Both Japan, China and Korea are bilateral destinations. It will be his first trip to the region full of economic dynamism notwithstanding the global crisis. It will also be a meeting with the US’ main creditors that keep the dollar floating by buying more. The visit will provide a possibility to give cooperation with China a new solid footing without turning it into a G2 and thereby alienating the US’ other partners. And finally, it will be a chance to discuss North Korea. Will Obama bring new messages to engage North Korea?
On North Korea, Obama’s trip is likely to contain the following ingredients; A message of engagement to North Korea by dispatching Bosworth at a later date. A reconfirmation of the military alliance with both Japan and South Korea concerning the threat from a nuclear and missile-armed North Korea. A wish to see China to doing more on North Korea. And a discussion of the desirability of a grand bargain with North Korea as outlined by Lee Myung-bak of South Korea.
As I outlined in an earlier article, Obama is caught in dilemmas with North Korea. Obama wants to speak with the enemy both also to listen to his allies. Obama will bring along a message of engagement with North Korea and enter the black hole of negotiations with North Korea. The remaining question is if he will come out more successful than his predecessors.
Yet the engagement is still going to be confined to bilateral talks with the aim of restarting multilateral talks in the Six-Party process. That means that the Special Representative, Stephen Bosworth will travel to Pyongyang. The informal understanding is that there will be no more than two independent meetings. This is done in order to respect the US’ allies so that Japan and South Korea do not feel alienated from the process and because the results obtained with North Korea in the previous negotiations were enshrined in the framework of the Six Party talks.
So the US can’t stay in the bilateral loop for too long. In that context, it was seen as a positive development that Wen brought back a message from Pyongyang that North Korea will return to multilateral negotiations if there is sufficient progress in the bilateral track. It might be a mirage. The fine print says that Kim was more exactly stating that the renewed negotiations could be multilateral talks and not necessary Six Party talks and could be in different formats with 4, 5 or 6 participants. North Korea has previously declared the Six Party talks dead. DPRK might offer to reengage in a four-party process thereby potentially excluding one or two of US’ allies. Not very palatable to the US – yet true to the promise to Wen of reengaging multilaterally. North Korea will know as in earlier occasion to play this game well. And the US will be vulnerable because of the ambition to show results from engagement.
Obama’s second dilemma is regarding principles versus pragmatism. It also comes in full play with North Korea. Obama made his far-sighted speech in Prague in April on a nuclear-free world. The Nobel Prize was also awarded on that visionary background. Obama’s pragmatic and engaging side is therefore more constrained with a nuclear transgressor dreaming of becoming the Israel of North East Asia. Here he has to show resolve and principles in action.
Compare it with Burma where he is able to meet with the leaders of the regime, which he is intending to do in the up-coming ASEAN-summit in Singapore. The difference is that regime only hides bad behaviour towards its citizens and not nuclear weapons. So restarting talks with Nort Korea from anywhere else than where the Six-Party process halted and with irreversible progress will make Obama look as caving in on principles.
Lee Myung-bak is likely to make Obama talk of the possibility of a grand bargain of economic aid for nuclear disarmament with North Korea during his stay in Seoul. Everybody would like to see that happen. In practice, it is easier to offer yet it has been impossible to carry through. Earlier negotiations show that North Korea consistently harken back to an action-for-action principle. It might also be the way for the US and partners to actually check up on on-going compliance.
‘We are not in talks for talks’ sake,’ Jeff Bader, the NSC official said at a press briefing before Obama’s trip. ‘We are not interested in buying Yongbyon for a third time. We are not interested in indulging North Korea’s dream of validation as a self-proclaimed nuclear power.’ Yet that is precisely what Kim is going to offer although repacked in a new form. This administration is not dead-intent – like Bush was under the last phase with chief negotiator Hill – on creating a quick legacy. It can still wait. Yet so can North Korea. The destabilising effect on the region and the non-proliferation regime is the real time pressure for the US.