Nervous local officials looked more like they were receiving a visiting emperor than participating in public revelries. In some ways, signs of nervousness are appropriate in these times. Beijing has increasingly asserted itself in the city in the five years since Xi’s ascent.
There is a raft of accusations about Beijing’s pushy behaviour. They range from interference in the local legal system to dictating outright what system is used to choose chief executives and which politicians are allowed to sit in the local parliament.
But is the balance sheet for Hong Kong twenty years since the handover uniformly bleak?
There were plenty of commentators in the build-up to 1997 who thought the city was on a path to oblivion. The most dystopic visions had People’s Liberation Army vehicles moving into the city the night the reversion happened, with an immediate takeover of institutions by hostile forces from the Communist mainland. That never happened.
Nor, for that matter, was the city visibly facing orders to change its system in the ensuing few years. All the more remarkable is the fact that after the huge impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Hong Kong in 1998 — including searing unemployment and collapsed growth — China never used this as an excuse to impose radical changes in governance. And the city recovered remarkably quickly.
The most striking thing in the ensuing decades is how much the status quo continued and how durable the ‘one country, two systems’ rubric proved to be.
The original agreement between the United Kingdom and China for handover in 1984 provided the broad framework for Hong Kong to continue with its capitalist system, despite being the sovereign territory of a socialist country. It was also able to maintain a high degree of autonomy in its legal system, its currency, its interest rates and its internal governance.
In this context, the first 15 years of Hong Kong’s reversion to Chinese sovereignty ran remarkably smoothly. Challenges like massive opposition to Article 23 anti-secession laws (named after the clause in the Basic Law, the city’s de facto constitution) saw public protests during 2002 handled without spinning out of control.
But real changes have occurred recently, and the outcomes from these are far from clear. It looks like the will to preserve the original agreement of 1997 is disintegrating, and that a wholly new mindset is emanating from Beijing.
There are two types of change. The first relates to the incremental — but increasingly tight — assertion of mainland control. Chief executives now need to do Beijing’s bidding, the claim goes.
The fiasco of attempts in 2013 to introduce a highly managed new system for chief executive elections failed because of widespread, prolonged demonstrations and a lack of consensus.
Further, trust in local leaders is scant. CY Leung, the last chief executive, left after one tumultuous term. His replacement, Carrie Lam, faces the same challenge: how does Hong Kong square the circle of forging constitutional change that satisfies the both Chinese elite politicians and increasingly assertive local constituencies?
The search for an amenable, balanced civic space that at least unites most parties is proving tougher. Hong Kong politics is blighted by the same divisiveness that now dominates in the United States and Europe. This could give Beijing an even more substantial excuse to intervene in order to impose its version of stability and order.
The second change is a more amorphous threat to identity. Mandarin, not Cantonese, seems to be the new lingua franca of the city. Over ten million Mainland tourists flood the city each year, and tensions between the visitors and locals often flare up.
The dwindling cohesion is exacerbated by high levels of local inequality and the brute fact that life is becoming more challenging for most who live in the city. Accommodation is hugely expensive, costs of living are perpetually rising and competition from other centres in the region is warming up.
Despite these two big issues, the most remarkable thing about the 20th anniversary of the handover is how Hong Kong has managed to maintain its distinctive atmosphere. People are still allowed to protest. Local politics remains lively and contentious. Local people are not passively accepting a mainland takeover by any measure.
Underneath this is a very simple reality. In the negotiations before 1997, both the United Kingdom and China returned many times to the idea that the key objective was to deliver a Hong Kong for Hong Kongers. They were the core elements of the process.
For both sides, there was much posturing about who was most able to demonstrate they were actually supporting this. The Chinese and British each loudly proclaimed their key strategy was to deliver a Hong Kong that worked for the people of the city, rather than having any ulterior motive.
In 2017, there is plenty of evidence that people throughout the city are taking this promise at its word. They — and they alone — are the guarantee that the city will be able to enjoy its unique status, despite the increasing challenges and complexities of the last few years. Twenty years on, it is still too early to discount the resilience of Hong Kong and the people who live there.
Kerry Brown is Director of the Lau China Institute and Professor of Chinese Politics at King’s College, London.
A version of this piece was originally published here at Asian Currents.
This is an interesting analysis of contemporary Hong Kong but there are areas of contention.
1 “Twenty years after the handover from British to Chinese sovereignty, there seems to be nothing but perpetual gloom in Hong Kong commentary.”
This is not true. Facts published by the Hong Kong Govt show that since 1997, the population grew from 6.49 million then to 7.34 million today, instead of going down as predicted by the doomsayers. Hong Kong’s life expectancy for men went up from 77.2 years to 81 years. For women, it went up from 83.2 to 87 years. If you wish to live a long life, then Hong Kong is the place.
The GDP soared from HK$1.373 trillion in 1997 to 2.489 trillion in 2017, a rise of 81.2%, again defying the doomsayers, who predicted that there would be a capital-flight after the super-sized royal yacht, Britannia, sailed out of Hong Kong harbor on 1 July 1997. Hong Kong’s economy under China must be doing something right.
Source: http://www.hksar20.gov.hk/eng/pdf/photobook/The_Facts.pdf
2 “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first visit to the territory as national leader was marked by a security lockdown.”
The same thing would happen if President Trump visited Hong Kong. He will be driven in a bomb-proof, bullet-proof black luxury limo, called the “Beast”. There will be nervous US security agents running alongside the Beast. If it is good for the goose, why is it bad for the gander?
3 “But is the balance sheet for Hong Kong twenty years since the handover uniformly bleak?”
Dr Tim Summers, a British Chatham House China expert who lives and works in the city, gave it a four out of five for progress thus far. “It’s not changed in the ways that people either hoped or feared 20 years ago” he said, according to a report.
4 “There were plenty of commentators in the build-up to 1997 who thought the city was on a path to oblivion.”
They all had to eat their hats, laced with stiff cheddar, made from donkey’s milk.
5 “The most dystopic (sic) visions had People’s Liberation Army vehicles moving into the city the night the reversion happened,..That never happened.”
Why would China cull the proverbial goose that lays the golden eggs?
6 “Nor, for that matter, was the city visibly facing orders to change its system in the ensuing few years.”
That is also true. There is a saying in the American south: “If it ain’t broke, don’t change it?”
7 “All the more remarkable is the fact that after the huge impact of the Asian Financial Crisis on Hong Kong in 1998 —China never used this as an excuse to impose radical changes in governance. And the city recovered remarkably quickly.”
Yes. In fact, China never devalued the RMB to exacerbate the crisis, which was timed to start in Bangkok ONE day after the Hong Kong handover to China. Critics say it was allegedly the dirty skunk works of George Soros and the CIA.
8 “The most striking thing in the ensuing decades is how much the status quo continued and how durable the ‘one country, two systems’ rubric proved to be.”
It’s because China keeps to her part of the bargain, like in the 1890 Sino-British Convention on the Sikkim-Tibet border. It was India which violated that Convention in the Dolam plateau recently.
9 “There are two types of change. Chief executives now need to do Beijing’s bidding, the claim goes.”
If all the 28 British Governors in colonial Hong Kong, stolen from Qing China after two Opium Wars, had to do London’s bidding why is it so bad for the Chief Executive in Hong Kong to do Beijing’s bidding now? As for democracy, Martin Jacques, the British author, pointed out that Britain had 150 years to introduce it and never did.
10 “The second change is a more amorphous threat to identity. Mandarin, not Cantonese, seems to be the new lingua franca of the city. Over ten million Mainland tourists flood the city each year,..”
According to a report: “Two decades ago westerners comprised the bulk of Hong Kong’s tourists, today mainlanders account for the overwhelming majority, many of them rather more wealthy than most Hong Kong Chinese. Likewise, an increasing number of mainlanders have moved to the territory – which is a growing source of resentment.”
11 “Accommodation is hugely expensive, costs of living are perpetually rising and competition from other centres in the region is warming up.”
The real estate agent Knight Frank’s skyscraper index shows that “Hong Kong is the most expensive city in the world to rent office space – at US$302 per square foot. That’s almost double the next most expensive city, New York, which is US$159. (By comparison London’s skyscrapers look affordable at US$104)”.
Hong Kong, like any successful city, has become a victim of its own success and many young folks are priced out of the equation, reminiscent of the situation in Sydney and Melbourne today.
12 “Despite these two big issues, the most remarkable thing about the 20th anniversary of the handover is how Hong Kong has managed to maintain its distinctive atmosphere.”
Yes and it’s true that “People are still allowed to protest. Local politics remains lively and contentious.”
13 “Twenty years on, it is still too early to discount the resilience of Hong Kong and the people who live there.”
Maybe the tell-tale sign is that while Hong Kong’s share of China’s GDP in 1993 was a decent 27%, today that share has plummeted ominously to only 2.9%.
According to Martin Jacques, the British author of When China Rules the World: “If China needed Hong Kong in an earlier period, this is no longer nearly as true as it was. On the contrary, without China, Hong Kong would be in deep trouble.”