But what does this political battle portend for Pakistan’s quest to solidify stable democratic governance and promote economic development as well as for its ever fluid foreign and security policy strategies?
Pakistani politics have been in disarray since last year, when Nawaz Sharif was forced out of office. The leaking of the Panama Papers in 2016 put Sharif under scrutiny for undisclosed assets. It was later found he also held a work visa for the United Arab Emirates. Subsequently, the Supreme Court disbarred him in July 2017 from holding public office for failing to disclose his employment (and a salary he was eligible to receive) while prime minister with the Dubai-based company Capital FZE, owned by his son Hasan Sharif. Just weeks out from the election Nawaz Sharif was convicted of corruption by Pakistan’s anti-corruption court, the National Accountability Bureau, after he was unable to explain how his family came to own undeclared properties in London’s ultra-wealthy Mayfair district. A document purporting to explain Sharif’s daughter Maryam Sharif as the trustee of the properties for her brother Hussein was found to be a forgery. In what has been dubbed ‘fontgate’, the document was dated February 2006, but the font used in the document, Calibri, was not commercially available until 2007.
Nawaz Sharif has been sentenced to 10 years prison and fined US$10.6 million. Maryam Sharif, Nawaz’s presumed political heir, was also sentenced to seven years prison and fined US$2.6 million while her husband Muhammad Safdar Awan was sentenced to one year prison for failure to cooperate with the court. The PLM-N is now being led by Nawaz Sharif’s brother Shahbaz Sharif, the long-serving governor of Punjab.
Nawaz Sharif’s surprise return to Islamabad from London on Saturday, at the same time as a suicide bomb killed over 180 people at an electoral rally in southern Pakistan, and Sharif’s arrest on arrival, are further dramatic developments in the unfolding saga of Pakistani politics.
The anti-corruption drive, which made possible the ouster of Nawaz Sharif, was spearheaded by Imran Khan and his PTI. After a glittering international cricket career the Oxford-educated Khan turned to philanthropy raising funds for cancer treatment and research before entering politics. Khan has been a member of the Pakistan National Assembly since 2013, when his party won 35 seats to become the third largest party. This base in parliament and background in grassroots community activism enabled Khan to become a leading opposition figure in the campaign against political corruption.
Khan’s platform calls for addressing Pakistan’s inequality by creating jobs, providing housing for the poor, reducing chronic power outages, improving education and health, and cracking down on corruption. Khan has also been an outspoken critic of the United States, its treatment of Pakistan in the war against terror and its role in Afghanistan. He’s also had cool relations with the powerful Pakistan military, traditionally close to Washington. On both fronts, there are signs of fence-mending, although Khan’s underlying positions haven’t shifted.
Khan has pledged to support the United States in fighting terrorism but he opposes US-backed operations by the Pakistani military that have killed innocent civilians in the campaign to root out extremists. He says he will ‘communicate with the United States on good relations, but the way they have treated Pakistan like a doormat is not fair’.
Khan’s ties appear to have warmed, a development of importance to effective government in Pakistan where the security situation dominates many aspects of both internal and external affairs. Indeed, it’s the Sharif camp that is now complaining about ‘the hidden forces’ that might spoil their political chances. Nawaz Sharif’s efforts to assert civilian control over the military during his last term failed, turning the military establishment decisively against him. In recent times, he’s accused the army and judiciary of working together to have him removed from office, depriving his party of a fair playing field in the general elections.
Khan touts working with the military a matter of practical necessity. ‘I think a democratic government rules from moral authority’, he said in a recent interview. ‘And if you don’t have moral authority, then those who have the physical authority assert themselves. In my opinion, it is the Pakistan Army and not an enemy army. I will carry the army with me’. While Khan has opposed the military’s operations against Taliban insurgents in the tribal regions and its cooperation with the United States, this hasn’t prevented his developing closer ties.
Yet how Khan and the military may ultimately clash or cooperate remains uncertain. In recent months General Qamar Javed Bajwa, new Chief of Army Staff, has increased his clout while dissenting voices in the country have come under greater pressure and restrictions on the media have increased.
In our lead essays this week, Farooq Yousaf and Sajjad Ashraf reflect on a Pakistani polity that’s still deeply divided.
Farooq argues that ‘none of this year’s contestants can currently claim to have a nation-wide following. The PPP, once regarded as the only national party, is now confined to the Sindh province owing to massive corruption scandals that tainted its time in government between 2008 and 2013. The PML-N, a Punjab-centric party, is focusing on its provincial stronghold. And Imran Khan’s PTI, initially aiming to root out corruption from the country, has started welcoming turncoats from other political parties on the rationale that these individuals are “electables” who know the “science of how to win polls in rural pockets”… Moreover, while Nawaz Sharif took an anti-military and anti-judiciary stance, his brother Shahbaz Sharif (who is currently leading the party) has maintained a somewhat reconciliatory tone’.
Some polls in Punjab, the largest state where the national election will be likely be won or lost, suggest that the majority still back the incumbent PML-N government. While these polls are notoriously unreliable, the contest is far from over. Khan’s PTI party has substantial support among young people and across social media but the mainstream press back PML-N and Pakistani elections are notable for their low voter turnout.
Ashraf observes that ‘the character of democracy in Pakistan does seem to be changing’ and that ‘[p]olitical parties that represent family fiefdoms appear to be part of a weakening trend. But against the backdrop of acrimonious and vendetta politics, it is doubtful whether a peaceful democratic transition will substantially change the existing power dynamics or bring about political stability and maturity in Pakistan’.
‘Despite the many uncertainties, Pakistanis should celebrate the fact that the country is witnessing a relatively smooth [if tumultuous] democratic transition for the third time’, Farooq concludes. For a country that’s been marred by long periods of military rule in the past, such transitions provide hope of gradual political and democratic progress.
The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.