They are insignificant because Solomon Islands and Kiribati are small countries with little international heft. Taiwan has far more important relationships with unofficial partners, namely with the United States, Japan, the European Union, Australia and India. All are among Taiwan’s top 15 trading partners.
The United States has long held a national security interest in the Taiwan Strait. These interests are laid out in the Taiwan Relations Act and evidenced by major arms sales to Taiwan and the island’s designation as a major non-NATO ally.
The 1997 US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines outlined how the two countries might cooperate ‘in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’. This is widely understood to refer to potential developments in the Taiwan Strait (and on the Korean peninsula). The 2015 Guidelines further reinforce Japan’s interest in ‘regional’ security.
And Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper noted ‘Australia is concerned about the potential for the use of force or coercion in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait’.
The European Union may not have a unified view of its security interests in the Taiwan Strait, but important members like the United Kingdom and France have stepped up their defence activities in East Asia in ways that may benefit Taiwan. As for India, Delhi is likely to remain cautious in its approach to the Strait, but there is ongoing quiet cooperation with Taipei on non-traditional security issues with the potential for future growth.
Taiwan knows that its economic and national security interests lie in sustaining and deepening these ties. Although Solomon Islands’ and Kiribati’s decisions certainly are a blow to Taiwan’s diplomatic space, the severing of ties does free up some financial and human capital resources that could usefully be applied elsewhere.
Taipei might consider employing those resources in its New Southbound Policy (NSP), which President Tsai Ing-wen announced in 2016. The policy, which has four pillars — economic and trade collaboration, people-to-people exchanges, resource sharing, and the promotion of institutional links — seeks to deepen Taiwan’s unofficial relations in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australasia through ‘multifaceted cooperation and establishing mutual prosperity’. The NSP has been successful in expanding trade as well as societal and institutional links with target countries. Continuing to emphasise the effort, in part by backing it with a greater commitment of resources, will help ensure it continues to bear fruit in the years ahead.
China’s latest poaching of diplomatic allies could likewise give even greater impetus to already advancing US–Taiwan relations. Solomon Islands’ and Kiribati’s moves once again revealed the depth of US support for Taiwan, with many members of US Congress criticising China and the island nations, and calling on Washington to stand with Taipei.
Honiara’s and South Tarawa’s moves also mark setbacks for the United States, which has of late re-emphasised its Pacific island relationships in an effort to counter China’s growing influence in the region. Taiwan might well take advantage of this moment to accelerate efforts to move to a more normal relationship with the United States and to further deepen security cooperation.
Taiwan’s loss of diplomatic allies is unfortunate, but in the short term Taiwan will not suffer greatly — it can weather much as long as it has the United States (and, perhaps implicitly, US allies) standing by its side. But there may be significant implications for stability in the Taiwan Strait over the longer term.
Chinese state media has already threatened that Taiwan will lose all of its diplomatic allies if Tsai Ing-wen is re-elected in January. Whether that is a serious threat and whether Beijing has the wherewithal to carry it out are unclear, but it raises an interesting question. If Taiwan sees its formal diplomatic allies significantly reduced over time — or even entirely eliminated — does that make unification a more likely prospect for the People’s Republic?
Chinese President Xi Jinping might think so, but the opposite is in fact more likely. If one day Taiwan finds itself with few or no diplomatic allies, the door will be open to a reassessment of Taiwan’s existence as the Republic of China (ROC). Taiwan’s people might consider amending the ROC constitution or replacing it altogether, moving from de facto to de jure independence.
The people of Taiwan have every right to determine their own future. But China, ironically, might be pushing them in a direction that Beijing has long considered inimical to its own interests. The crisis that results will be one of China’s own making.
Michael Mazza is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.