One explanation for the pessimism about Chinese governance is the recent return to polemics reminiscent of the earlier years of political reform. For example, the notion of a ‘core leader’ — de-emphasised during the years of Hu Jintao’s presidency — implies a reduced stress on consultation among different levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a mechanism for decision-making. Another example is the inclusion of a leader’s personal name in a political doctrine (‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’), enshrined in the party charter and the state constitution. It is only the second time (after Mao Zedong Thought) that this has happened.
Xi seized political advantage because of sentiment for change. The country needs collective leadership that functions effectively and authoritatively to restrain the parochial interest groups within the state, military and Party that over the past decade have been hijacking policy to feather their own nests. In November 2017, during the Party Congress, he pledged to shift the party’s mission from delivering high-speed — but costly — economic growth to meeting the people’s demands for a ‘better life’. The new agenda encompasses a broad array of goals including better public services, stronger social welfare, a cleaner environment, eradication of poverty, closing regional gaps in development and greater global influence. The vision closely tracks the aspirations of China’s growing middle class.
To these ends, a set of institutional reforms are being implemented by the decisions of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress. The move to improve efficiency and reduce overlap in government led to a reduction of the number of ministries from 34 to 26, and elimination of seven non-ministerial agencies.
The changes included setting up new departments, such as the Ministry of Emergency Management, tasked to improve response to disasters such as floods, fires and earthquakes by bringing together the response units in different agencies. The State Grains and Reserves Administration will be set up to manage strategic and emergency-aid goods such as grain, cotton and sugar. A Veterans Affairs Ministry will be established to take care of retired soldiers.
The National Health and Family Planning Commission was renamed the National Health Commission — indicative of the pursuit of a ‘better life’. China has allowed two-child families since 2016. As the country rapidly ages, with a quarter of its population estimated to be 60 years or older by 2030, more change is needed on this front. To better manage China’s natural resources and tackle serious environmental problems arising from its rapid economic growth, two new ministries are being set up: the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment.
Another major institutional change is the merging of the banking and insurance regulators to reduce financial risk. Financial risks have been identified by the government as one of its three ‘critical battles’ — together with poverty and pollution. Because the Chinese economy today is far more intertwined with the rest of the world economy, mismanagement of China’s finance could trigger a financial crisis on a global scale.
The new line-up of government agencies does seem to lend credibility to Party instructions that the ultimate goal of governance is not just to make China wealthier and stronger but also allow the populace to ‘benefit from the fruits of opening up and reform and get a share of the dividends’.
Along with the creation of the National Supervision Commission, which will administer party discipline over all public servants (including non-party members) to ensure they act in the public interest, the message for loyalty is loud and clear. Still, it will be essential for Xi to hear challenges and get feedback from the leadership circle when ideas are flawed and policies produce poor results. Absence of disagreements could mean that he becomes more insulated and prone to mistakes.
In addition, the pursuit of a ‘better life’ in China requires making difficult trade-offs between economic growth and environmental protection, and among social classes and regions with diverse and contradictory interests. Making such decisions requires more debate and consultation, not less. Communicating the logic behind specific policies to the people will be as significant as the policies themselves, and in many cases, more so.
In the past few years, China has drawn its foreign policy confidence from its achievements over the past 40 years. Yet, as former US president Barack Obama indicated when he set the philosophical basis for the US pivot to Asia, declaring that ‘prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty’, most of the Western world is far from ready to appreciate development input from China, much less leadership. A case in point is that even at the divisive G7 summit of 2018, China came up as a topic for possible joint push-back in terms of trade.
Still, China thrived by being open to the rest of the world, and the world is much better off today to have the challenge of competition from China rather than the humanitarian challenge it had 40 years ago. Keeping the lines of communication open — in all weather, domestic and diplomatic, and at the levels of both governments and societies — is the bare minimum approach for managing differences and preventing misjudgements. In a geostrategic sense, competition rather than confrontation is by far the preferable future.
Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy at Peking University. An extended version of this article appeared in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Trade wars and Asia’.
Thank you for this interesting account of governance in China.
I have a theory that officials in China (including at the highest levels, perhaps even the CCP’s Politburo) are appointed through a combination of: (i) “elections” based on ex ante rules, chosen by an “electorate” and (ii) ex post “selection” made by a smaller group, which I denote as the “selectorate”.
For example, the rules might stipulate that an “electorate” of senior CCP members would nominate 2 or 3 individuals for public office, from which 1 is chosen by the “selectorate”. Perhaps in special circumstances, the selectorate might even chose another individual altogether, but give reasons for that choice.
This is just a theory or a model. I imagine the actual process is different. But suppose this model is reasonably accurate, I would argue that democracy in China (which I understand is a quality that China values) could be improved over time as: (i) the “electorate” is progressively widened to include more people, (ii) the rules (and process) of election become more transparent, and (iii) decisions of the selectorate are based on good reasoning, having regard to public discussion, and with a published statement giving reasons for the selectorate’s choice.
I would argue that many established Western democracies also entail a combination of “elections” and “selections”. For example, members of the Australian Parliament are elected by a universal electorate of adult citizens (non-citizen taxpayers not having a right to vote), while the Australian cabinet is selected by the members of the political party (being the “selectorate”) having majority control of Parliament.
I assume the rules governing Chinese governance is mostly unwritten, but perhaps over time, unwritten conventions will become sufficiently established for commentators (such as yourself) to describe with reasonable accuracy.
I also assume these unwritten conventions will change over time, perhaps becoming ever more transparent, with an ever-widening electorate. Over time, the “selectorate” would take on a more “hands off” approach, as confidence in that the relevant electorate will make informed choices based on public discussion and good reasoning, vs choices driven by social identities (e.g., class identities, rural/urban identities), fear or prejudice.
1 “How did the West get China so wrong..?”
It’s called double standards. Many Heads of States in the West, like the kings, emperors and queens, have no term limits. In two of the three branches of the US Government, members of Congress have no term limits and rhe Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President for a life term. In the UK, members of the House of Lords are appointed for life by the Prime Minister.
2 “The country needs collective leadership that functions effectively and authoritatively to restrain the parochial interest groups within the state, military and Party..”
This is true but Democracy is not the answer. China had a bitter taste of Democracy which lasted for nearly four decades after the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911. There were civil unrest, abject poverty and utter chaos created by special interests and warlords “to feather their own nests”, resulting in the annexation of China’s islands in the South China Sea by France in the 1930s and the invasion of the mainland by Japan from 1931 to 1945, causing the tragic death of more than 25 million people. The country was also hobbled by a grotesque civil war which lasted from the 1920s to 1949, when the ROC lost and fled to Taiwan.
3 “The new agenda encompasses a broad array of goals including better public services, stronger social welfare, a cleaner environment, eradication of poverty, closing regional gaps in development and greater global influence.”
If this benefits the majority of the people of China it needs to be lauded. In his Gettysburg address in 1863, President Lincoln declared that “this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom” with a “government of the people, by the people, for (implied majority of) the people..”. That may be true then (never mind about the fate of the Native Americans) but this is no longer true today.
According to a recent Washington Post report, as at December 2017 “the top 20% of households actually owned a whopping 90% of the wealth in America”.
Today is it more accurate to describe the US as having “a Government of the People, by the People, for the benefit of a minority of the People”? If this is true then it is not the form of government that the PRC needs or desires.
4 “that the ultimate goal of governance is not just to make China wealthier and stronger but also allow the populace to ‘benefit from the fruits of opening up and reform and get a share of the dividends’.
This is true. In the last 40 years about 900 million people have lifted out of abject poverty and more will be done for rest by 2030. Today, about 120 million Chinese tourists spend their vacations all over the world and then they all return home on their own volition.
In the late 1970s/1980, compared to World GDP, the US GDP represented about 25% versus China’s anemic 2.2%. Then Deng Xiaoping adopted a socialist market economy based on Meritocracy in the late 1978 after he declared that “It is not the colour of the cat that counts but whether it can catch mice”. China’s economy took off and since 2014 China’s GDP on a PPP basis has been the highest in the world. Today, China is the biggest trading nation on Earth.
5 “Still, it will be essential for Xi to hear challenges and get feedback from the leadership circle… Absence of disagreements could mean that he becomes more insulated and prone to mistakes.”
This is true. There is a need to avoid the “Saddam Hussein” syndrome, an affliction so dire that no one dared to offer any advice to him. That led Saddam to miscalculate. He invaded Kuwait and precipitated two devastating wars by the US and Nato against a then prosperous Iraq, the last of which was based on lies of WMD in March 2003. Today Iraq is still at war.
6 “Yet, as former US president Barack Obama..declaring that ‘prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty’”.
But freedom without prosperity is the worse from of poverty. Under China’s Meritocratic System populists like Obama or billionaires like Trump would have no chance to be the President as they essentially had no experience in governance. This has been vindicated because Obama increased America’s National Debt by a whopping US$10 trillion in just 8 years in office and Trump added another US$1.197 trillion in his first one and a half years, escalating the US National Debt to US$21.197 trillion today, not counting the Unfunded Debts of over US$200 trillion, according to Prof Lawrence Kotlikoff.
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-11/lawrence-kotlikoff-us-fiscal-gap-200-trillion-our-country-broke
7 ”In a geostrategic sense, competition rather than confrontation is by far the preferable future.”
China does not seek wars as she has been the biggest beneficiary of Peace in the last 70 years. President Xi told the US Defense Secretary recently that China is not an expansionist nor will she colonise any country. This is wise because History shows that in the end the Roman, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Ottoman, Dutch, French, Nazi, British and Japanese Empires all fell when the ‘hubris’ ran out.