The Obama administration now confronts a historical crossroads in Asia that could shape the United States’ international standing for decades. How well the president fares in Japan, China, South Korea and at the APEC summit in Singapore may determine if Washington can recapture some of its influence which was damaged by the Bush administration’s regional indifference. If things go badly, the U.S. could become marginalized in arguably the most economically and strategically dynamic region in the world.

Obama’s initial stop will be in an increasingly turbulent Japan. Traditionally one of America’s most stable allies, it has now elected an uncharacteristically populist government that threatens to revise long-standing basing arrangements for U.S. military personnel and to shift the country’s foreign policy away from privileging the U.S. alliance toward adopting a distinctly regionalist posture. The President must convince Prime Minister Hatoyama that shared ideals of nuclear disarmament and regional prosperity cannot be realized independently of a viable U.S.-Japan security relationship. Hatoyama’s determination to put an end to Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, his ambiguity over Japanese contributions to peacebuilding in Afghanistan and his initial East Asia Community proposal that appeared to exclude U.S. membership (since modified to accommodate possible American involvement) all appear to compromise this objective.

Sino-American relations have become the key factor for Asian stability. Obama’s visit to China following his stop in Japan will reinforce this point. The most immediate issues to be raised with China’s leaders relate to managing the global economy, cooperating on nuclear proliferation (especially in respect of North Korea and Iran), coordinating climate change policies and a dialogue on human rights.

Harder and more substantive long-term issues are likely to be underplayed in talks with his Chinese counterparts. China’s military modernization and power projection are reconstituting Asia’s balance of power. Convincing China’s leaders to assert greater authority over a conservative and powerful military will not be easy but is a precondition for avoiding future regional conflicts. Other geopolitical concerns between Washington and Beijing include coordinating their respective approaches to stability in central and southern Asia; addressing security differences in the East and South China Seas, and reaching common ground on managing North Korea once Kim Jong-il departs the scene. Without systematically addressing these longer-range contingencies, no amount of photo opportunities or oratory involving America’s popular young president will overcome looming problems in this most critical bilateral relationship.

The Obama administration’s recent decision to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and its assistance to Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand in building up their capabilities to neutralise terrorist movements are positive and substantive indicators of greater U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. The APEC summit could be a catalyst for the United States to relinquish its tendency to exercise uncompromising asymmetrical security politics via its bilateral alliance network. This outcome remains unlikely, however, when U.S.-Japan security ties are fragile and U.S.-China differences remain acute.

South Korea is Obama’s last stop on his Asian visit. His discussions with South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, will occur soon after a naval skirmish between the two Koreas along their contested western sea border. Prior to this, North Korea’s relations with the U.S. had been warming and Washington had planned to dispatch a special envoy to Pyongyang as a means of reconstituting the Six Party Talks on North Korean nuclear disarmament. Following the naval incident, U.S. Secretary-of-State Clinton announced that visit would still go ahead. This is consistent with Obama’s diplomatic style of engaging potential adversaries rather than confronting them.

U.S. conservatives argue that this is the wrong course if American power is to be respected and American influence is to be sustained in Asia. They argue that ‘engagement without reciprocity’ will enhance Chinese power and alienate U.S. allies. This premise ignores evidence that the Bush administration was guilty of imperial overstretch and accelerated the decline of U.S. power in the region. The mark of enduring international influence is a great power knowing when to engage or disengage strategically and when to negotiate judiciously. Obama has staked his presidency’s foreign policy success on that principle. What happens in Asia this week may vindicate or discredit his approach.