
Acknowledgement: At the outset, an acknowledgement. Some of the ideas presented here were first mooted in a paper I read at the People’s Liberation Army’s 3rd Xiangshan Forum last October. Others have been borrowed from the forthcoming title ‘Asia-Pacific Security Dynamics in the Obama Era: A New World Emerging.’ So, there is much to thank the Academy of Military Science in Beijing, and Routledge in Abingdon, for.

Introduction: We live in times of transitional tensions as great-powers vie for position within a system betraying symptoms of strategic fluidity. Change is in the air, but the specificities of that change are unclear, as is the likely systemic end-state. Starting a decade before Secretary of State Alexander Haig noted, ‘In terms of the strategic interests of the United States and the West in the last quarter of the 20th century, China may be the most important country in the world,’1 US-China relations have swung from hostility through covert collaboration to tacit alliance to ‘near-peer rivalry’ and ‘strategic partnership,’ a dynamic dialectic which has shaped the peak of the systemic power hierarchy in a manner few other bilateral relationships have done.

President Hu Jintao’s talks with Barack Obama in Washington, and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates’ visit to Beijing in January indicated efforts to fashion a *modus vivendi* between the system-manager and an insurgent power seeking not to overturn a beneficial structure, but to expand its autonomous space within the existing system. These talks reflected recognition of changing power-relations, but differences over policies to address deep mutual insecurities persisted.2 Seen from Washington, China has been the only power able to challenge US primacy. Shortly after joining the Obama cabinet, Gates told Congress,

> China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber- and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernisation in these areas could threaten America’s primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air, and sea assets, and the networks that support them.’3

Nine months later, he reassured America, ‘The US is projected to have more than 1,000 F-22s and F-35s before China fields its first fully operational fifth-generation fighter – a gap that will grow well into the 2020s.’4 America’s China focused security discourse has contributed to this dialectic becoming a key factor, both reflecting and reinforcing Sino-US strategic competition, the crucial dynamic shaping the Asia-Pacific, and indeed, the global security landscape. The action-reaction sequence was recently ‘operationalised.’

The most visible signs of shift came on 27th May 2010, when Admiral Gary Roughhead, the US Chief of Naval Operations, and General Norton Schwartz, US Air Force Chief of Staff, jointly rolled out ‘AirSea Battle,’ a new operational concept designed to deter and,
if deterrence failed, defeat the People’s Liberation Army in combat.\(^5\) Comparable in scope, scale and ambition to ‘AirLand Battle,’ a concept adopted by NATO and US forces in 1981 to deter or defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, ‘AirSea Battle’ aimed at trumping Chinese ‘anti-access/area-denial’ capabilities with integrated aerial-maritime operational ‘force-multiplication.’\(^6\) In 2010, as Beijing laid down what it called the ‘foundations of basic national defence,’ America identified China as the source of threats to US national security akin to those presumably posed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.\(^7\)

Since 1945, such transitions have been noted twice – first, the 1970-71, when China and the USA established a tacit coalition against the Soviet Union and transformed the systemic core into an expanded bipolarity; and, again, in 1989-91 when the Soviet collapse and China’s strategic marginalisation converted the systemic outline into as close to a unipolar formulation as we are ever likely to see. And, now, a third, more gradual and less precisely definable shift is in train.

The literature on the shift of systemic focus from ‘the West to the rest,’ from ‘the West to the East,’ from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from America to China is already substantial; one may treat these works with affection or disdain depending on one’s preferences or prejudices. However, a few trends appear to be developing some traction:

- The sequence of changes to global political, economic, diplomatic, scientific-technological and military dominance passed from Dutch to Portuguese, Spanish, French, and British leadership to American primacy, or at least pre-eminence, over a five-hundred year period. This essentially Euro-Atlantic phenomenon is now facing challenges that are likely to be insuperable.
- The rise of the ‘rest’ has been reflected in research by various American bodies such as investment bankers at Goldman Sachs, and the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) global academic arm.
- Goldman Sachs were credited with creating the BRICs formulation, pointing out that by 2030, Brazil, Russia, India and China would equal or exceed the collective domestic product of the Group of Seven economies. Until then, these four states had showed little interest in working together as a group; since then, a semi-formal framework of diplomatic-economic collaboration has evolved. Bankers rule our lives in more ways than one.\(^8\)
- Leaders of the four countries met in Brasilia in April 2010 for their second summit, and in the first Article of their Joint Statement, said –

  ‘We share the perception that the world is undergoing major and swift changes that highlight the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all relevant areas.’\(^9\)

The second Article said –

‘We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.’\(^10\)
This would suggest that BRICs states are gunning for a more level and less hierarchical systemic structure. However, given that Russia and China are part of the P-5 fraternity and India and Brazil wish to join them, these declaratory objectives carry some inconsistencies. Still, if Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Dmitry Medvedev, Manmohan Singh and Hu Jintao are endowed with a reasonable grasp of the reality, then you would acknowledge that systemic shifts are in progress and their four countries will collaborate in shaping the outcome. US relations with these four powers vary. But given Washington’s efforts to boost already strong strategic ties to India, develop a nuclear partnership with Russia, build on traditional links to Brazil, and manage complex relations with China, such Joint Statements of intent hint at a tacit insurrection against the order undergirded with the system-manager’s primacy. So, transitional turbulence is not a hypothetical glimmer in revisionist eyes; it reflects fluidity informing the crystallisation of a new politico-economic, military-security order.

Key teams of the US intelligence community forecast the 2025 global political landscape thus: ‘A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of nonstate actors – businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks – will also increase. The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and economic power roughly from West to East now underway will continue. The United States will remain the single most powerful country but will be less dominant.’11 The impact of such changes on America’s systemic role, and the consequences flowing from it, have been examined by academic mentors of the US military. By the beginning of the Obama Administration, the consensus appeared to be that unipolarity was already giving way to multipolarity, and America would do well to adapt itself to this emerging reality.

- A corollary of this argument was about how best to manage relative decline and retain leadership. That discussion triggered a debate among some of America’s sharpest minds about the nature of imperium, leadership, power and interests. I’ll refer to just two commentaries highlighting the most sophisticated arguments. The first is by Professor Joseph Nye of ‘soft power’ and ‘smart power’ fame who, as a practitioner in the first Clinton Administration, helped shape America’s long-term strategic approach to Asia, particularly China and Japan. Nye rejects the notion of American decline and says that notwithstanding ‘all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern barbarians and non-state actors.’ As regards China’s system-bending explosive economic ascent, Nye points out, ‘linear projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. China’s authoritarian political system has shown an impressive capability to harness the country’s power, but whether the government can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and to Chinese leaders.’12 American resilience, Chinese brittleness and history’s non-linear progression are difficult to question.

- The countervailing comments are from another analyst of American and Asian affairs. Chalmers Johnson recently passed away but left us with a treasure-trove of analyses of processes shaping America’s engagement with Asia, and indeed,
the world. In January 2008, Professor Johnson noted that the US defence outlay was close to a trillion – a thousand billion – dollars. While this was the budget for the Department of Defence, it did not include costs of producing and maintaining nuclear warheads, which went to the Department of Energy; or the cost of paying for the medical and other bills for veterans, which went to the Veterans Affairs Department; or foreign military assistance, which was paid out of State Department allocations; or the cost of the actual defence of the republic, which was the task of the Department of Homeland Security. Johnson said, ‘It all adds up to an unbelievable amount that is over time not sustainable...These things can’t go on forever and they are not going to. The American empire could come to an end before this film is over if just one little thing happened, if Saudi Arabia decided it wanted to be paid for its oil in Euros instead of dollars.’ Drawing attention to the political trauma which followed German bankruptcy in 1923 and China’s in 1948, Johnson said, ‘Bankruptcy isn’t funny. It’s better than an atomic explosion, but... it would unleash in this country almost unimaginable pressures for revolution once you wipe out the wealth of all of the society. And we’re toying with that, we’re threatening that with our fiscal imbalances...Why should we be concerned about imperialism and militarism? It’s a suicide pact. That’s how empires end.’

Both Nye and Johnson make sound points and while we cannot ‘know’ the future, there is something to both sets of prognostications that is relevant to the currently apparent systemic turbulence. One way of looking at complex categories is to focus on specific elements, e.g., flashpoints which could escalate from confrontation to conflict. Several of these serve as possible triggers of violence which could consume East Asian prosperity in a flash, and inflict severe systemic strains. In no particular order –

**Taiwan:** Unlike Tibet and Xinjiang, whose political status is unlikely to change against Beijing’s wishes, the position of Taiwan is moot. In January 2010, Washington announced the sale of arms worth $6.4bn to Taipei. This triggered a cut-off in military-to-military links and, followed by Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama, caused relations to plunge. The PLA has focused for decades on preventing Taiwan’s formal independence. While the military interface remains edgy, the political-economic ground has shifted. Both governments are weaving a network of regimes, practices and habits aimed at gradual reconciliation and the avoidance of violence. Pro-independence forces have not disappeared, far from it; but fears of conflict across the Strait have dissipated.

**Korea:** The Korean Peninsula assumed a sharper confrontational profile in 2010. Beijing informed Washington that it viewed North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes as ‘threats to the whole world’s security.’ Beijing even came round to accepting a reunified Korea under Seoul’s authority if it did not turn hostile. However, China could not countenance threats to its interests reflected in official US statements and naval-air drills conducted in areas considered sensitive. Korea remains a potent source of possible conflict because of a variety of structural inconsistencies. One of them is differing Sino-US perceptions of what is ‘right’ or acceptable in so far as North Korean conduct is concerned; another is whether China should be forced to withdraw its support for the
status quo; and a third is the enforced asymmetric legitimacy of the two Korean states. Apart from two different economic and political systems, are the Koreas any different in terms of their legitimacy? Do they merit dissimilar approaches although both were creations of third-party military interventions and both are equal members of the United Nations? Should the unilaterally US-imposed ‘Northern Limit Line’ be given the same status as the negotiated Military Demarcation Line? Who should determine the Peninsula’s political future and how should that determination be effected? Answers to these questions are not apparent but would be crucial to peace and stability.

After eight months of intermittent but extensive joint naval-air exercises around the Peninsula, one inference must be that an authoritarian, isolated, nearly-bankrupt and insecure regime which is armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear explosive devices will probably not be influenced by adversarial shows of force. Since these threatening drills have produced no perceptible changes in conduct, such an actor might be persuaded to change its behaviour with incentives that address key insecurities. Threats of war and economic sanctions have not proved persuasive with Pyongyang; consistent and ‘serious negotiations’ might. Now that Stephen Bosworth, Washington’s special envoy for Korean affairs, is using this phrase, there is hope that practical measures may finally be put in place to weaken the drives motivating what outsiders might see as erratic provocations.

**Japan:** The historically competitive nature of Sino-Japanese relations, briefly interrupted by Yukio Hatoyama, returned to the fore, even under a Democratic Party dispensation seen as less nationalistic than the Liberal Democratic Party. Hatoyama sought to strike a balance between Japan’s security alliance with the USA and Japan’s Asian identity, in his East-Asian Community initiative. Naoto Kan’s government has moved closer to the LDP stance as far as China is concerned. Affected by China’s rise to the second largest economy and Japan’s decline to the third, Beijing’s increasing assertiveness manifest in its response to the detention of Chinese fishermen by Japanese coastgurdsmen in disputed waters, and Beijing’s tough approach to ASEAN-member states over maritime disputes in the South China Sea, as well as Beijing’s formal support for Pyongyang, Tokyo has for the first time since 1972 openly identified China as a source of profound insecurity. Its ‘National Defense Program Guidelines’ published in December identified threats to Japan’s security emanating from, among other things, ‘Global shifts in the balance of power’ brought about by ‘the rise of emergent powers and relative change in the US influence.’ Against that backdrop, ‘Military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency are of concern for the regional and global community.’ Beijing was suitably outraged.

As Japan’s rivalry for the position of the Asian top-dog looks increasingly forlorn with growing uncertainties over the depth and credibility of America’s provision of strategic deterrence, and near-certainty of the upward trajectory taken by China’s influence, Sino-Japanese tensions are likely to persist. Given their close economic-commercial relations, significant military capabilities, and linkage to the systemic power relations, Sino-Japanese conflict would carry the seeds of devastating escalation. The risks of this sharpening of particular dialectics will increase with any erosion of Tokyo’s sense of
security derived from the US-Japanese alliance, especially as the alliance’s effectiveness in delivering either foolproof deterrence or defence is no longer beyond question.

ASEAN: The most urgent source of instability may lie in the South China Sea. There, overlapping maritime-territorial claims pushed by China and Taiwan on the one hand, and Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia on the other came to the fore in 2010 as Beijing tentatively pushed the Sea to its collection of ‘core interests,’ and the USA responded by claiming comparable rights there as part of its ‘national interest.’ China’s Kuomintang government proclaimed sovereignty over much of the South China Sea and issued an explicatory map in 1947. After the Communist victory two years later, Beijing adopted this claim and re-issued the map. With the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) triggering a discovery of maritime interests by many regional states, the National People’s Congress passed appropriate legislation in 1992. In 1993, China made its claims and cartographical representations at a maritime conference in Surabaya.

Its assertions took on a military edge in 1974, 1988 and several times in the 1990s. As China’s naval strength grew, Vietnam developed security links with Japan, India and the USA while ordering sophisticated combat platforms from Russia. Chinese naval units have also clashed with Filipino sailors. The USA has recently boosted security relations with other ASEAN members, especially Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. At gatherings of ASEAN-based multilateral groupings, China was increasingly isolated and singled out. This trend became clear at the ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting-plus conclaves in Hanoi in the second half of 2010. With a history of conflict characterising Sino-Vietnamese relations, current trends could trigger another ‘lesson-teaching’ Chinese exercise a la 1979, but things are so different now, that the outcome could be even murkier than it then was.

To avoid that risk, as a tacit coalition of China’s critics coalesced around the USA, Beijing initiated negotiations on the basis of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) signed in 2002. In recent months, parallel to the crystallisation of a counter-China bloc around the USA and its allies, some ASEAN states have reached out to Beijing. Thailand not only ordered machine-tools and other equipment for building missiles from China, but also invited Chinese Marines for an unprecedented joint exercise with Thai Special Forces. As 2010 ended, confirmation of secret negotiations between China and Vietnam over overlapping claims in the South China Sea arrived. China would not countenance challenges to its occupation of the Paracels, but Spratlys were apparently negotiable. It was in this context that Beijing was angered by Hanoi’s attempts to draw Washington in on those talks. General Ricardo David, Chief of Staff of the Filipino armed forces, flew to Beijing with a shopping list of combat hardware aimed at modernising the military’s ability to fight various insurgent groups, especially the communist New People’s Army. This was a significant shift in Manila’s security stance and a notable diplomatic victory for China.

Concluding remarks: America the persistent - China resurgent
With America’s economic resilience likely to restore it to pre-crisis levels in a few years, the USA could balance its books, rejuvenate its national substance and recapture the
authority of its moral high ground. But the environment in which its leadership would be exercised would have been transformed by then. The BRICs would demand far greater attention than they have received, and the consequences of dialectic interactions among myriad variables could be unpredictable. As regards Sino-US relations, divergences remain striking. Hillary Clinton reflected the Washington consensus on US leadership:

‘Throughout our history, through hot wars and cold, through economic struggles, and the long march to a more perfect union, Americans have always risen to the challenges we have faced. That is who we are. It is in our DNA. We do believe there are no limits on what is possible or what can be achieved. And now, after years of war and uncertainty, people are wondering what the future holds, at home and abroad. So let me say it clearly: The United States can, must, and will lead in this new century. Indeed, the complexities and connections of today’s world have yielded a new American Moment, a moment when our global leadership is essential, even if we must often lead in new ways.’

Perhaps in a somewhat unfair comparison, Beijing’s perspective sounds defensive: ‘China will not follow a path to war like Japan did in World War II, but that does not mean that China will surrender to US strategic containment. China should on one hand speed up defensive modernization, and on the other hand, continue to rise peacefully using its economic power...Taking on China as a competitor may serve as an incentive to the US. If the US takes China as an enemy, the result would be disastrous.’

During Hu Jintao’s January state-visit, President Obama’s emphasis on the universality of rights, freedom of navigation and level-playing currency fields, and Hu’s stress on the diversity of the world, China’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and development interest, and his repeated reassurances that China did not seek an arms race with America, would not challenge its systemic leadership and did not seek to dominate any other country suggested differences in perspectives and emphases. This apparent dialogue of the deaf raises questions whose answers could shape the geopolitical and strategic landscape over the coming decades, and I leave you with a few:

- Would America expect China to conform to parameters set by Washington and its allies, or would the two powers work out a new framework of collaboration on the basis of consultative equality?
- Would America acknowledge that with few practical levers with which to either constrain China’s growth or shape China in America’s own image, US primacy is bound to erode; would America adapt itself to sharing system-management tasks?
- Would China acknowledge it could not advance its case as that of a perennial victim, and accept the burdens of responsibilities that came with enhanced power?
- Would the transition to this perhaps 1:0.75 para-bipolarity be managed calmly with vision and statesmanship, or would brinkmanship popular with domestically-focused populist politicians win the day?
- Would America persist in forging a ‘ring of steel’ around China? Would China’s neighbours join this enterprise with vigour?
- Would China moderate the assertions of its claims, reduce regional insecurities, and prevent a spiralling security dilemma from defining the region?
Would America seek to democratise China by subverting its unelected authoritarian domestic dispensation, or treat China the way it treats Saudi Arabia?

In short, would America and China adjust their systemic claims, rebalancing their mutual expectations, or sleepwalk into a status quo vs revisionist war?

(I do’nt have answers to these questions; if you do, I’d be very keen to hear them.) Tx U

**Brief bio: S. Mahmud Ali**

Syed Mahmud Ali was trained at the Pakistan Military Academy (1970-71) and educated at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI - 1981), and King’s College, London (1985-90). After commanding an anti-tank platoon in the Sindh-Rajasthan sector during the December 1971 war between India and Pakistan to indeterminate effect, he spent two years as a military prisoner incarcerated at a frontier fortress on the Khyber Pass. Following repatriation to Bangladesh, he served for a decade in regimental, instructional and General-Staff appointments, including stints in counter-insurgency operations in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and on the faculty of the School of Military Intelligence. During his two decades as a broadcaster, analyst, editor and manager with the BBC World Service, he published a series of volumes including a trilogy on the evolution of Sino-US security interactions. He has now completed a follow-on volume titled ‘Asia-Pacific Security Dynamics in the Obama Era: A New World Emerging.’ He is currently a Fellow at the Oxford-Cambridge Research Group.

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2 Washington stressed the benefits of cooperation while Beijing underscored objections to US policies ‘threatening’ China’s ‘core interests’ e.g., arms sales to Taiwan and surveillance operations in China’s proximate maritime- and air-spaces. See, for instance, Jim Garamone, *US, China Must Cooperate as World Powers, Gates Says; Beijing, American Forces Press Service, 10 January 2011; Li Xiaokun and Cheng Guangjin, ‘Sino-US militaries seek to “reduce miscalculation”,’ *People’s Daily*, 11 January 2011.
5 Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced the roll-out at the USAF Academy Graduation Ceremony in Colorado Springs on 26th May 2010.
7 The logic, premise and operational mechanics of ‘AirSea Battle’ are in *CSBA Releases New Report*, Washington, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010; Jan van
10 Ibid., Article 2.
14 Ambassador Richard Hoagland to Secretary of State, US Embassy Ref: Astana-0678, 8 June 2009.
16 See, for instance, Donna Miles, Mullen calls on China to Help Curb North Korean Aggression, Seoul, AFPS, 8 December 2010; Chico Harlan, ‘In South Korea, Joint Chiefs Chairman scolds China for its “tacit approval” of North’s aggression,’ The Washington Post, 8 December 2010.
17 Stephen Bosworth, Remarks Upon Arrival in Incheon, Republic of Korea, Incheon, Department of State, 4 January 2011.
19 See comments by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson in China poses no threat to anybody, Beijing, Xinhua, 17 December 2010.
20 Greg Torode and Minnie Chan, ‘China stands firm on Paracels in negotiations with Vietnam,’ South China Morning Post, 12 December 2010.
21 Hillary Clinton, Remarks on United States Foreign Policy, Washington, Council on Foreign Relations, 8 September 2010. A week before Hu Jintao’s state visit, she said, ‘Our leadership in the world and our commitment to tackle its greatest challenges have not drained our strength or sapped our resolve. Quite the opposite. They have made us who we are today: A force for peace, prosperity, and progress across the globe... The world looks to the United States for leadership to manage the changing times, and to ensure that this juncture leads to greater stability, peace, progress and prosperity. That is what we have always done. It is what we will always do.’ Clinton, Inaugural Richard Holbrooke Lecture on a Broad Vision of US-China Relations in the 21st Century, Washington, State Department, 14 January 2011.
23 The White House, Remarks by President Obama and President Hu of the People’s Republic of China in an Exchange of Toasts at State Dinner, 19 January 2011; Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People’s Republic of China, ibid.