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Central and Eastern Europe is no Chinese Trojan horse

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Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban attend the China-CEEC Economic and Trade Forum in Budapest, Hungary, 27 November, 2017 (Photo: Reuters/Laszlo Balogh).

In Brief

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has long been portrayed as a homogenous post-communist region in mainstream Western media and popular imagery. It is often seen as either resilient to the erosion of democratic standards and authoritarian propaganda because of its historical experiences or, for the same reason, as a place especially prone to elite capture and crony capitalism.

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This dualism has spilled over into international assessments of the region’s attempts to strengthen its ties with China, most notably through the 17+1 platform (previously 16+1). The initiative, established in 2012, links 17 arbitrarily chosen states (the Baltics, the Visegrad Group, most Balkan countries and Greece) with China through high-level political meetings, regional gatherings and people-to-people networks.

The region has repeatedly been dubbed ‘a Chinese Trojan horse’ being bought ‘on the cheap’. Beijing’s spreading influence is ‘worrying the West’. Although the adjectives describing Beijing’s inroads into CEE countries differ, the overarching message from non-local media remains similar: the region is tightening its ties with China and entering its sphere of influence.

These concerns seemed legitimate at the onset of the initiative. But due to a lack of knowledge and awareness about the character and scale of China’s engagement in the region, repeating these assertions years later ignores the reality on the ground. The situation looks  different from regional capitals.

The CEE region did go through a brief, albeit intense, ‘romance’ with China. There was a time when some governments in the region thought of using cooperation with Beijing as leverage in negotiations with Brussels. Only Hungary and Serbia continue to defend this approach. In most other cases, what was often perceived as a strategic turn towards China was actually a short-lived idea that stemmed from domestic considerations.

The region quickly realised that its expectations did not match Beijing’s intentions. Most countries in the region became aware of the risks associated with unconditional cooperation with China more quickly than their Western European counterparts, who have been strengthening ties with Beijing for decades now. For instance, the data shows that despite political rapprochement, the cumulative value of Chinese FDI in CEE states remains minimal compared to China’s investment in Western Europe. Between 2000 and 2019, even relatively small Finland attracted more Chinese capital than all 17 CEE states combined, while in Germany China invested over 20 times more than in Poland, the biggest country of the 17+1 format.

After a couple of years of rapprochement, most CEE states have realised that strengthening ties with China was not a ‘win-win’ strategy. Instead, the 17+1 format antagonised Brussels while enabling China to one-sidedly expand its footprint in the region — albeit to a limited extent.

Simultaneously, the international environment evolved quickly to China’s disadvantage. US–China strategic rivalry reached new heights when the COVID-19 pandemic hit in early 2020 as both countries became engaged in a global blame game. Beijing doubled-down on its image-building efforts in CEE media, which bore the marks of propaganda and disinformation.

Beijing’s removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy and the mass detention of Muslims in Xinjiang also further shifted global attitudes against China. The debate on the role of Chinese tech giant Huawei in building 5G networks abroad has also intensified, with increasing numbers of EU states banning the company from its domestic markets for security reasons. New research suggests that European attitudes towards China have significantly worsened.

Recent moves by some CEE countries also indicate that a Europe-wide shift in perceptions of China has already affected local policymaking. Most European countries that signed joint declarations with the United States on securing 5G technologies from authoritarian influence are also 17+1 members, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.

The draft version of Poland’s new cybersecurity law includes provisions such as exclusion of certain providers based on evidence of human rights violations in their countries of origin. This makes it one of the harshest legal responses to that problem in the global arena. Meanwhile, Czech elites’ entanglements with Chinese entities has backfired enormously at the domestic level, leading not only to a worsening of China’s image but also to increased interest in cooperation with Taiwan. This has created a window of opportunity for the island to expand its international ties and increase its soft power.

17+1 member countries should not be regarded as ‘troublemakers’ because of their perceived closeness with China. Some Western European voices still mimic Chinese discourses about the strength of China–CEE ties. This is both counterproductive and dangerous as it brings the whole European community further away from genuine partnership and debate on one of the most pressing issues the European Union is facing — China’s rise.

The European Union should move towards a more value-based yet realistic assessment of the ongoing changes in the international balance of power, and it should play a more proactive role in this process. But it should not exclude some of its members from the decision-making processes in a patronising move to distance itself from the alleged ‘Chinese Trojan horses’.

Alicja Bachulska is an analyst at the Asia Research Centre, War Studies University, Warsaw, and coordinates the MapInfluenCE project in Poland.

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