The election itself was tainted by serious allegations of fraud and manipulation. Independent observers reported widespread rigging by the powerful military’s peak intelligence service, which supported Khan’s campaign and undercut the electoral gains of the ruling centre-right Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) led by former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Sharif challenged the military by trying to assert civilian authority over foreign policy, stop military support of Islamist militants and see through the prosecution of former military dictator General Pervez Musharraf.

The country’s higher judiciary, often under pressure from the military, kowtowed to the generals by disqualifying PML-N members from holding public office or contesting elections, including Sharif, who was ultimately jailed for 10 years on dubious corruption charges just before the election. The military’s ‘menu of manipulation’ also included coercing PML-N members to switch parties, propping up violent extremists in the electoral arena against PML-N, a systematic assault on media freedom, heavy military deployment inside polling stations around the country on polling day, and suspected electoral fraud. Despite the military’s brazen efforts to make Khan win, he only has a thin majority in parliament and remains dependent on fickle coalition partners, like the Muhajir Qaumi Movement.

Lacking a policy program or governing experience, Khan has instead relied on bombastic populist claims to burnish his credentials as a man of the people. Such claims include completely eradicating corruption, recovering the US$200 billion allegedly stashed by politicians abroad, and establishing an Islamic welfare state even though Pakistan has typically depended on foreign assistance to keep its economy afloat — in fact, it may soon have to seek an IMF bailout worth US$8–12 billion to avert a balance-of-payments crisis.

His foreign policy rhetoric is equally fanciful. Khan has made a career out of strident opposition to the US presence in Afghanistan which he holds responsible for the rise of militancy in the region. In particular, he has loudly opposed the CIA’s employment of armed drones in the northwestern borderlands of Pakistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants and threatened to shoot them down if his party ever came to power. Moreover, Khan has endorsed Islamist militant groups such as the Afghan Taliban as a legitimate national struggle, and called the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which is implicated in the murder of thousands of Pakistanis, ‘our brothers’.

Since becoming prime minister, Khan has made relatively pragmatic statements on relations with the country’s neighbours, such as envisioning a relationship with India based on peace and trade rather than conflict, and has even suggested open borders with Afghanistan.

But in order to appear strong in external relations compared to his predecessors, Khan and his government have made a series of blunders. For example, his government forcefully denied that the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had urged Khan in a telephone call to act against terrorists operating in Pakistan, only to backtrack after the Americans released a transcript of the conversation. Similarly, it had to walk back the announcement of an offer of dialogue from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi after India denied making any such gesture.

Despite his Foreign Minister’s declaration of independence from the military, if Khan decided to actually take charge of foreign policy, he would quickly discover his government’s limited room to manoeuvre. He did so recently when he had to backtrack on his decision to grant Pakistani citizenship to Afghan and Bengali refugees. The Pakistani military vigilantly guards its prerogatives in the national security arena, including the country’s relations with the United States, India, Afghanistan and China. And it considers civilians either unreliable or incapable of handling national security.

There is no evidence to suggest that Khan’s government has carved out an independent foreign policy. His government’s most notable foreign policy initiative has been to fan the toxic flames of religious bigotry by loudly protesting Dutch politician Geert Wilders’ reported plan to hold a cartoon contest of the Prophet Muhammad. The government quickly claimed credit for Wilders’ cancellation of the event.

Pakistan has made some democratic gains since the transition from Musharraf’s authoritarian rule in 2008. These gains include the landmark 18th constitutional amendment that restored the constitution to its original intent of a federal system. But as Sharif’s political troubles and Khan’s unimpressive track record indicate, the military stands ready to punish any civilian government that dares to craft its own foreign policy.

Aqil Shah is Assistant Professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Oklahoma.