Additionally, regional neighbours can benefit from cooperating in areas such as trade and investment, financial regulation, technology transfer, educational exchange, irrigation, disaster relief, and sea lane security.
Today, East Asia and the Asia-Pacific are home to a complicated ecosystem of diverse regional bodies. Collectively, they have the potential to contribute greatly to any future East Asian Community. However, these often (but not always) have overlapping memberships: ASEAN as formed in 1967, but did not include the countries of Northeast Asia. Subsequently, we saw the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Community forum (APEC) as a multilateral economic body and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for security cooperation. Both of these pan-Pacific multilateral bodies included not only countries geographically in East Asia but others, such as the United States. At least one other body is not mentioned frequently enough in discussions of East Asian Community building, namely the Six-Party process aimed at dealing with nculear problems on the Korean peninsula.
In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis and the disdain for multilateralism shown by the Bush Administration, Asian governments, spurred by ASEAN, invested considerable organisational effort in institutions developed for Asians only: the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) and the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT). APT was subsequently supplemented by the creation of a more inclusive body, the East Asia Summit which added India, New Zealand and Australia.
East Asia does not need more institutions. The region has a plethora of such bodies that currently are weaving linkages across national boundaries. At this point in time, East Asian governments must focus on generating more conspicuous results instead of more meetings. Process can be critical in enhancing mutual trust and at socialising members into more commonly accepted frameworks for addressing particular problems.
A sense of community is not a prerequisite for cooperation. Various successes are today being achieved in numerous areas such as: the environmental problems of yellow sand and acid rain from China; forest burnings in Indonesia; and avian flu prevention across the region. Expanding the number and reach of such cooperative ventures should be the building blocks for an East Asian Community. Open regionalism has been a mantra of many, but not all of the architects of East Asian regional bodies. Yet, the broader global economic, environmental and security problems should not be ignored in favour of some hermetic isolation of the future East Asian Community.
East Asia’s current institutional architecture is intensely complicated, with highly porous boundaries and likely to undergo what I have called ‘Institutional Darwinism’, namely a process whereby those institutions that prove to be effective will survive while those that fail to do much will wither into irrelevance and disappear. For the moment, more is better than few and community can be generated piecemeal from various mini-successes in many different venues.
Different members of any community bring their divergent strengths to the forging of collective success. Japan is well-poised to provide technical, financial and organisational leadership in an East Asian Community due to its large level of resources and expertise. In addition to sixty-plus years of political democracy, rule of law, and minimal military muscle flexing at its neighbour’s expense add to the country’s appeal.
At the same time, the country’s leaders must recognise that despite its post-war record of achievements Japan’s image across the region is often quite negative. Only when Japan deals more forthrightly with the record of its pre-war and wartime past will this mistrust be replaced.
Considerable scepticism remains in Japan about the country’s long term ability to cooperate with China in areas beyond trade and investment. Both countries continue to manoeuvre to enhance their potential influence in any emerging regional community. It will not be easy for Japan (given its twenty years of slow economic growth and scepticism about China’s long term intentions) to regain the national self-confidence to engage China not simply as a competitor but periodically as an ally in community building.
Finally, at least as much as the region as a whole, Japan has global and not just regional, interests. Not all of the critical issues facing Japan can be dealt with on a regional level and surely its longstanding ties to the US should not be jettisoned in some false belief that they can effectively be replaced by tighter ties with Asia. Japan must find the right balance between being part of Asia and remaining part of the West. It needs to keep one foot firmly planted in each. It needs to participate in more than one community.
T J Pempel is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at University of California, Berkeley.
The US at the time were the greatest economic powerhouse with a virtual monopoly of capital, corporate expertise and business models desired by most developing Asian countries at the timer as well as moral legitimacy.
I was a young expatriate manager working for a US multinational at the time and benefited from its skilful “can do” pragmatism of its culture.
Then equally over achievers from Japan had their day in the sun underpinned by their government strategic funding and investment targeting the region.
The US corporate model today as well as its economy is not the same as the US that I used to admire and emulate.
Unfortunately, the life and product cycle of birth followed senescence then death applies to the US, Japan and even a future China in the goodness of time.
The Asian countries are in a better position to internally negotiate the solutions towards new regional architectures suitable to their needs and realities.
Both the industrialising and developing countries have transformed their conservative and formerly debilitated colonised community and hybridised to improve their future prospects.
The East Asian countries (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) will re-examine their national interests by re-calibrating economic priorities with regard to opportunities presented by China and the US.
In this light the US base in Okinawa is a running sore causing decades of social grief for locals in Okinawa.
Unfortunately, during this period of decade old geo-political and relative economic power the US strategy remains rooted in military ascendancy and China containment that is symbolised by the bases in Okinawa.
It is also true to state many Asian countries fear a potential regional structure without mitigating mechanisms to modulate China ascendancy.
In time Asia will conceive a solution in which the US will have a role.
In my view, the US should re-evaluate its military based geo-strategic ideology and its definition of national interest in light of its recent failure as a role model.
It’s present hubris and vision of hegemony based on its notionally insolvent economy is unsustainable and does not contribute long term solutions to peace.
China for the next few decades requires peace to facilitate their transition towards a modern technologically sophisticated nation.
Japan faces adaptation challenges and need China and security.
Taiwan will become increasingly part of China.
China will make concessions to be Japan and Taiwan that is agreeable to all.
The problem of potential oil reservoir sharing between China and neighbours will be negotiated.
Why? – because Asian countries have co-existed for millennia and for millennia into the future.
They are no longer kingdoms but nation states living within an interlinked ‘eco-system?
Singapore is an examplar of a City State born of hostility in their neighbourhood to become a now valued Asean member.
The US and Australia need to find a role contributing towards value adding within the region rather than an “insurance policy”
Your insightful comments “East Asia encompasses vastly different political and economic systems. Religious and cultural cleavages are often deep and divisive, unresolved territorial conflicts are numerous, and several of the world’s most powerful nation-states have competing interests in the region”.
The period from the 1960’s thru to 1970’s witnessed the leading role played by US corporations followed then eclipsed by Japanese Zaibatsu’s then Taiwan etc.
Both the US and Japan at the time broadly contributed much needed funding and role models during their respective “ascendancies” in the region.
The US at the time were the greatest economic powerhouse with a virtual monopoly of capital, corporate expertise and business models desired by most developing Asian countries at the timer as well as moral legitimacy.
I was a young expatriate manager working for a US multinational at the time and benefited from its skilful “can do” pragmatism of its culture.
Then equally over achievers from Japan had their day in the sun underpinned by their government strategic funding and investment targeting the region.
The US corporate model today as well as its economy is not the same as the US that I used to admire and emulate.
Unfortunately, the life and product cycle of birth followed senescence then death applies to the US, Japan and even a future China in the goodness of time.
The Asian countries are in a better position to internally negotiate the solutions towards new regional architectures suitable to their needs and realities.
Both the industrialising and developing countries have transformed their conservative and formerly debilitated colonised community and hybridised to improve their future prospects.
The East Asian countries (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) will re-examine their national interests by re-calibrating economic priorities with regard to opportunities presented by China and the US.
In this light the US base in Okinawa is a running sore causing decades of social grief for locals in Okinawa.
Unfortunately, during this period of decade old geo-political and relative economic power the US strategy remains rooted in military ascendancy and China containment that is symbolised by the bases in Okinawa.
It is also true to state many Asian countries fear a potential regional structure without mitigating mechanisms to modulate China ascendancy.
In time Asia will conceive a solution in which the US will have a role.
In my view, the US should re-evaluate its military based geo-strategic ideology and its definition of national interest in light of its recent failure as a role model.
It’s present hubris and vision of hegemony based on its notionally insolvent economy is unsustainable and does not contribute long term solutions to peace.
China for the next few decades requires peace to facilitate their transition towards a modern technologically sophisticated nation.
Japan faces adaptation challenges and need China and security.
Taiwan will become increasingly part of China.
China will make concessions to be Japan and Taiwan that is agreeable to all.
The problem of potential oil reservoir sharing between China and neighbours will be negotiated.
Why? – because Asian countries have co-existed for millennia and millennia into the future.
They are no longer kingdoms but nation states living within an interlinked ‘eco-system?
Singapore is an examplar of a City State born of hostility in their neighbourhood to become a now valued Asean member.
The US and Australia need to find a role contributing towards value adding within the region rather than an “insurance policy”