Stronger US–India relations, especially in the commercial space, would stimulate economic growth in India. But reflexively strengthening military and diplomatic ties with the United States because of the border dispute — creating the impression that India has chosen sides in the US–China rivalry — will do little to ease pressure at the border and related tensions. It is more likely to convince China to take an even harsher stance against India. China could use the border dispute not only to provoke India, but to send a signal about diminishing US power in the region.
While the Sino-Indian rivalry is complex, the border dispute is for the moment the clearest manifestation of bilateral tension. This issue isn’t one that can be solved by the United States — it is the product of different levels of border infrastructure development between India and China, combined with the general state of the two countries’ militaries. An improved US–India partnership will not solve this problem, even if it were upgraded to a military alliance buttressed by a defence treaty.
That the United States and India would even sign a defence treaty is not under consideration. India still treasures its policy of ‘strategic autonomy’ and a defence treaty with the United States would radically depart from this long-held position. It is unclear if there is any appetite in Washington, especially under the current administration, to extend military commitments to India. In the event of another deadly border conflict, the United States would either be at risk of clashing with China or jeopardise its credibility by not getting involved.
When observers talk about India moving closer to the United States, they refer to a relationship short of a defence treaty. India would benefit from access to a better range of military gear, US intelligence, joint military exercises and exchanges, as well as diplomatic support. But these will not reverse the balance of power between China and India, nor will they blunt China’s border advantages. There is a limit to how much military equipment India can buy, conditioned by its economic footprint.
China–India tensions have frequently ratcheted up as a result of border confrontations over the past decade. Yet until the clash in June, all other instances in the recent past had been victimless. India’s weaker position compared to China isn’t a consequence of a lack of manpower, nor a lack of equipment. A lack of infrastructure remains the main impediment to expanded front-line military deployment. Washington cannot easily offer India credible assistance here in the high altitudes of the remote Himalayas.
Low-level Chinese border pressure short of war is the main irritant, yet these kinds of skirmishes are beyond US reach. Some hope that a stronger US–India partnership might deter these operations, but Japan’s long-standing defence treaty with the United States did nothing to deter constant and growing Chinese pressure around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The US–Philippines defence treaty did not prevent China from taking over Scarborough Shoal. The border danger posed by Beijing isn’t that China will one day invade, but rather a threat of incremental advance.
Beijing may believe that if India sides with the United States, it is lost as a non-aligned power, transforming India into the perfect tool through which to send a signal about Washington’s inability to help its friends. The border dispute will no longer be just a point of pressure against India, but also an opportunity to show countries in Southeast Asia, for instance, that the United States cannot help them in their disputes and that stronger ties with Washington will only attract problems. It is likely that Chinese pressure at the border will intensify and could extend to new areas, like the eastern sector in Arunachal Pradesh, which has been less active. China might also take other confrontational measures, such as finally materialising the long-dreaded military base at Gwadar, Pakistan.
India’s main issue isn’t that it has ‘appeased’ China, nor that it hasn’t been close enough to the United States. It is the economic and hard power gap between it and China. No alliance or foreign policy shift will solve this inequality. Trying to maintain workable relations with Beijing and manage border tensions — while catching up to China over the next decades — was and still is the wisest policy.
Strengthening economic and trade ties with the United States, as part of a general policy of increasing economic engagement with other countries to boost economic growth, will help India. But creating the impression that India has chosen a side in the US–China rivalry and joined a coalition against China will only increase Sino-Indian tensions.
If the US–China ‘Cold War’ defines the first half of the ‘Asian Century’, the China–India relationship will probably shape the second half. To meet this challenge, India’s best bet is to plan for the long term, instead of letting its strategy be driven by short-term pressures.
Andrei Lungu is President of The Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific (RISAP).
On Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific international relations, India and Indians are – and have always been- slow learners, but they eventually learn. And the only way that they will eventually learn of the futility and failure of their ‘strategically autonomous’ tilt to Washington, just as they learnt from the futility of their ‘non-alignedly’ aligned tilt towards the Soviet Union in the late-60s to mid-80s, is by implementing the tilt to Washington and witnessing and digesting over a period of time the meager geopolitical crumbs on tap. This eye-opener day of recognition of the futility of this tilt is still more than a decade or more out. But it will arrive.
At the end of the day, the Indian interest vis-à-vis China needs to be defended, championed and won by the U.S.-India relationship and the Quad IN SOUTH ASIA. And surprise, surprise, Washington and the other Quad powers have neither a strategy of victory nor even the least interest in this part of Asia (South Asia), except for its maritime thoroughfares. If anything, the U.S. and the Quad powers seem to be getting more radioactive by the day in each of the smaller South Asian states (because of their India linkage). And when this finally dawns on the Indians, they will see the futility of their tilting ways … that the U.S. has basically very little to offer on India’s CORE geopolitical interest across the wide Indo-Pacific arena. And thus will also dawn a realpolitik-based dictation of the need for India to transcend its ‘complexes’ – to state it politely – vis-a-vis China and establish a frank relationship of give-and-take based on merits, interests and power rather than one based on a weird notion of entitlement that China’s road to greatness or the U.S. staying power for greatness somehow runs through New Delhi. The China-India relationship will be a mainstay of international relations in the second half of the 21st century, and the Indians still have a good 30 years to figure that out and get it right.
Maybe for the second time in two successive regional orders, India needs to make the wrong choice to finally learn. Such is its mastery over great power politics. But, hey, Bulgaria made the wrong choice 4 times over in 4 successive European orders dating back 150 years before choosing well in the post-Cold War era. And the country is doing pretty well now. So I wouldn’t worry too much about India’s choices either.
Yes, I agree with the views you have put across. This is an infinite game. A game of geopolitical dominance and even an ideological one. China wants not only it’s hegemony over Asia and maybe more conceivably now, as Xi’s China believes it’s time has come now. The Asian century is now a Chinese century. So therefore, it wants to consolidate it’s control over a vital part of South Asia by making India fall in line. It clearly knows it has the first mover’s advantage. Chinese leadership however has thought that since India’s on the backfoot now because of the pandemic, which they opposed that WHO’s decision for an independent probe on the origins of the virus. This was the calculation; a weakened financially India cannot outlast a border tension if the economy is in the doldrums. Hence, to come out of this situation, India has to play an infinite game. China wants India to get fatigued and wilt under pressure.
India, on the other hand has to realize this. You cannot gain strategic advantage immediately as your resources are crunched and the pandemic has taken a big toll on lives and livelihood. It has to study what it’s strong points are, where the maximum gains are and what is the best policy to tackle this, by looking decades ahead. India has experience in creating bangladesh, from Pakistan. So it has to have some of the best Geo-strategists thinking the future way ahead. Whatever the future may lie, Xi has made sure one thing– he has made enmity with a future generation of a billion Indians.