The document’s release, coupled with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s trip to the Pacific, aims to reassure regional states that the United States will not be distracted by competing priorities in Europe. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February is now testing Washington’s focus and resolve amid these challenging times.
Compared to the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the latest Indo-Pacific Strategy is noticeably succinct. The 19-page document, compared to the 64-page report in 2019, highlights several key areas of concerns including climate change, global health and North Korea’s nuclear program.
But the most pressing matter is the state of the regional — and international — order, with China its biggest threat.
As such, Washington’s priorities in the Indo-Pacific are portrayed in a manner that is not so much focussed on China as it is focussed on shaping the region’s security architecture. It explains that the US objective ‘is not to change the PRC’. Instead, it is to build a ‘balance of influence in the world that is maximally favourable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values that we share’. This is a much more tempered position from Washington, reflecting an intention to veer from geopolitical bipolarity with Beijing.
Over the last year, the Biden administration has taken steps to ensure that its Indo-Pacific policy eclipses its concerns about China. Compared to the previous administration, there is a significant shift away from asking partners and allies to align with Washington over Beijing. That US engagement in the region is not designed to make anyone ‘choose between countries’ was tirelessly repeated through separate high-key diplomatic trips made to the region. Instead, the assertion is now that US engagement is based on legacy rather than geopolitical contests, aiming to expand a wider network of like-minded countries.
This objective can be seen in the Biden administration’s response to regional anxieties over the US–China rivalry. Countries have made it expressly clear that they do not want to be forced to choose too starkly between Washington or Beijing, preferring instead to focus on regional stability. As such, by underscoring engagement and cooperation based on ‘shared agendas’ and ‘shared values’, the United States can frame its engagement in the Indo-Pacific beyond concerns about China.
As the strategy notes, perhaps in a self-aware manner, Asia has often been viewed too narrowly as an arena of geopolitical competition. By shifting the focus towards shared interests and prioritising alliances and partnerships, US policy in the region can expand beyond a narrowly framed binary of geopolitical interests.
The latest release of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is a clear nod to this. It asserts that the regional rules-based order is at stake, one in which ‘governments can make their own sovereign decisions, consistent with their obligations under international law’.
The report additionally acknowledges variations within outlooks espoused by key regional partners, reflecting an effort to present the congruence and confluence of an Indo-Pacific vision that is collectively shared. The call for collective efforts to safeguard the regional commons is resounding.
A closer look at the Indo-Pacific strategy reveals that much of the document is written in future tense. A search of the key words, ‘we will’, turns up 84 hits in the document. With the Biden administration only in its second year in office, the Indo-Pacific strategy will serve its purpose to shore up anticipation for sustained US engagement in the region. This is especially so as the region looks with interest at the forthcoming US Indo-Pacific economic framework.
At the same time, the next few months will be a critical period for Washington to prove that it can indeed walk the talk and demonstrate that it is serious about prioritising the region. So far, its efforts to keep attention on the Indo-Pacific while also contending with Russia’s aggression and a deepening security quagmire in Europe is commendable.
As the situation in Europe continues to develop, it remains to be seen if Washington will be able to find the energy and momentum it needs to make good on its promises to the region. But what is clear is that Indo-Pacific countries have been here before — and they will be waiting to see if the Biden administration will be able to deliver where previous administrations have failed.
Amanda Trea Phua is Senior Analyst in the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
This piece is a good example of analysts working with the same facts coming to diametrically opposed conclusions.
The analysis ignores extant realities and the old adage –believe what a country does, not what it says. Contrary to the article’s assertions, both hawks and doves generally agree that the goal of the IPS is to contain China’s rise. Indeed the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) warns that China is “combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power.” It predicts that “our collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefited the Indo-Pacific and the world”.
The piece claims that the IPS reflects “an intention to veer from geopolitical bipolarity with Beijing.” But the core intent of the IPS is to contain China. Worse, it is based on false assumptions, self delusions, wishful thinking and contradictions and ignores fundamental differences between the interests and values of the core of the region –Southeast Asia – and those of the U.S.
The U.S. continues to delude itself as to the history of its relationship with the region. The IPS says “For 75 years [since the end of WWII] the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence to support regional peace, security, stability and prosperity”. This oft-repeated mantra by US policy makers and DC think tank analysts ignores the US role in suppressing Vietnam’s liberation movement and its support of bloody coups and the reign of horrific human rights violators in Indonesia (Suharto), the Philippines (Marcos) and Taiwan (Chiang Kai-shek). The recent US debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq, the region’s countries are wary of US military involvement. The lesson of the last 75 years for them is that US military involvement often results in failure, chaos and disaster for those countries and regimes that assist it in pursuing its hegemonic interests.
The piece says that “the Biden administration has taken steps to ensure that its Indo-Pacific policy eclipses its concerns about China”. It claims that it demarks a “significant shift away from asking partners and allies to align with Washington against Beijing”. To the contrary, the IPS says the U.S. intends to build greater coordination with allies and partners “across war-fighting domains” to ensure allies can dissuade or defeat aggression in any form” including attempts to alter maritime boundaries or undermine the maritime rights of other nations. That is essentially asking Southeast Asian countries to choose between it and China.
The analysis refers to shared values between the U.S. and Southeast Asian nations. But few countries in the region share core US values. ASEAN autocracies like Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam do not share Western democratic ideals like freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and free and fair elections. This was underscored by the fact that the only Southeast Asian countries invited to the US-convened Summit for Democracy were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste.
Behind the verbal veil, the IPS is essentially saying that the US-Southeast Asia commonality is fear of China. However some Southeast Asian states like Cambodia and Laos have made their accommodations with China and do not fear it and others will continue to hedge between the two because of their national economic interests – not values. Moreover, the recent turmoil and stultifying divisions in US politics undermine the attractiveness of US ‘democratic values’.
The IPS states that the U.S. “will be a partner in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and accountable democratic governance.” This will be accomplished “through investments in democratic institutions, a free press, and a vibrant civil society.” But this may be seen by Southeast Asian countries as an intent to interfere in their internal affairs –something that goes against basic ASEAN principles and will not be welcomed by most–even those US- deemed ‘democracies’
The analysis says that the IPS reflects an effort to present the ”congruence and confluence of an Indo-Pacific vision that is collectively shared”. But ASEAN and the U.S. have fundamentally different visions for the region. The U.S. vision of an implicitly anti-China, security-oriented Free and Open Indo-Pacific contrasts with ASEAN’s inclusive [including China], less militaristic Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Moreover there are contradictions between US rhetoric supporting ASEAN’s aspiration of centrality in regional security affairs and its actions. The IPS says “We endorse ASEAN centrality” and intend to contribute “to an empowered and unified ASEAN”. But it also states that then the means of accomplishing IPS goals will be by “strengthening the Quad and delivering on its commitments”; and “supporting India’s continued rise and regional leadership”. Trying to achieve these objectives simultaneously will create tensions that may be insurmountable.
Rather than being a change in US policy for the better, the IPS is more of the same under the guise that “we have come to help you”. Don’t believe everything the U.S. says. Southeast Asian countries don’t.
Mark J. Valencia
Adjunct Senior Scholar
National Institute for South China Sea Studies
Haikou, China
Dear Mark. This is Amanda.
Thank you for the response to what is, if I may, being a Southeast Asian and situated within a Southeast Asian country, a perspective from within the region.
The key argument here is that there is noticeable effort by the Biden administration to shift the rhetoric, and even if only rhetoric, away from geopolitical rivalry with China that is evident in the IPS.
There is value in this.
Regional countries have been grappling with the US-China binary (re: expressions on “choosing sides”). Any shift in i) actually not reifying this binary discursively or in action, or ii) attempting to expand the conversation beyond the binary, or fallacy of a binary, whichever you prefer, is valuable for regional countries.
The article makes no reference to shared values between the US and ASEAN.
Rather, it notes that by choosing to shift its focus on alliances and shared values, the IPS can serve the purpose to expand the conversation beyond a US Asia Policy as one fixated on China.
You would find that I agree with you that the US’ values-based campaign may not find the crowd or support it wishes to have here.
I tend to agree that the values-based proposition may as easily become yet another mode of differentiation between the US and China, but that does not disregard the administration’s attempt to soften the us-versus-them narrative that the IPS, especially when taken in comparison to the last IPS, is a reflection of.
Finally, I cannot imagine a more oppressing manner of conducting research should we all be arriving at the same conclusions, so thank you for sharing yours. You speak with a conviction I admire.