No government ministry is spared in the 106-page document that sets out a matrix of programs and activities to be achieved. The framework may simply be political rhetoric by an incoming government keen to impress the voters — but, as the document notes, these strategies will be the ‘litmus test of the DCGA four year policy and development priorities’.
The creation of such a document provides an interesting insight into Solomon Islands government’s view of its own development ambitions and trajectory. Sogavare has said the framework should be ‘simple, precise and achievable’, though it seems to be none of these. The document is mostly concerned with reviewing existing programs, particularly long-standing, donor-funded large development infrastructure projects. These include the Tina River hydropower project funded by the World Bank, an undersea fibre optic cable to enhance telecommunications funded by Australia, an international terminal for the new Munda International Airport funded by New Zealand, and a Japanese project to extend the improved Kukum Highway out to Honiara International Airport.
In addition to these projects, the framework calls for greater efforts to achieve better government services, improve tax revenue, implement state-of-the-art health, sewerage and power, and develop a better-trained bureaucracy. Other agenda items also appear particularly ambitious, for example settling outstanding compensation and land issues in the vicinity of Honiara’s international airport, which is unlikely to be achieved quickly.
Donors continue to play a large role in Solomon Islands’ economic development. In 2018 Australia provided roughly 55 per cent of all aid to Solomon Islands, and invested around AU$2.8 billion (US$1.9 billion) into the Pacific Islands Forum’s Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which operated from 2003 to 2017. Australian aid to the Solomon Islands in 2019–20 will increase to AU$198.3 million (US$138.4 million), making it the second-largest Pacific Islands recipient of Australian aid after Papua New Guinea.
Australia’s Pacific Step Up program aims to create regional growth in the Pacific through an AU$2 billion (US$1.4 billion) infrastructure facility, ‘focussed free trade’ through the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus, and a labour mobility scheme.
Despite these actions, the 100-days framework indicates that Solomon Islands is looking to broaden its mix of development donors, with the United States to be ‘re-engaged’ as a development partner and a ‘Comprehensive Assessment on the China Question’ to follow. This signals a potential diplomatic shift from Taiwan to China.
The framework announces the adoption of a ‘friends to all and enemy to none’ foreign policy, which involves extending relations to ‘all UN members’. Taiwan, which provides AU$8.85 million (US$6.18 million) in Constituency Development Funds to members of parliament, is mentioned twice (in relation to labour mobility schemes and stadium construction for the 2023 Pacific Games) — but if a foreign policy shift occurs, China will likely not tolerate Taiwan remaining as an aid partner.
A shift in diplomatic relations to China would build on an existing strong trade relationship. From 2007 onwards, China has purchased more Solomon Islands exports than any other country. In 2017 China purchased two-thirds of all Solomon Islands exports (valued at US$456 million), and Solomon Islands takes 13 per cent of its imports from China (US$79.1 million).
While 62 per cent of Solomon Islands imports come from Asia — with China and Singapore both at 13 per cent and Malaysia at 12 per cent — Australia remains the single largest source of imports at 17 per cent. Australian products cost Solomon Islands around US$100 million in 2017, but Australia bought just US$13.3 million (1.9 per cent) of Solomon Islands exports — well down from the US$121 million of 2012.
RAMSI aimed to induce economic development through engagement with the global market and promoting tourism and export crops. Solomon Islands exports are now over 10 times their 2000 value, and export agriculture now accounts for 10.9 per cent of exports. Despite this growth, the main exports remain rough wood (68 per cent), and processed fish (7.5 per cent), neither of which is sustainable in the long term.
Sogavare’s 100-Days Policy Framework seems to recognise that internally-focussed development — built on an expanding domestic population and growing internal markets — can induce long-term, sustainable growth. Stronger infrastructure through improved road and maritime transport linking rural and urban sectors can help to consolidate economic growth, as well as enhance urban food security in Honiara. As a recent study of the Honiara Central Market shows, 82 per cent of market producer–vendors are women, and smallholder production for domestic consumption enables asset creation among rural communities.
In a country where the population of around 660,000 is still predominantly rural, Sogavare’s focus on completing large-scale infrastructure projects bodes well for the nation’s development. The possible addition of China to Solomon Islands’ existing aid donor mix would likely result in new infrastructure projects. Such a move would raise questions for Australia about the emphasis of its priorities in Solomon Islands and the extent of its post-RAMSI influence.
Charles Hawksley is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at the University of Wollongong.
Nichole Georgeou is Associate Professor in Humanitarian and Development Studies at Western Sydney University.