Much of Pakistan’s politics throughout 2015 has revolved around the army’s actions and the government’s apathetic approach to governance. Despite ongoing problems, there have been some notable achievements.
To beef up a crumbling civilian structure, the army imposed civil–military ‘Apex Committees’ at provincial and federal levels. Made up of both military and political leaders, these committees are responsible for coordinating security policies. Importantly, they have been able to make significant policy decisions, bringing some order in governance.
The army has also had considerable success in breaking the nexus between the militant wings of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which finance terror and crime syndicates in Karachi — Pakistan’s economic Achilles heel. While this has won them support from the public, it has created tensions with some of the political oligarchs in Karachi.
The army’s emphasis on the need to secure military gains through civilian follow-up actions — such as controlling sectarianism, terror financing and depoliticising the police — continues to strain its relations with the government.
The treason case against former president Musharraf — the original reason for the discord between the government and the military — continues to be a source of tension. The army is convinced that outbursts against them are orchestrated. An inherently weak, tainted civilian leadership is yet to understand that they cannot publicly ridicule the military and get away with it. And so the relations between the two have remained testy throughout 2015.
At the same time, Pakistani politicians, who normally slug it out among themselves, have united to prevent a complete breakdown of the ‘democratic process’. Still, this is largely because politics has become a very profitable business in Pakistan.
Due to a failure to prove organised ballot rigging during the 2013 elections, Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) has lost some of its shine. Yet relatively strong performance in local elections in Punjab and Sindh reinforced the electoral standing of the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) and the PPP. What this means is that Pakistan is dangerously moving towards an increasingly polarised polity.
At the national level, Sharif’s governance style remains imperial — the state machinery is run through a predatory group made up of Sharif’s family members and close associates from the time of his first government in the early 1990s. The cabinet has reportedly met only three times in 2015. Running a transparent and just political system remains a challenge in Pakistan.
Midway through the current term, there has been little progress in achieving a more clean and efficient government. Road works have become the key development priority, yet not one initiative on healthcare or education has been launched. The Finance Ministry, run by a close Sharif relative, unashamedly fudges budget figures, concealing the true financial position of the government from the public.
No one is held accountable for inefficiency or corruption. No wonder Pakistan ranked at 126 of 175 countries in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perception Index. Levels of tax collection have repeatedly been poor and Pakistan’s exports have been consistently falling.
While the IMF has shown confidence in the economy, many notable economists have warned of the risks of excessive borrowing and the possibility that Pakistan is slipping into a debt trap.
On top of this, the state has not lived up to its responsibility to protect its citizens. And minorities have continued to bear the wrath of religious fanaticism.
After a brief bonhomie when President Ashraf Ghani took power in Kabul, relations with Afghanistan are rocky again. Iran and Pakistan are caught on opposing sides in Afghanistan and in their relations with the Gulf states. And Pakistan is watching strengthening Iran–India relations with considerable suspicion. The India-Pakistan statement late in the year announcing resumption of dialogue process offered a glimmer of hope for peace.
Following military action to eliminate militants from North Waziristan — a long standing US demand — relations with the United States have stabilised. But the United States continues to make demands on Pakistan in pursuit of its global counter-terrorism agenda.
Resistance from within the military leadership, and the country at large, barely saved Pakistan from the prime minister’s disastrous commitment to send ground troops to the Saudi led war in Yemen. Still, this will have implications for Pakistan’s longer-term engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
The formal signing of an agreement to commence work on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor was the big news of 2015. The agreement both reinforces China’s commitment to Pakistan and serves China’s strategic interests.
Like usual, it was a difficult year and Pakistan seems to have missed another opportunity to set its house in order. The current army chief is the most popular leader in Pakistan at the moment. Pakistanis are already worrying about what will happen when his three-year term expires in November 2016. With huge debts and endemic corruption, a polarised Pakistan faces serious challenges ahead.
Sajjad Ashraf is an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He was a member of the Pakistan Foreign Service from 1973–2008.
This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2015 in review and the year ahead.