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Hints at political change in Laos

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Politburo member of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, Head of the Party's Organizing Committee Chansi Phosikham speaks at the opening ceremony of the 11th National Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party in Vientiane, Laos, 13 January 2021 (Photo: Reuters/Laos Communist Party/Handout).

In Brief

Held from 13–15 January 2021, the 11th Congress of the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) — the most eagerly anticipated event of Laos’s five-year political cycle — delivered modest change at the top and reaffirmed the country’s high-stakes economic strategy, including its growing reliance on China. Yet it saw significant turnover of personnel at lower levels and hinted at possible shifts in political and economic emphasis.

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Attended by 768 delegates, the main function of the congress was to elect a new 71-member party central committee, which in turn selected the powerful general secretary, politburo and secretariat. While key parts of this process are concealed from public view, it appears to blend Leninist democratic centralism with patron–client relations, political networking and intervention by party elders, thus moderating any mood for political change. Pre-congress negotiations largely determine the outcome.

Change at the top was measured. Succeeding the retiring Bounnhang Vorachith as general secretary is popular Prime Minister and party number two, Thongloun Sisoulith. State Vice President and standing secretariat member, Phankham Viphavanh, leapfrogged National Assembly President Pany Yathotou and Deputy Prime Minister Bounthong Chitmany to become the new number two. Bounthong was made standing member of the secretariat, an influential position held by Bounnhang before Phankham.

Other politburo members rose two places, including closely watched offspring of the party’s first two leaders. Xaysomphone Phomvihane, son of late party founder Kaysone Phomvihane and head of the Lao Front for National Development, rose to number five. Deputy Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, son of still-influential powerbroker Khamtay Siphandone and rumoured pre-congress frontrunner for prime minister, rose only to number nine, casting doubt on those predictions.

The president and prime minister will be named after February’s National Assembly elections. If Thongloun becomes state president, like his predecessors since 1998, the congress leaves Phankham best positioned to become prime minister. A less likely possibility — particularly if Sonexay or even Xaysomphone can claim the premiership — might be for Phankham to become state president, again splitting the party and state presidencies.

Greater renewal occurred in ranks 10–18. Four new faces were elevated to the expanded 13-member politburo, including two that jumped from ranks 23 and 50, and five new members of the nine-person secretariat (ranked 14–18) were plucked from ranks 39–63 of the former central committee. With three of the nine key promotions being female, four women now sit in the politburo or secretariat — a notable increase from just one (Pany).

Rejuvenation was greatest lower down the pecking order. Strikingly, 31 of the previous 69-person central committee were not re-elected — a significant cleanout of senior and mid-level cadres — allowing the election of 33 new members and 10 substitutes. This turnover suggests the party might be acting on criticism of party and government leadership expressed in Bounnhang’s political report, which censured officials for lacking courage and creativity in dealing with new problems.

What are the implications of the changes?

Speculatively, we might ponder a potential tension between the family patronage networks of wartime revolutionaries, who have previously dominated the politburo, and a newer breed of better-educated technocrats advocating party discipline, socialist state-building, scrutiny of government projects and equitable development.

For the first time, the LPRP is headed by career cadres and educators rather than wartime soldiers and commissars. A protege of the revolutionary theorist Phoumi Vongvichit, Thongloun trained as a teacher upon joining the revolution, took advanced degrees in the Soviet Union and later became a respected foreign minister. As prime minister, he introduced efforts — albeit limited — to curb official largesse and corruption. Phankham and Bounthong were also educators and have forged careers in party propaganda, training and organisation. Phankham has a no-nonsense reputation while Bounthong has headed the party’s anti-corruption program. Both have also served as provincial governors. These leaders may act more resolutely to implement policies to strengthen party and state institutions, including those related to discipline and integrity.

Socialist state-building language was prominent at the congress, reflecting a recent pattern. Leaders emphasised the need to improve rule-of-law, especially in economic areas. Lest rule-of-law be confused with liberalisation, Bounnhang stressed the role of these and other reforms in building the ‘people’s democratic state’ and advancing towards socialism. Bounnhang also highlighted the need to improve ‘management of social media’, an apparent reference to quelling online criticism of the government.

On the economic front, the congress did not indicate any changes to Laos’s hydropower-intensive economic strategy or its deepening dependence on China. But in addressing the country’s debt woes and the COVID-19 economic crunch, Thongloun acknowledged his government’s poor financial management record, reinforced the need for development to reduce poverty and inequality and announced a reduced annual growth target of 4 per cent for 2021–25. This reduction is notable; the question is whether it was solely due to the COVID-19 recession or if it flags a shift in approach.

Speculation aside, talk of tension between patronage and technocratic socialism would be premature. Revolutionary family patronage networks are unlikely to fade anytime soon. Sonexay may have failed to leapfrog rivals but the Siphandone family boosted its representation in the central committee, as did other influential families. Nevertheless, hints at potential shifts in political and economic emphasis provide crucial watch points for the coming years.

On the other hand, the congress is unlikely to presage change in Laos’s international relations. While Bounnhang celebrated the country’s ‘partnership of common destiny’ with China, the LPRP’s key political relationship with the Vietnamese Communist Party, forged in the Indochina Wars, remains fundamental to its founding mythos.

Simon Creak is Assistant Professor of Southeast Asian History at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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