Nepal claims the areas on the eastern side of the Kali River — now called Mahakali in Nepal — based on the 1816 Treaty of Sugauli with British India. The road’s inauguration led to spontaneous protests in Nepal despite the nationwide lockdown due to COVID-19.
On 11 May, Nepal’s Foreign Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali handed the Indian Ambassador a diplomatic note protesting the action and calling upon India to halt any further activity. Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli asserted in parliament that Nepal would not cede an inch of territory. Nepal then rectified its political map to include the claimed territories and set up a border outpost at Chhangru.
India quickly deemed the new map unacceptable. On 15 May, Indian Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane insinuated that Nepal raised the issue at the behest of someone else — an obvious reference to China. This sparked further furore in Nepal. With the Indian Army Chief also serving as honorary chief of the Nepali Army, this appeared very insensitive. The statement also insulted Nepal by implying it could not even raise core national interests such as territorial integrity on its own.
Still, India’s perception reveals some important insights. To begin with, it showcases India’s insecurity vis-a-vis a rising China. There is no denying that Chinese influence in the region is increasing along with Chinese trade, investment and developmental projects.
Some Indian analysts remark that Nepal is tilting towards China, especially after Oli came to power in 2018. Nepal signed crucial agreements of trade, transit and connectivity during Oli’s 2018 visit to China. This is unsettling India as it still considers the Himalayan region as its natural security frontier with China. Some concerns are legitimate, but viewing every issue between the two nations — which share close multidimensional relations — through a geopolitical lens is reductive. As a larger power, India should have engaged Nepal to solve the issue tactfully.
India also sees the disputed region as strategically significant. Singh asserted as much during the inauguration. During the 1962 Sino–Indian War, Chinese forces overwhelmed Indian forces. Since then, India has been vigilant about monitoring Chinese activities along the border. India has identified the Lipulekh pass as an important strategic location, optimal for stationing military units to track Chinese activities on the other side.
India also has a territorial dispute with China over the Line of Actual Control (determined by the 1962 conflict), which occasionally erupts. Still, Nepal allowed India to set up 19 Indian border posts in Nepali territory immediately after the war. The territorial claims of Nepal may not necessarily lead to any significant reduction in India’s presence in the region.
Nepal’s reaction was atypically strong this time. This was not the first time the territorial dispute has come to the fore. It was raised prominently during the signing of the Mahakali Treaty in 1996. Nepal usually responds to such disputes with public protests followed by strong political statements aimed primarily to gain ‘nationalist’ credentials among its domestic audience. These statements are not followed by any significant concrete action in perceived fear of Indian retribution — especially because Nepal’s governments since 1990 have been weak. Some progress was made during former Indian prime minister Inder Kumar Gujral’s visit to Nepal in 1997, when the two sides agreed to maintain the status quo in the region.
Foreign Minister Gyawali acknowledged Nepal’s weakness in the past. The current Nepali government commands an almost two-third majority in parliament, which is largely due to strong anti-Indian sentiments following the 2015 Indian blockade on Nepal. National solidarity on the issue is strong now, as shown during the multi-party meeting called by Oli. The government has the political capital and intense pressure to ‘deliver’ this time. Besides, it was an opportune time for Oli to put his nationalist rhetoric into action at a time when his position was challenged due to internal party differences.
While the territorial dispute is important in itself, it is complicated by Nepal’s feeling of insecurity vis-a-vis India. The relative sizes of the economy, India’s history of intervention in Nepali domestic politics, and extreme dependence on India has led to an inferiority complex and the growth of anti-Indian sentiments. These erupt in response to both actual and perceived Indian encroachment, and are further complicated by India’s concern about China. With this in mind, a bilateral issue between Nepal and India has become intertwined with the broader geopolitical issues between India and China.
Nepal faces an unenviable situation. The current Nepali government came to power partly riding on anti-Indian sentiment following the 2015 blockade, and the government has taken rather extraordinary measures to strengthen Nepal’s claim over the disputed territory. Nepal still believes an appropriate solution can be reached through diplomacy — but a solution is not easy. Any minor miscalculation from India or Nepal will significantly test the already strained ‘special relations’ between the two nations.
Santosh Sharma Poudel is Co-Founder of the Nepal Institute for Policy Research and faculty of International Relations at Tribhuvan University.