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Moon’s popularity wanes as South Korea’s economy stalls

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South Korean President Moon Jae-in delivers his speech on the government's 2019 budget proposal during a plenary session at the National Assembly in Seoul, South Korea, 1 November 2018 (Photo: Reuters/Kim Hong-Ji/Pool).

In Brief

South Korean politics is spinning once again as President Moon Jae-in’s approval ratings continue to decline sharply. An offspring of the candlelight revolution, the Moon government has enjoyed exceptionally high popularity for a relatively long time based on three pillars — a strong sense of political legitimacy, domestic reform of ‘past accumulated evils’ and diplomatic missions aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

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But approval ratings have dropped rapidly since November 2018, about a year and a half after Moon first took office. By early December, the support polls had dropped below 50 per cent. The downward spiral is continuing with little hope for dramatic reversal in the near future.

Three overlapping factors explain the Moon government’s falling popularity.

The first factor is the ineffectiveness of the peace process on the Korean Peninsula. The historic North Korea–US summit and the three inter-Korean summits produced no visible outcome. The prospect of an end-of-war declaration and a peace treaty — as well as the possibility of North Korea–US diplomatic relations — set high expectations for peace on the Peninsula. These expectations were important in acting as a foundation for public support of the government. It is no surprise then that Moon’s empty hands have negatively affected his government’s approval ratings.

The second factor is the government’s economic performance. President Moon has failed to meet public demand for notable livelihood improvement. The income-led growth strategy — buttressed by raising the minimum wage, shortening working hours, decreasing temporary employment and reducing income inequality — did not appeal to voters, not because the policies themselves were wrong but because they were implemented ineffectively.

The third factor is sluggish political reform. The participants of the candlelight revolution demanded fundamental innovation of the political system. Their demands included constitutional revision, electoral system change and prosecution and judicial system reform. But none of these measures have proceeded fruitfully. Voters are becoming sceptical of the prospects for innovations of this kind as the Moon administration continues to lose golden time.

Diagnoses vary. The conservatives tend to explain Moon’s policy line by his leftist bias. The non-partisans label him as simply incompetent. The liberals say he has betrayed civilian order. The result is delayed reform and a weakening of the administration’s support base.

While the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) won the 2017 presidential elections and the 2018 regional elections, the party does not hold the majority of seats in the National Assembly. This is due to the moderate outcome of the 2016 National Assembly elections under the ousted president Park Geun-hye. In other words, the DPK cannot provide stable legislative support to push reform agendas when it faces the harsh political offensives of the opposition Liberty Party of Korea (LPK).

Ironically, the LPK seems to be the weakest conservative party in South Korea’s political history. It lacks an eloquent political agenda to compete with the ruling liberals and a promising candidate for the next presidential election.

The political implications of a weak opposition with veto power usually begin with a stalled political process because the opposition is more likely to engage in political struggles than in policy debates. As a result, passing important reform bills tends to get tougher.

As most political parties will join the competition in the 2020 National Assembly elections, 2019 is a critical year for the Moon administration.

Overall, Moon’s support rate is still relatively high historically speaking. But Moon holds only a narrow margin. If he fails to regain the support of at least the non-partisans and the practical youth through policy performance, prospects are bleak for winning the National Assembly elections. Even politicians in the ruling camp and the bureaucrats will not be sympathetic to his reform and economic agendas.

Potential progress on the North Korean nuclear issue following North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s vowed visit to Seoul may raise approval ratings for President Moon, but only temporarily. The political salience of the peace process has already been eroded somewhat and may not be enough to firmly recover the hearts of disappointed voters.

More visible economic revival, job creation, easing of economic inequality and political and institutional reforms need to be realised to match high public expectation.

But the economic prospects for 2019 are not looking positive. The growth rate in 2019 is expected to be moderate at most. Recent polls show that Moon’s main supporters — young people — have turned their backs against him for mainly economic reasons.

This year will be the litmus test for the South Korean liberal government. If his government does not turn things around soon, Moon will quickly become known as a lame duck.

Kim Kee-seok is Professor of Comparative Politics at the Department of Political Science, Kangwon National University.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2018 in review and the year ahead.

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