as the destruction of much of the old city of Kashgar through the $500 million ‘Kashgar Dangerous House Reform’ program), displaced thousands, and brought an influx of Han migrants to the region.
Second, alongside this state-led modernisation strategy, the authorities have implemented yearly ‘strike hard’ campaigns. These are against ‘splittists’ and, since 9/11, ‘terrorists and extremists’. Before 2001 these campaigns led to accelerated trials of alleged ‘splittists’. But in the post-9/11 climate the actions that are now criminalised as ‘terrorist’ acts have been expanded and punitive measures increased. This approach continues with Xinjiang governor Nur Berki. When announcing the increase to the counter-terrorism budget, Berki stated that the government would ‘constantly strike hard against violent terrorism, showing no mercy, in accordance with the law, and maintaining a high-handed posture’.
This leads to the third major issue contributing to unrest: the state’s continued desire to monitor and control ethnic minorities’ cultural and religious expression. Since the 1990s the regional government has been especially vigilant with respect to what it terms ‘illegal religious activities’ — that is, all religious or cultural activities that take place outside of state-sanctioned parameters. Significantly, the government’s continued anti-religious campaigns played a role in stimulating some of last year’s unrest in Turpan. Characteristic of the state’s heavy-handed approach has been the ‘Project Beauty’ campaign that is aimed at discouraging mostly Uyghur women from wearing traditional headscarves or veils.
In the aftermath of the 2009 Urumqi events, long-serving Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan was removed by Beijing in favour of the reportedly reform-minded Zhang Chuxian. This raised hopes that Zhang’s lighter touch would moderate tensions in the region. But Zhang’s return to old strategies and political slogans — such as his 2011 call for the CCP to institute ‘flexible iron-fisted rule’ — quickly dispelled hopes.
The most noteworthy ‘innovation’ in Chinese policy toward Xinjiang and the Uyghur since 2009 concerns Ilham Tohti. His arrest signals that Xi Jinping is determined to take the ideological fight to those advocating greater autonomy for Xinjiang’s Uyghurs.
Three days after Tohti’s arrest the Global Times excoriated the scholar. In an editorial it described him as someone who had abused his position to advocate for greater autonomy for Xinjiang. Tohti’s questioning of government claims regarding the extent of ‘terrorist’ acts amounted to an attempt to ‘find a moral excuse for terrorists’. The editorial concluded that without ‘brains’ like Tohti behind the ‘terrorists’ they would be a clueless mob.
This reveals the motive behind Tohti’s arrest: his criticism of the CCP’s line on the Uyghur and Xinjiang are perceived by Beijing as providing moral and intellectual succour to disaffected Uyghurs in Xinjiang. But if the CCP does not address the fact that its policies in Xinjiang play a role in stimulating such disaffection, the region will be doomed to repeat its cycle of unrest and violence.
Michael Clarke is a senior research fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University.
Undoubtedly there have been serious ethnic problems in Xinjiang and some of them may have been caused by policies and/or implementations of policies and administration. However, to attribute most of the problems in Xinjiang to ethnic problems may mask other causes of the problems. For example, there are many serious problems in areas that are mainly Han ethnic people – the dominant and the largest ethnic group in China, such as demolishing properties for new construction in cities or new urban areas. Some reports indicate that there are tens of thousands of mass unrests a year in China, a reflection of general problems as opposed to ethnic problems.
In terms of the pipelines linking Xinjiang to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, it probably paled in significance when compared to the Three Gorges Dam that caused/forced millions of people to move and migrate to other new settlement areas.
Were the problems of the Three Gorges Dam project mainly an ethnic problem as perceived by people outside China? Probably not.
Development may cause some destruction and China has not been skilful in dealing with many issues associated with development, such as dislocation of people and destruction of some historical, cultural, religious and ethnic heritages.
Development can and often does involve changes. No one can promise no changes to anything while making development a reality at all occasions involving either natural or man-made things. The key issues include costs and benefits any potential development means and how to protect those that should be protected and prioritise things and how to handle sensitive issues.
While that is a fact, exaggerating issues that may be general but at the same time involving minority ethnic groups does not necessarily contribute positively to finding better solutions to resolving them.
For example, here in Australia there are issues and different views of how the economy in Tasmania is going and how to balance the need for development and growing the economy and protect the environment. Such issues, while differing in degree, are not too dissimilar to some of the development issues in China.
Having made the above comments, I would say that the arrest of Uyghur scholar Tohti was regrettable event. There should ideally be greater freedom of speech for everyone in China.
The Dangerous House Reform Program throughout Xinjiang has been more about the removal of adobe slums and illegal constructions and the relocation of residents to modern government
sudsidised accommodation.
In Kashgar and other surrounds, the government has been intent on the removal of old and dilapated buildings in regions vunerable to earthquakes. Photographs from regional sources show that some Kashgar buildings in the old city zone were not destroyed but renovated according to the national conservation standards for historical and cultural cities.
The state monitors all religious expession throughout Xinjiang regardless of ethnicity and religious affiliation and the Law applies equally across the board to Muslims, Buddists, Taoists and Christians alike.
The ‘Project Beauty’ campaign discouraging headscarves and veils is no different from Laws being enacted and enforced in other parts of the non-Muslim world. Apart from the issue of scarves and veils, the Project Beauty according to the Xinjiang Women’s Federation promotes the ethnic clothing industry, provides financial aid and small loans to impoverished women and students and conducts seminars on marriage and family, women’s rights, mental health and parent-child relationships.
It would be naive to believe that there are no ‘brains’ (from within and outside) behind some of the waves of violence in Xinjiang and despite the government’s heavy handedness, it is high time for those Uygurs leading the charge to come to grips with the fact that violence will never resolve the cultural, polical and economic issues facing the Uygur people in Xinjiang.
There are two fundamental issues fuelling the unrest/violence by Uyghurs inside and outside of Xinjiang Province. Undeniably, the influence of jihadist militant Islam, usually led by Imams and other clerics,has found fertile ground among disaffected Muslims in the NW. When coupled with Islamic philosphy that preaches and teaches that Islam should rule, and those who refuse to “submit” should become second-class citizens ( dhimmi) under the protection of their Muslim overlords…… it makes a potent message for those who adopt a “born to rule” mentality. The militant Imams preach violence as the means to attain their goal and terrorism is the result.
The second influence is that of wealth, and who is to control it. Xinjiang Province, apart from hosting pipelines from the massive oil-fields of Central Asia, is bountifully endowed with all sorts of mineral assets which have barely had the surface scratched for exploitation.
Huge gas fields ( and some oil) are being brought into production, while enormous deposits of various minerals are just waiting to be exploited once sufficient capital and expertise is found for development. All are essential for the future economy of China, and are a magnet for covetous eyes.
When Uyghur nationals use jingoism and jihadism to fuel violence for political gain one can be very sure that financial motives soon skulk in the background.
China has redoubled its effort to face terrorism. Such step has been taken after China has been liable to a number of terrorist attack. The last attack against Chinese train station has led to the murder of many persons and tens are injured. Chinese has taken serious procedures to face such suicide attack.