The incumbent president Khaltmaagiin Battulga of the Democratic Party — who had been blocked from running for a second term by the MPP-dominated parliament — sought to mobilise popular support by gathering mass rallies in the main square of Mongolia’s capital Ulaanbaatar. Yet Khurelsukh mostly relied on support from the bureaucracy and law enforcement.
Khurelsukh’s presidency is unlikely to affect Ulaanbaatar’s relations with Moscow. Russia, along with China, is a critical neighbour and partner for Mongolia. 2021 marks the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Mongolia, with Moscow becoming the first foreign power to formally recognise Mongolia’s sovereignty in 1921.
Despite former president Battulga’s reputation as a politician with pro-Russian sympathies, Moscow remained neutral in Mongolia’s domestic political struggle. After the election was decided, the Kremlin promptly congratulated the newly elected president. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Khurelsukh spoke in July confirming ‘their mutual resolve to continue developing friendly ties and comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and Mongolia’.
In September, Khurelsukh made a virtual appearance at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. In his remarks at the forum, Khurelsukh made noted that Mongolia supports both Putin’s foreign policy vision of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative. Khurelsukh also mentioned the possibility of a free trade agreement between Mongolia and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. So far Mongolia’s only free trade agreement is with Japan.
Yet concerns over Mongolia’s plans to build river dams that may impact the fragile natural environment of areas across the border in Russia’s eastern Siberia remains an irritant in Russian–Mongolian relations and is likely to continue under Khurelsukh. Partly because of Russian pressure, Mongolia halted projects to build hydropower plants on the Egiin Gol and Shuren rivers — tributaries of Selenga river which feeds into Russia’s Lake Baikal.
Still, Mongolia has launched the construction of a dam on the trans-border Uldza river. The dam is needed to divert water for mining projects in Mongolia’s southern Gobi region. The Uldza dam, if completed, may disrupt the ecology of the unique Torey Lakes in Russia’s Daursky Reserve, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Despite Moscow’s concerns, Mongolia’s Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh made it clear that the country will not abandon its ambitions in hydropower and dam construction, which Ulaanbaatar views as a path to energy self-sufficiency.
Despite disagreements over dams, Russia and Mongolia are pressing ahead with the Soyuz Vostok natural gas pipeline project that would transport gas from Russia’s western Siberia into China via Mongolia. A feasibility study is nearing completion, with Russia’s Gazprom expecting to start the construction next year. If realised, the pipeline will become the biggest joint undertaking by Russia and Mongolia since the Soviet era. Russia and China have the option of constructing a gas pipeline from western Siberia directly into western China via the Altai Mountains. Yet, the Mongolian route would bring gas directly to the areas of China that need gas.
The pipeline route through Mongolia is not completely risk-free. Mongolian resource nationalism has troubled foreign investors in the country. The pipeline traversing Mongolian territory could potentially hold the project hostage to Mongolia’s turbulent domestic politics. This may be one reason Beijing has not yet signed off on a binding contract for the pipeline. An energy crunch that is now afflicting many parts of China could prompt Beijing to make a final decision in favour of the Mongolian route for Russian gas.
The election of Khurelsukh has not changed the patterns of Mongolia–Russia military collaboration, which remains active. In September and October, Russian and Mongolian units conducted the annual Selenga bilateral exercise. Taking place in Mongolia, it involved around 1,400 servicemen from both sides. Still, Russia is watching warily as Mongolia pursues its ‘third neighbour’ policy and develops military-to-military ties with the United States. Moscow is especially uneasy with Mongolia hosting the Khaan Quest international exercises, which are conducted in close collaboration with the US Indo-Pacific Command.
Mongolia’s establishment of a ‘strategic partnership’ with South Korea, agreed at a September virtual summit between Khurelsukh and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, is another example of Mongolia’s pro-active multi-vector foreign policy. South Korea became Mongolia’s sixth strategic partner, after Russia (2006), Japan (2010), China (2014), India (2015) and the United States (2019).
Ulaanbaatar’s foreign policy hedging is also visible in Mongolia’s vaccine diplomacy, with the country receiving vaccines from Russia, China, India and the West. Mongolia initially ordered 1 million doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine, but as of July had received only 80,000 doses, apparently due to production bottlenecks in Russia. The majority of the jabs administered in Mongolia have been China’s Sinopharm vaccine.
Regardless of who holds the presidency in Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar will continue to have a vital interest in strong relations with Moscow. Despite Mongolia’s pro-active multi-vector foreign policy, Russia, rather than distant ‘third neighbours’ will remain the ultimate guarantor of Mongolia’s security and sovereignty.
Alexey Mikhalev is Director of the Center for Studies of Political Transformation, Buryat State University, Ulan-Ude.
Artyom Lukin is Associate Professor at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok.