In the days following the North Korea–Russia diplomatic summit, Russia’s Vice Foreign Minister for Asia Pacific Affairs Igor Morgulov held a telephone conversation with the US Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs Steve Biegun. During their chat, the two diplomats discussed the feasibility of implementing a solution to the North Korean security crisis, with an emphasis on the need to consider the interests of all states involved.
The telephone call between Morgulov and Biegun underscores the fact that the security crisis constitutes one of few areas where Moscow and Washington maintain relatively constructive interaction. As an exception in the litany of contentious areas in Moscow–Washington relations, it is important to understand why North Korean security remains an area of fairly constructive Russia–US dialogue, as well as the limits to US–Russian cooperation over Korean security.
In essence, Russia and the United States share a common goal in the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Yet Moscow and Washington differ in the manner in which they perceive the threat a nuclear-armed North Korea poses.
Russia and the United States agree in principle on the need to stem nuclear proliferation across the globe. Specific to North Korea, in addition to approving sanctions packages against Pyongyang, Russia — like the United States — refuses to recognise North Korea as a legitimate nuclear state and desires North Korea’s return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). And Russia’s ‘National Security Strategy to 2020’ outlines its desire to build a ‘strategic partnership’ with the United States cooperating on stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide.
But the United States has not always been receptive to Russian attempts to fulfil a constructive role in Korean security. Washington was initially cool towards the Kremlin’s participation in the Six-Party Talks, which was ensured at Pyongyang’s insistence. Washington also dismissed a Russian proposal made when the Six-Party Talks were launched in 2003 to entice North Korea back to the NPT and the Agreed Framework in exchange for measures that would Pyongyang’s isolation and vulnerability.
Today, while the United States has conducted comparatively positive discussions with Russia over North Korean security, the results of such interactions have not been concrete. The Kremlin frequently describes interactions between Russian and US officials over Korean security as an ‘exchange of opinions’, meaning that Moscow and Washington remain in contact but with little to show for their dialogue.
Russia’s position on North Korea differs from the US view of North Korea as a ‘rogue state’. By extension, Russia does not share the US aversion to the North Korean regime, viewing political status quo as preferable to political instability. Many Russian experts believe sanctions will simply solidify domestic support for the Kim regime and increase the risk of armed conflict.
For Russia, North Korea’s nuclear threat is more oblique. The spread of nuclear weapons in general undermines Russia’s status as a great power, as nuclear arms comprise one of the few remaining claims to great power status Moscow retains. Even so, many Russian experts believe North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are for defensive purposes rather than offensive applications.
The far greater threat to Russian security stemming from the Korean Peninsula is not North Korea itself, but the spectre of between Pyongyang, Washington and its allies. Armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula would place Moscow’s ties with Washington under more strain as well as damage Russia’s economic interests in the Asia Pacific, given Moscow’s keen interest in trilateral economic cooperation with North and South Korea.
Moscow and Washington’s ability to maintain active and cordial interactions over the North Korean security crisis is beneficial for the multilateral dynamics of the Korean security crisis. Despite the sobering lack of substantive between the two powers, an understanding of the real differences in their shared desire for North Korean denuclearisation can prevent misunderstandings between Russia and the United States, and help the two sides maintain relatively constructive interactions.
Anthony V Rinna is Senior Editor and specialist on Russian foreign policy in East Asia for the Sino-NK research group.