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How does the public perceive the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan?

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People walk past a Taiwanese flag amid COVID-19 in Taipei, Taiwan, 10 August 2020 (Photo: Reuters/Ann Wang).

In Brief

Observers of Taiwan’s foreign relations are well aware of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) perennial efforts to isolate Taiwan from the international community. Under the ‘One China’ policy, establishing diplomatic ties with Taiwan is tantamount to breaking up with the PRC.

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Since President Tsai Ing-wen came into office, China has poached a number of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. Taiwan is now left with just 15 national partners, including the Holy See, after seven states switched recognition to the PRC since 2016. Erosion of international recognition, while underway for a long time, still gradually weakens Taiwan’s assertions to sovereignty.

Despite the constant effort exerted by the Taiwanese government to voice concern and challenge the trend, how Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation is perceived by its own public is rarely brought up. Studying this offers insights for policy observers and policymakers on the future of cross-Strait relations. How citizens in Taiwan respond to China’s use of international pressure may also be of interest to citizens elsewhere, especially in Hong Kong, dealing with similar issues.

Ethnic identity in Taiwan is complicated due to the island’s unique history. After losing the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) retreated from mainland China to Taiwan, along with two million mainlanders under the banner of the Republic of China. During its rule, the Kuomintang suppressed indigenous Taiwanese identity in order to cultivate a Chinese one. This was to support its aim of eventually unifying with mainland China.

According to surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, in 1992, at the beginning of democratisation, 46.4 per cent of respondents considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 25.5 per cent considered themselves soley ‘Chinese’ and 17.6 per cent thought of themselves as only ‘Taiwanese’.

A poll by the same institute in 2020 reflects a sharp change in identification in Taiwan. Over 67 per cent of respondents considered themselves only ‘Taiwanese’. Only 27.5 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the respondents regarded themselves as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ and only ‘Chinese’, respectively.

Identity appears to have a strong relationship with how Taiwanese people perceive and evaluate Taiwan’s diplomatic challenges.

Those who consider themselves to be ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ or only ‘Chinese’ see the ‘Republic of China’ as crucial to their ethnic identity — the name reinforces and legitimates the existence of a Chinese identity in Taiwan. But those who consider themselves to be only ‘Taiwanese’ appear less likely to care as much about the Republic of China losing diplomatic partners, as they tend to consider ‘Republic of China’ to be out of touch with their identity.

To study the link between identity and public attitudes toward diplomatic relations, the authors designed a survey with the Pollcracy Lab at National Chengchi University. Between 6 and 8 January 2020, 1060 respondents answered the following two questions on Taiwan’s international isolation: ‘If our diplomatic partners kept declining, would it cause negative impacts on Taiwan?’ After reading recent news on other nations severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, are you still confident with Taiwan’s diplomacy?’

32 per cent responded that losing partners represents a ‘serious negative impact’ for Taiwan, while 41 per cent and 27 per cent chose ‘somewhat negative’ and ‘no impact’, respectively. For the second question, 4.8 per cent of respondents felt more confident about Taiwan’s diplomacy, while 50 per cent and 45 per cent of the subjects expressed the same and less confidence on the matter, respectively. Overall most citizens considered losing diplomatic partners to be problematic.

The survey also asked citizens about their identity. 57 per cent of the respondents identified as solely ‘Taiwanese’, and 41 per cent considered themselves ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. 1.2 per cent of subjects thought of themselves as ‘Chinese’ only.

Among those identifying as only ‘Taiwanese’, 17 per cent worried that losing partners would carry a serious negative impact for Taiwan. The level of concern among those with dual identity and a ‘Chinese’-only identity was much higher, at 51 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. The percentages among those who identified as only ‘Taiwanese’ that believed losing partners would have ‘no negative impact’ for Taiwan were much higher compared to the other two groups.

On the question of confidence in Taiwan’s diplomacy, most ‘Taiwanese’, 71 per cent, responded that the diplomatic crises would not negatively influence their confidence. But citizens with dual identities or a ‘Chinese’-exclusive identity were much less confident in the government’s diplomatic efforts, 23 per cent and 0 per cent, respectively.

Taken together, the survey shows most consider dwindling diplomatic allies to be problematic. But interestingly, identity plays a significant role in determining how the public evaluates.

These results suggest several implications for cross-Strait relations. First, Beijing’s strategy of weakening the international popularity of the Taiwanese government by taking away its diplomatic partners does not have a huge effect on the island. Although most consider the issue a problem, it has not caused them to substantially lose confidence in their government. Second, those that exclusively identify as ‘Taiwanese’ are especially immune to the negative impact of losing diplomatic partners.

Ultimately, what seems more important for Taiwan is establishing and maintaining robust unofficial diplomatic relations, particularly with the United States. As the United States continues to pass legislation supporting Taiwan, such as the recent Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, and support its meaningful participation in international society, the government in Taiwan will be able to find ways to recover the damage caused by nominally losing friends to China.

Yao-Yuan Yeh is Associate Professor of International Studies and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Modern Languages at the University of St Thomas, Houston.

Charles KS Wu is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Purdue University.

Austin Wang is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Fang-Yu Chen is a recent PhD graduate in Political Science at Michigan State University.

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