In April 2020, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen pledged donations of surgical face masks and other forms of medical assistance to foreign nations to support the global fight against COVID-19. Taiwan has had only 442 confirmed cases — almost 50 per cent of which have recovered — and only 7 fatalities.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen expressed the European Union’s gratitude for Taiwan’s efforts and gestures of solidarity. Taiwan made a direct donation of 1 million face masks to the European Union and donated another 5.9 million face masks through bilateral channels to individual member states. Across Europe, Taiwan has been lauded for its domestic strategy to contain the spread of COVID-19.

In the United States, the State Department issued a statement describing Taiwan’s COVID-19 response as a successful model and Taiwan as ‘a true friend’ in times of need. This follows US President Donald Trump signing legislation to support Taiwan’s recognition in international forums and to take unspecified action against countries that ‘undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan’.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau thanked Taiwan for its donation of 500,000 face masks, only a day after Canada’s foreign minister twice avoided mentioning the country during a virtual meeting of the House of Commons.

In Japan, Taiwan has provided assistance to public hospitals and special schools under the framework of a cross-party friendship association. In Southeast Asia, a total of 1 million face masks were donated as part of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP).

While Taiwan’s global response has no doubt received a welcome reception from the international community, it is not without controversy. For decades, Beijing’s ‘One China policy’ has been instrumental in Taiwan’s exclusion from the international community. Taiwan is not recognised as a sovereign state by most members of the international community and has been denied access to international organisations and often barred from joining significant international meetings. China’s growing influence over the past decade poses greater challenges for Taiwan’s quest for international recognition.

The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) cold treatment of Taiwan is one example of its non-recognition. In the early days of the global pandemic this deprived Taiwan of access to crucial information and the chance to share best practices that could have helped shape the global response.

Taiwan’s unprecedented response to the COVID-19 pandemic, if sustained and expanded, provides an opportunity for Taiwan to establish greater legitimacy for its independence. In this respect, there are three areas of opportunity for Taiwan.

First, Taiwan’s global outreach lays the groundwork for greater access and active participation in some multilateral platforms, especially those that tackle human security challenges. Taiwan’s response model is difficult to ignore for all international organisations that deal with crisis situations as it is an example that can be emulated in other national emergency situations. This earns Taiwan some measure of soft power that can counterbalance Beijing’s influence over multilateral forums.

Second, Taiwan’s enhanced profile in the international community could potentially trickle down and change cooperation dynamics in the region. Initially, it could build from proposed non-traditional security cooperation with Japan with its historical record of close societal and cultural linkages. Taiwan may use its COVID-19 experience to introduce and shape health cooperation with Tokyo. This is a step forward in transforming Taiwan–Japan relations from being a subset of Japan’s China policy to a more mutual and equal relationship. This ‘new normal’ is not far from reality given the warm relations between Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party.

Public–private collaborations between Taiwan and South Korea are also promising. During the pandemic, these collaborations increased manufacturing volume, modified regulations for wider consumer access, and optimised and coordinated distribution. This expanded and made the distribution of important medical items during the first crucial days of the pandemic more equitable. This collaboration has set a benchmark for other bilateral emergency cooperation models in the region.

Third, Taiwan’s COVID-19 response in Southeast Asia will likely reinforce the reputation of its NSP. This is crucial given China’s attempts to cultivate greater influence over ASEAN.

Consistent with NSP’s four-pronged objective, Taiwan could widen the scope of its assistance to Southeast Asia by sharing its best practices, scientific research collaborations, and methods for capacity-building in medical supply manufacturing. This could lead to greater functional cooperation and dialogue between Taiwan and ASEAN member states.

Taiwan’s response to COVID-19 highlights its role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community. While many countries continue to struggle in their fight against the invisible enemy, Taiwan took decisive action demonstrating its credentials as a responsible regional and global citizen.

Taiwan’s COVID-19 experience will hopefully mobilise international support for its eventual inclusion in the World Health Assembly (WHA). Early indications of that were seen in many countries’ vocal support for Taiwan’s WHA participation this May. The global pandemic has provided Taiwan an unexpected platform to increase its soft power and counter China’s efforts to delegitimise it. Taiwan’s increasing soft power and functional cooperation will expand the political space that Taiwan can operate in.

Robert Joseph Medillo holds an MA in Political Science from De La Salle University.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on the novel coronavirus crisis and its impact.