Aside from some notable developments in the Russian military’s capabilities in the Asia Pacific, Moscow’s defence posture in Northeast Asia has been relatively mild over the post-Cold War years. Russia’s recent willingness to engage in provocations in Northeast Asia is rather uncharacteristic. The fact that South Korea was the target of Moscow’s most recent military thrust is all the more surprising. Russia has traditionally tried to maintain strong working relations with South Korea, while Seoul has on occasion refused to take sides against Russia with its major ally the United States.
One explanation for the Kremlin’s willingness to rock the boat in Northeast Asia, a sub-region who’s stability Moscow has long expressed concern for, is the deepening of the China–Russia strategic partnership. Beijing and Moscow’s growing cooperation appears to be emboldening Russia to demonstrate its capabilities, as well as put the strength of the US alliance network in Northeast Asia to the test. Indeed, as one scholar presciently noted, China and Russia see South Korea as the weakest link in Washington’s Northeast Asian alliance network.
Russia certainly has no illusions about the fact that its own clout on the Korean Peninsula is nowhere near that of China, and appears to tacitly accept that Beijing will remain the senior member of the China–Russia entente as it operates in Northeast Asia. Still, increased cooperation with China could provide an opportunity for the Kremlin to undermine US interests in Northeast Asia. Yet if Moscow decides to continue collaborating with China to disrupt the US position in the region, Moscow will have to contend with potential opportunity costs — in particular its relationship with South Korea.
Technically a ‘strategic partnership’, Moscow–Seoul relations have been more style than substance. South Korea generally doesn’t view Russia as a particularly helpful partner in the pursuit of North Korean denuclearisation. Bilateral economic ties, while experiencing some growth, remain stunted.
Recent developments in South Korean security policy have met with consternation in the United States. In turn, Seoul has pushed back against Washington’s criticism of its decision to withdraw from GSOMIA. Still, it is unwise to read too much into the hiccups in the US–South Korea relationship. Although US officials use the term ‘ironclad’ somewhat liberally in their description of the alliance, the bilateral relationship has demonstrated a degree of vitality. It survived the tenuous period from 1998–2008 that included serious differences over North Korea policy as well as significant shifts in the US defence posture on the Korean Peninsula.
Today, even as US President Donald Trump himself is placing exorbitant demands on Seoul for the maintenance of the current US–South Korea defence framework, lawmakers in Washington are working to buttress the alliance from their end. Several bills currently making the rounds in the US Congress specifically highlight Chinese and Russian intentions on the Korean Peninsula, including the ejection of United States Forces Korea.
The political will of the United States to maintain its alliance with South Korea cannot be measured based on the actions of the chief executive alone. Likewise, even though South Korean President Moon Jae-in has highlighted the importance of being willing to ‘say no’ to the United States, support for the US–South Korea alliance remains strong among the South Korean voting public.
Rather than driving a wedge between Washington and Seoul, the Kremlin could end up alienating South Korea. This would be detrimental to Moscow’s policy of diplomatic ‘equidistance’ between the two Koreas. Placing excessive strain on ties with South Korea could also undermine one of Russia’s most critical economic relationships in East Asia.
To be sure, problematic political relations with the European Union have not undermined the strong trade relationship between several EU member states and Russia. The same logic could also apply to Russia–South Korea economic ties in the face of stress on bilateral relations. Yet there is a striking disparity in the economic strength of European Russia and the Russian Far East, the latter being a focal point in the Kremlin’s strategy toward South Korea.
South Korea can potentially garner benefits from continued cooperation with Russia, yet the stumbling blocks to fruitful economic cooperation are many — particularly on the Russian end. Russia’s economic development policy since 2008 specifically highlights cooperation with Asian economic partners as a priority. If it hopes to keep South Korea in its corner as an economic partner, cooperation with China to the detriment of stable ties with Seoul is a gamble Russia can ill afford to lose.
Of course, Russia has already shown its ability to strike a balance between China and South Korea during the THAAD dispute. But circumstances have changed as China–Russia defence cooperation has increased while the US regional security architecture is facing a major hurdle in the current dispute between Japan and South Korea. Still, as Russia moves forward to pursue its interests at what appears to be a weakening in the US defence network in Northeast Asia, it risks ending up with fraught ties with one of its most critical economic partners in East Asia.
Anthony V Rinna is Senior Editor and specialist on Russian foreign policy in East Asia for the Sino-NK research group.