, a high crime rate and deeply rooted corruption.
When he announced that nothing and no one can come between him and his crackdown on crime and corruption — which he promised to accomplish within six months — he received mostly cheers from a populace frustrated with the failed promises of the previous administration. More thumbs up were aimed his way when he threatened to abolish either Congress or the courts (or perhaps both) should they stand in his way. This anti-crime crusade is backed up by his bounty offers for the deaths of drug traffickers. Not even journalists are ‘exempted from assassination’.
But Duterte will soon learn that nothing is absolutely black and white in international affairs. Complexity is the name of the game. Drawing arbitrary lines in the sand will not only be futile, but also counterproductive.
The three pillars of Philippine foreign policy are national security, economic security, and the protection of the rights and interests of Filipinos overseas. The preservation and enhancement of national security hinges on the development of a minimum deterrence capability for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In 2012, the outgoing Aquino administration revised the 1995 AFP Modernization Act and from 2013 onwards the Philippines increased its defence spending significantly. A completely modern military is still a long way off, but the seeds have been planted.
The modernisation efforts came amid rising tensions in the South China Sea (known in the Philippines as the West Philippine Sea). Apart from beefing up its military, the Philippines under Aquino also resorted to filing an arbitration case against China, the results of which will be announced in the coming months. Two end scenarios to the case come to mind.
If China and the Philippines continue to assert their sovereignty in the South China Sea despite a forthcoming ruling from the arbitration tribunal, then one can expect an increase in the militarisation of the disputed waters and a decrease in regional security. But if the parties involved display a commitment to international law and principles, then an increase in security cooperation is likely to happen. Whatever the decision of the tribunal may be, both scenarios should prompt the incoming Philippine government to realise that it is crucial to work with its partners and allies.
Engaging China bilaterally is a step in the right direction. The Philippines must also continue to see the value in engaging regional entities, despite divisions within ASEAN. Likewise, the Philippines needs to maintain good relations with the United States and Australia. Refusing to work with or threatening to cut ties with the outside world is a fatal strategy and will only serve to alienate the Philippines.
Meanwhile, the incoming president has presented an eight-point agenda to promote and attain economic security. This includes macroeconomic policies focused on economic stability, increased tax collection, better infrastructure, creating a positive investment climate, providing support to small farmers, improving land administration and management, the provision of basic and higher education, and implementing conditional cash transfers. If the ultimate goal is narrowing the gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’, then the challenge is how to flesh out this bare bones agenda. Providing subsidies may be beneficial, but only in the short term. In the long run, who bears the cost?
Duterte’s crusade against crime and corruption may indeed hold the key in terms of engendering a positive investment climate and bringing more foreign direct investment into the country. But this also raises another question in the international arena: which economic tide must the Philippines ride? There is a multiplicity of initiatives out there being led by major powers. The US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership is one example, others include the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ‘One Belt, One Road’ efforts. The question is not so much how the Philippines can get in on the bandwagon, but rather how the Philippines can take advantage of these simultaneous ‘pivots’ to Asia.
The protection of Filipinos overseas requires an equally deft foreign policy. In the first place, the high numbers of overseas Filipino workers are a symptom of insufficient employment opportunities at home. The lack of these opportunities then pushes Filipinos to seek alternative means elsewhere, even at the risk of their own safety. If economic security were high, then the chances of overseas Filipinos at risk of exploitation would be significantly lower. In the same vein, as the Philippines currently depends on the many Filipinos working overseas and sending money back home, it is to the country’s interest to maintain friendly relations with others.
The pillars of Philippine foreign policy are inextricably linked to each other. An appreciation of their interconnectedness amid the complexity of international relations is necessary not only to ensure the security of the country, but also to guarantee positive reciprocity from the country’s partners and allies around the world.
Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby is Associate Professor of International Relations at De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines.