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Japan and Australia ramp up defence engagement in the South China Sea

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Australian counterpart Malcolm Turnbull hold a joint press conference in Tokyo. The two leaders vowed to accelerate negotiations over an agreement aimed at facilitating joint operations and exercises as part of increased defense cooperation, 18 December 2015. (Photo: AAP).

In Brief

Amid the increasing tensions in the South China Sea the United States has called for its regional allies to more actively support its freedom of navigation (FON) operations. But despite their political support for the operations, it seems that neither Tokyo nor Canberra are willing to put their support into direct action.

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe explicitly ruled out the possibility of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) directly engaging with the FON operations early on, although he did not deny the possibility of the SDF being dispatched to the South China Sea in a future contingency. And while Australia has reportedly considered conducting its own FON exercise, the Turnbull government has so far avoided provoking China — its top trading partner — by expanding its military activities in the region.

But this does not mean that Japan and Australia are indifferent, nor ‘free-riding’ on US efforts to resolve the South China Sea issue. Instead, both countries have gradually enhanced their defence engagement with Southeast Asia. This could provide indirect but more substantial support to US FON operations than direct engagement. This enhancement strategy seems to consist of three elements: enhancing their presence, expanding partnerships and coalition-building.

First, both Japan and Australia have enhanced their presence in the region through increasing the number of joint bilateral and trilateral military exercises, patrolling and port visits to maritime countries in Southeast Asia. Since last year, Japan’s P3C aircrafts have visited Vietnam twice on the way back home from anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia. Japan also conducted its first bilateral maritime and air exercises with the Philippines in 2015 and its first bilateral Table-Top Exercise for search and rescue with Vietnam in February 2016.

In April 2016, a Japanese submarine with two destroyers visited the Philippines’ Subic Bay — the first port visit by Japanese submarines to the Philippines in 15 years. In the same month, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) helicopter destroyer passed the South China Sea to participate in multilateral naval exercises hosted by Indonesia, and two other MSDF destroyers made a first port call at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.

Likewise, Australia has recently reviewed and enhanced its defence commitment to Southeast Asia by increasing the frequency of its long-standing patrolling exercises with P3C aircraft and sailing warships through the Spratly Islands. In the longer term, the Australian Defence Force is looking to build up its maritime capabilities, which will strengthen its strategic presence in the South China Sea. According to the 2016 Defence White Paper of Australia, securing its nearer region, including ‘maritime Southeast Asia’, is now Australia’s second highest priority after the defence of Australia itself.

Second, both countries have strengthened their partnerships with Southeast Asian countries through capacity-building and defence equipment cooperation. Japan has not only agreed to provide patrol boats to the Philippines, but is also reportedly considering transferring training aircraft (TC-90) for maritime surveillance activities in the Spratly Islands. Japan held its first ‘two-plus-two’ meeting with Indonesia in December 2015, agreeing to negotiate the transfer of defence equipment and technology.

Australia has also quietly strengthened its bilateral maritime partnerships in Southeast Asia. Australia transferred its Customs and Border Protection Vessel (ACV) to its Malaysian counterpart agency in February 2015 and donated two decommissioned Heavy Landing Craft (LCHs) to the Philippines in November 2015 (three more were sold at a friendship price in March this year). Australia has also upgraded its defence and security cooperation with Vietnam, concluded ‘strategic partnerships’ with both Singapore and Malaysia, and is in the process of renewing its defence pact with Indonesia in order to expand defence exchange between two countries.

Third, on top of the strong Japan–Australia security ties, both nations have quietly promoted building loose coalitions through strategic dialogue and military exercises. A good example of this is the trilateral foreign secretary-level meetings between Japan, Australia and India in June 2015 and February 2016. Following this, Japan has already moved to join the US–India exercise Malabar and Australia is reportedly interested in participating in the exercise later this year.

Another example is the expansion of the membership of military exercises such as Corp North, which originally began as a bilateral military exercise between Japan and the United States in 1978. In 2012 Corp North became a trilateral with Australia and now it has expanded to include other regional powers, such as South Korea, New Zealand and the Philippines, in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. There has also been a growing momentum for cooperation between coast guard agencies between the United States, Japan, Australia and other regional partners, which will likely realise more multi-layered security cooperation.

Japan and Australia have independently and jointly enhanced their defence engagement with Southeast Asia. And, while it is unlikely that more direct engagement — like US–Japan–Australia joint patrolling activities — will soon be realised, such activities are still crucial to showing solidarity with the US-led FON operations and to secure America’s military commitment to the region.

But such cooperation is not risk-free. While defence engagement will enhance the maritime capabilities of some countries and amend the asymmetric power balance in the region, it may also increase political disagreement between maritime and continental Southeast Asian countries regarding regional security matters. Japan and Australia must be careful to balance expanding their bilateral defence engagements in maritime Southeast Asia with improving cooperation in more inclusive regional multilateral security institutions. To do so, more communication and coordination between Japan, Australia and other regional powers is required.

Tomohiko Satake is a Senior Research Fellow at National Institute of Defence Studies, Tokyo. The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of NIDS or the Ministry of Defence, Japan.

4 responses to “Japan and Australia ramp up defence engagement in the South China Sea”

  1. Mr Tomohiko Satake’s claim that “despite their political support for the (US FON) operations, it seems that neither Tokyo nor Canberra are willing to put their support into direct action” make sense for the following 3 reasons:

    1) Prof Greg Austin’s piece “In the background of the current debate is a big lie, an unadulterated fib, perpetrated by the Pentagon.. that China’s actions in the South China Sea threaten commercial shipping.”

    http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/mountains-out-of-molehills-the-pentagons-big-lie-about-the-south-china-sea/

    2)“Why Beijing poses no threat to South China Sea commerce”:

    http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/why-beijing-poses-no-threat-to-south-china-sea-commerce

    3)Dr Sam Bateman, a former Australian Naval Commodore, warned that “(Australian) policymakers need to be cautious of the White Papers’ exaggerations about how much China threatens Australian trade and security interests in the South China Sea.”

    The claim that Abe “did not deny the possibility of the SDF being dispatched to the South China Sea in a future contingency” confirms Abe’s duplicity.

    Japan’s Constitution clearly states that, to wit:

    “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

    By trashing Article 9, Abe will be paving the way for the resurgence in Japanese militarism. More in my piece in the Eurasia review here:

    http://www.eurasiareview.com/15022016-is-abe-paving-the-way-for-a-resurgence-in-japanese-militarism/

    Lest we forget, Japan’s naked aggression and greed drove it to annex the Ryukyu islands in 1879, renamed it Okinawa and then stamped out everything distinctive about the ancient kingdom.

    That was imperial Japan’s first victim after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, a practice run for the forceful theft of China’s Daioyu islands circa 1894 as a war booty (renamed the Senkaku in 1904); the ceding of Taiwan and the Pescadores in perpetuity to Japan (under the sham Shimonosecki Treaty of 1895); colonization of Korea (1910 to 1945); annexation of Manchuria in 1931, renamed it Manchukuo and installed the exiled last Qing Emperor of China, Henry Pu Yi as the sham new Emperor; invaded China from 1931-45, killed tens of millions of innocent civilians (300,000 alone in Nanjing), Organized rapes (Comfort Women in Korea and China), looted the treasury of many hundreds of tons of gold and silver, and experimented on life humans with deadly diseases at Unit 731; colonization of the Spratly and Paracel islands in 1939; invaded Hong Kong, Burma, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Indochina, the Philippines, Indonesia and many Pacific islands from 1941 onward, after bombing the US Navy’s Pearl Harbor, igniting the Pacific war.

    That brutal war ended in August 1945 when two Atomic bombs landed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    Under the Potsdam Declaration (1945) and the terms of the Cairo Conference (1943) Japan must return ALL territories, taken by ‘greed and violence’.

    Even the Spratly and Paracel islands were returned to the Republic of China under the Treaty of Peace on 28 April 1952, by extension to China, under the one-China policy, a principle which is recognized by the US, Japan, Asean and Australia.

    But today evidence shows that Japan illegally nationalized the Daioyu islands in Sept 2012, with Uncle Sam’s egregious connivance to seed a war with a rising China.

    Will Abe fail to learn from History and escape from the ‘Thucydides Trap’, by manufacturing a war of attrition, this time against a nuclear-powered China, under Uncle Sam’s tutelage?

    Let’s hope not, as it will surely end badly for Japan and the peace-loving Japanese people.

  2. 1 It is true that “Japan and Australia have independently and jointly enhanced their defence engagement with Southeast Asia”.

    But let us not forget that while Australia is embarking on this mission legally, under the Constitution, Japan, under the Abe administration, has trashed Article 9 of Japan’s peace Constitution, which is the highest law of the land.

    Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution clearly states that, to wit:

    “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

    So how does one explain why today, Japan has the 4th biggest military in the world, with three aircraft carriers, disguised as giant helicopter destroyers, like the Hyūga, Ise and Izumo?

    Hyūga was described in a PBS documentary as the “first Japanese aircraft carrier built since WWII.”

    If this is not a typical Japanese deception then what is?

    2 “while it is unlikely that more direct engagement — like US–Japan–Australia joint patrolling activities — will soon be realised, such activities are still crucial to showing solidarity with the US-led FON operations and to secure America’s military commitment to the region.”

    This is a non-sequitur, a logical fallacy in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises.

    The restriction of FON in the South China Sea is the biggest lie, hatched by the Pentagon and Abe fell for it. More here:

    http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/mountains-out-of-molehills-the-pentagons-big-lie-about-the-south-china-sea/

    Why would China restrict FON in the South China Sea when majority of her seaborne trade depends on FON and FON is crucial if the China-initiated Maritime Silk Road is to be successful?

    3 “Japan and Australia must be careful to balance expanding their bilateral defence engagements in maritime Southeast Asia with improving cooperation in more inclusive regional multilateral security institutions.”

    There is no need to lecture Australia what it should or should not do in South East Asia, which Japan once brutally invaded, colonized and incorporated into allegedly “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, aka abject, slave colonies to be looted and raped.

    The fact that Australia has selected French submarines over inferior Japanese ones sends an unequivocal message to Japan that an ab initio divergence in Australian/Japanese defense stance in Asia, into the future, is on the line.

  3. The award of building the 12 submarines for Australia to the French provides the best answer to this post.
    I happened to meet some people who were doing some jobs for the Australian government and they jokingly put it: “we are back to the Second World War when we were allied with France and fighting against Japan and Germany”.
    Afterall, history may repeat itself in a crude and unrelenting way!
    That perhaps summarises the insanity of the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s earlier failed approach to the big project. Some have said that that was one of the issues that Abbott was seen as unsound and prone to funny and poor judgement.
    Were Mr Abbott get his own way, Australia would lose out greatly. Some may say that Australia’s interest would be sold out.

  4. It seems to me that japan has the right to defend its interest as much as any other nation would. I’m assuming that he is leaning to the West for past history of hostilities with its neighbours, and because it signed a treaty at the end of World War 2 that forces them more or less to do this.

    On this treaty, I believe Abe is doing the right thing. After World War 2 the treaty forbad Japan to build an offensive army, although it is difficult to say what that means, but I assume it means not to build an army. I believe this to be unnacceptable for any nation, as it forces them to rely in other nations for defence and also forces them to forfeit their own interests.

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