AUKUS reveals ASEAN’s lingering symptoms of indecision and Indonesia’s inability to address conflict in the region, and has elicited mixed responses from ASEAN members. Indonesia and Malaysia expressed deep concern over a potential arms race following the plan to build eight nuclear-powered submarines in Australia. Singapore and the Philippines were more cognisant in their responses, stating that the partnership could contribute to regional stability. The inability to create a unanimous voice signals to Jakarta that ASEAN — the hallmark of Indonesia’s diplomacy — is hardly a unified front when facing collective challenges. Vietnam and other members’ silence, in this context, are deafening.
Indonesia’s fear is legitimate. Southeast Asia is on immediate frontline of AUKUS’s geopolitical impact. Any conflict with China will put Indonesia in the middle. Even worse, regional tensions risk leaving Indonesia as a ‘strategic spectator’.
But AUKUS should be put into perspective. The initiative needs to be treated as a minilateral option, rather than an arrangement purposely made to ditch ASEAN centrality. It’s a logical consequence of ASEAN’s inability to bridge rivalling parties in the region. As stated by former Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, ‘AUKUS was a reminder for ASEAN of the cost of its dithering and indecision on the complex and fast-evolving geopolitical environment’.
The essence of Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy is strategic autonomy — the number of moves that Jakarta has at its disposal. This can’t be achieved by relying solely on ASEAN, whose mechanisms are becoming increasingly inapt to keep amity among its partners. While expressing concern is required to ease tension, privately Jakarta’s security sector might be relieved that AUKUS provides the region leverage against China. Not by supplying cutting edge military technology per se, but from the commitment that external powers voiced for regional security.
Indonesia’s statement has cautiously avoided mentioning AUKUS by name and articulated in a rather tepid undertone — a default response from a country that has the highest stake in ASEAN. It signals concern, but not hostility towards Canberra. Behind the flaunt of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for neutrality, domestic opinion is still far from united. One member of parliament stated that there is support for the government to back AUKUS and stand against the latest Chinese foray in Natuna.
While Malaysian Minister of Defence Hishammuddin Hussein stated his concern over regional destabilisation, his Indonesian counterpart Prabowo Subianto has not issued any formal remark on AUKUS. The cross purposes between the foreign and defence ministries illustrate Indonesia’s nuanced attitude. Indonesia seeks to maintain trust by reassuring Beijing of its neutrality. While such concern needs to be enunciated publicly, it conceals deeper fear of being sidelined if similar moves unfold in the future.
Indonesia’s response towards regional conflict has long been lethargic, encapsulated in statements such as ‘deeply concerned’ and ‘note cautiously’ without concrete actions. Indonesia’s fear over conflict in its backyard is an understatement in this context — the threat has stepped over Indonesia’s lawn several times, often without reprimand.
Right after voicing its concern, Indonesia saw yet another Chinese incursion in its exclusive economic zone, and the longest one yet. This incursion by a Chinese survey vessel, two coast guard vessels and a destroyer in the North Natuna Sea has lasted over three weeks. The event ironically unfolded after Beijing summoned the Indonesian ambassador to express its displeasure over AUKUS. The latest incursion may repeat the cycle of Chinese territorial violations in 2016 and 2019, which Indonesia failed to deal with properly.
Jakarta is in dire need of keeping the potential threats surrounding the region in check. While ASEAN arrangements are still struggling to overcome their impasse, extra-ASEAN arrangements could help, including from Australia. After all, Jakarta–Canberra security ties could reach new heights during this Indo-Pacific quagmire after the two countries agreed to renew the Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Arrangement.
Indonesia is in dire need of modernising its arsenal. After the KRI Nanggala-402 accident in April, it’s evident that the country faces a looming threat from its outdated military technology. To achieve the Minimum Essential Forces targets, extra-ASEAN arrangements are viable options. Indonesia has begun to address this problem, though the progress might be incremental. On 17 September, Prabowo and UK Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace signed a license to manufacture two Arrowhead-140 frigates. A week earlier, Indonesia and Australia conducted their seventh 2+2 meeting to ramp up their defence relationship.
As far as bilateral relations are concerned, AUKUS has not altered Indonesia’s ties with its partners, including the AUKUS countries.
Asserting ASEAN’s centrality is one thing, yet addressing the real issue is another. Future ASEAN strategy should begin to recognise AUKUS, the Quad, and other similar arrangements as useful assets that complement ASEAN institutions and centrality.
Indonesia must put more weight on the ‘active’ part of its ‘free and active’ principle. And to be active, Indonesia needs more strategies at its disposal. ASEAN countries have lost much of their independence by translating neutrality as inaction. Managed carefully, AUKUS and the forthcoming minilateral arrangement could patch this gap.
Arrizal Jaknanihan is an Assistant Lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia.
1. Young Indonesians seem to have forgotten that their country was under Dutch commercial and colonial rule of exploitation and subjugation for over 300 years. Independence from the Dutch (and from the Japanese occupation of 4 years) was won with blood of millions of Indonesians slaughtered.
2. To propose that the nation embrace AUKUS is a thought that cannot be taken lightly. To all intents and purposes Australia is now a US colony except in name. By allowing its military to be tied to the US, Australia does not now have an independent foreign policy. It probably matters little to the Australians and Morrison welcomes US guidance because AUKUS, a subset of 5Eyes, is really a club of anglo-saxons.
3. Does Indonesia want to be part of AUKUS? Quite apart from becoming again a vassal state of Western powers, such a proposal goes against the very spirit of ASEAN neutrality. Philippine President Duterte knows better: “US treated us as their brown brethren”. It is precisely for this reason that the Japanese submarine deal was torpedoed at the eleventh hour. The Australian Government declared: “Our security cannot be tied to an Asian country.”
4. The future of Indonesia is with ASEAN and in ASIA. And Indonesia has huge potential to become a global economic power and a regional military power, as long as it manages to stay independent and takes steps to reduce poverty, improve education, build infrastructure, manage corruption…
The fear about ASEAN’s irrelevance is a valid concern. However, the unfolding of AUKUS and ASEAN’s mixed reactions shows that Indonesia’s current approach can’t hold ASEAN as the central platform. Support for AUKUS does not need to be announced publicly which would undermine Indonesia’s autonomy, But Indonesia can privately embrace AUKUS’s leverage. By becoming flexible to minilateral options, Indonesia could better assert its independence, while also increase its own leverage on the process.