The changing political environment can be seen in the relative rise of the LDP’s coalition partner, Komeito, which won four additional seats for a total of 35, and the LDP’s loss of three seats for a total of 291. More conspicuously, the far-right Party for Future Generations suffered a shattering defeat losing 17 of its 19 seats, leaving Takeo Hiranuma and Hiroyuki Sonoda as the only members of the party in the Diet. This is the party that assembled the most vocal and iconic nationalist right-wing candidates. Shintaro Ishihara, the 82 year old former governor of Tokyo, failed to win a seat as the last candidate on the party’s proportional representation list and immediately resigned from politics. Toshio Tamogami, the former chief of the Air Self-Defense Force who was dismissed for his nationalist views on wartime history, openly urged the LDP to break its coalition with Komeito in order to advance a conservative agenda on defence policy. He was defeated: a symbolic loss for nationalists.
The Democratic Party of Japan gained 11 seats, bringing its total to 73. The Japan Innovation Party lost only one seat, leaving it at 41, but its leader Toru Hashimoto, the once powerful Osaka mayor, saw his clout considerably weakened and he resigned from national politics to concentrate on Osaka regional politics. Kenji Eda, the former secretary to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, is now heading the party. Finally, there is the Communist Party, which gained 13 seats, leaving it with 21. Apart from the single conservative party, the LDP, all other significant parties share a liberal-centre ideological persuasion, including the Democratic Party, the Japan Innovation Party, the Komeito and the Communists, with other parties reduced to just two seats each.
This political landscape will influence Abe’s future policy, particularly on security and history. Optimists may argue that this political landscape — together with Abe’s ability to listen to his realist and moderate staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), such as Shotaro Yachi — will enable Abe to more closely align himself with global public opinion, including that of the United States and Europe. Pessimists argue that the combination of a powerful majority in the lower house, combined with the shifting political tide towards the liberal centre, could make the nationalists more vocal, leaving Abe with no choice but to listen to and implement their views.
Abe made it clear following the election that ‘revision of the Constitution’ is going to be one of his major political objectives. But does this make sense? As far as Article 9 — the ‘pacifist clause’ — is concerned, the major task now is the parliamentary debate on codifying the July 2014 cabinet decision, which authorised limited forms of collective self-defence by reinterpreting the constitution. After that, there does not seem to be any real necessity for any formal revision to ensure Japan’s proactive defence and security policy. MOFA may well seek a more active role for Japan in peacekeeping operations and actions authorised by UN Security Council resolutions. This could see the enactment of permanent law to allow Japan to respond to UN resolutions like the 2009 Afghan resolution or the 2003 Iraq resolution. But this would not require constitutional revision.
As long as the Komeito remains part of the ruling coalition, further revision of Article 9 beyond the cabinet decision is unlikely. Other issues are likely to take legislative priority. On issues of historical memory, such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine or the comfort women issue, very little was said during the election campaign.
The optimistic view is that Abe will now turn into a realist on these matters. If this is the case he would not go to Yasukuni and, without publicly saying so, would find a way to convey his new position to US President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping. On the comfort women issue he would allow diplomats to negotiate quietly to find new ways of healing old wounds, involving South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye in order to resolve this issue, one of the thorny points between Japan and South Korea. On this path, 2015 would see Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II commit his administration and future governments to the 1995 Murayama statement and his voice determination to never forget Japan’s role in the war. If this could be achieved, it might pave the way for Abe to take more resolute action to promote good relations between Japan and its Asian neighbours.
On the other hand, it is possible that Abe’s 2015 statement might be exclusively ‘future-oriented’, one that declares that Japan has done everything it can to reconcile with its past, and that other countries should simply move on. In this scenario, no further action would be expected by his cabinet on the comfort women issue. Abe might even visit Yasukuni Shrine again if his nationalist supporters feel that international pressure is an insult to Japanese pride. This is a recipe for Japan’s global isolation. Prime Minister Abe stated at his New Year press conference on 5 January that his cabinet has inherited and will continue to uphold the position of previous cabinets on historical memory in full including the Murayama Statement. This statement is certainly not a bad signal for the optimists. But we need to watch carefully how events will develop.
The post-election political landscape will also have implications for the issue of US military bases in Okinawa. Non-LDP candidates who opposed the transfer of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Base to Henoko won all four seats of the single-member district seats. Although all of the losing candidates nonetheless won a spot in the Diet through proportional representation list seats, the unpopularity of the Henoko option is becoming increasingly clear. The so-called ‘two plus two’ agreement between the US and Japan, which affirmed the Henoko option, is facing serious problems. Some intellectuals in Japan have begun articulating more clearly the issue of Okinawa’s identity as separate from the Yamato (Japanese) identity. Unless the government pays more serious attention to the long-neglected question of Okinawa’s identity the issue may well become the most difficult security, defence and foreign policy issue for Japan under the third Abe Cabinet.
Without even considering the travails of Abenomics — the third arrow of which, comprising deregulation and economic development, must now be implemented — Abe’s political plate will certainly be very full for the rest of his time in office. Abe will need to choose wisely where to leverage his political capital and skill to successfully navigate the challenges that lie ahead.
Kazuhiko Togo is director of the Institute for World Affairs at Kyoto Sangyo University and former Ambassador of Japan to the Netherlands. An earlier version of this article appeared here in the Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet Newsletter #91, December 2014.
This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2014 in review and the year ahead.