If their demeanours seem as different as could be, their diverging policy approaches on the key alliance issue of North Korea seem to also be a potential area of contention. The Trump administration favours a policy of maximum pressure to bring North Korea ‘to its senses’, while Moon campaigned on a policy of engagement with North Korea. Despite these differences, by all accounts the summit went well on security issues.

The two sides managed to avoid contention on security issues by consciously avoiding a discussion of THAAD — South Korea’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defence system — and giving the other something they wanted on North Korea. South Korea backed Trump’s push to increase sanctions, while Trump agreed to support South Korea’s attempt to coax North Korea into some type of dialogue that might lower tensions on the peninsula and begin North Korea’s denuclearisation process.

But if differences on North Korea have been smoothed over for the moment, other tensions are clearly beginning to form in the relationship.

During Trump’s campaign, two issues were continuously raised about South Korea — the need to share more of the cost of stationing US troops on the peninsula and South Korea’s trade surplus with the United States. The issue of burden-sharing is one that Trump raised during the summit and likely would have been raised by any US president, but the issue of trade is different. While former president Barack Obama praised the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), Trump has referred to it as a ‘horrible deal’ and job killer.

At the summit, Trump expressed his desire for a deal that is fair to both US and South Korean workers. He suggested that ‘the trade deal is up’ and that a new, fairer agreement would be negotiated. But Moon later noted that Trump’s remarks were ‘outside of what was agreed upon’, leaving the two administrations seemingly on different pages when it comes to trade.

Since the summit, the United States has announced that a special joint committee will be formed to renegotiate the KORUS FTA. South Korea, for their part, hopes to use the committee to analyse the impact of the agreement.

While the US trade deficit in goods with South Korea has grown from US$12.4 billion to US$27.7 billion since KORUS came into effect, it has been trending downwards for nearly a year. It has also served as a floor on US exports to South Korea as South Korean imports from the rest of the world have dropped in recent years. This combined with the fact that the US administration has yet to notify Congress of its intent to renegotiate the KORUS FTA as required under Trade Promotion Authority, along with the administration’s focus on steel and autos, suggests that it is looking for sector-specific changes rather than significant renegotiations of the agreement.

In the case of steel, the administration is currently conducting a Section 232 investigation that is expected to allow the US to restrain imports of steel. This could provide the US with leverage in talks over concerns that South Korea is dumping steel in the US market.

It is the auto industry that the United States has pointed to as the most significant driver of the trade deficit under KORUS. But in the absence of KORUS that deficit would have been greater. The United States did not eliminate or cut its tariff on autos until last year and subsequently saw drops in both the value and volume of Korean autos (HS Code 8703) exported to the United States. The growth in Korean exports under KORUS has been market driven, while KORUS has surely aided US exports to South Korea, which have grown from an initial low base.

This does not mean that the United States does not continue to face regulatory challenges in South Korea. But it also suffers from a limited distribution and repair network that hinders growth in automobile sales. Unless both issues are addressed, the US industry is likely to continue to face challenges in expanding sales.

While the United States and South Korea were able to bridge their differences on North Korea, it should perhaps not be surprising that there seems to be the potential for real differences on trade going forward. In light of Trump’s long-standing concerns on US trade deficits dating back to the 1980s, something shared largely by his economic team, we should expect the US administration to continue to push for measures it believes will reduce the trade deficit with South Korea. This is an area where it has a greater domestic political incentive to be seen as being tough than on North Korea.

At the same time, the KORUS FTA as originally negotiated is now 10 years old. If the special commission does a thorough job of evaluating the agreement, it may find areas in need of update that could benefit both countries.

Troy Stangarone is the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.